State v. Beardsley

• Decision Date: 07 July 1922
• Citation: 84 Fla. 109,94 So. 660
• Parties: STATE et al. v. BEARDSLEY et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

94 So. 660

84 Fla. 109

STATE et al. v. BEARDSLEY et al.

Florida Supreme Court

July 7, 1922

Suit by the State of Florida and the County of St. Johns against William H. Beardsley and others, as executors and trustees under the will of Henry M. Flagler, deceased. From an order sustaining a general demurrer to the bill, the plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

See also, 77 Fla. 803, 82 So. 794.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Valid assessments essential to enforce payment of ad valorem property tax. A valid assessment of property for taxation is an essential foundation to enforce the payment of an ad valorem tax thereon by the instrumentalities provided by law for such purpose.

State may collect on taxable property which has escaped taxation for previous years through error. A state, by appropriate legislation and action thereunder, may when no injustice is done, reach backward and collect taxes upon taxable property which has escaped taxation for previous years through the mistake or error of the assessor or the failure of the owner to return it for taxation.

Power to tax escaped property for preceding years must be given by statute. Statutory authority must exist to sustain the assessment of property for taxation for preceding years in which such property has escaped taxation.

Intent of valid statute is law, ascertainable by language and purpose of enactment. The intent of a valid statute is the law, and this is ascertained by a consideration of the language and purpose of the enactment.

Where legislative intent clearly manifested by terms, rules of construction unnecessary and inapplicable. Where the legislative intent is clearly manifest by the language used considered in its ordinary and grammatical sense, rules of construction are unnecessary and inapplicable.

Where ambiguous and uncertain, legislative intent ascertained by consideration of entire act and others in pari materia. Where there is ambiguity and uncertainty in the meaning of the words employed in a statute, the legislative intent should be ascertained by a consideration of the entire act and of others in pari materia, and appropriate effect should be given to all the material portions of the law, so as to effectuate as far as possible the intent of the lawmakers.

In construction of taxation statutes, intention of Legislature to bring clearly within it everything intended to be embraced presumed. In the construction of statutes relative to taxation, it is fairly and justly presumable that the Legislature has so shaped the law as, without ambiguity or doubt, to bring within it everything that was intended to be embraced.

Law providing for assessment and collection of escaped personal property tax held not to authorize assessment in 1919 for years 1914 to 1917, inclusive. The provisions of section 37 c. 5596, Acts of 1907, considered and held not to authorize the assessment of personal property in 1919 for the years 1914 to 1917, inclusive, though such property may have improperly escaped taxation for such years.

No law in 1919 authorizing assessment of personal property for any year prior to 1918, although improperly escaping taxation. No authority, statutory or otherwise, existed in this state in 1919 which authorized the assessment of personal property in 1919 for any year prior to 1918, though such property may have improperly escaped taxation for such previous year or years. George Couper Gibbs, Judge. Gorge Couper Gibbs, Judge.

COUNSEL

George W. Bassett, Jr., and David R. Dunham, both of St. Augustine, and George C. Bedell, of Jacksonville, and Rivers Buford, Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Scott M. Loftin and Robert H. Anderson, both of Jacksonville, for appellees.

OPINION

LOVE Circuit Judge.

Suit was brought by the state of Florida and the county of St. Johns against William H. Beardsley, William R. Kenan, Jr., and W. A. Blount, as executors, and as trustees under the will of Henry M. Flagler, deceased, by bill in chancery, filed in the circuit court of St. Johns county, wherein the complainants sought to enforce an alleged tax lien upon personal property, arising, as it is stated in said bill, from an assessment for taxes of certain personal property of the estate of Henry M. Flagler, in the hands of his executors, which assessment was made by the tax assessor of said county in 1919, for the years 1914, 1915, 1916, and 1917, and which property was omitted from the tax assessment rolls of said county for said years.

From the allegations of the bill, it appears that Henry M. Flagler for many years prior to, and at the time of his death, was a citizen of the state of Florida and a resident of St. Johns county; that his last will and testament was duly probated in the court of the county judge of said county, and letters testamentary duly issued therefrom; that an inventory and appraisal of the personal property of the deceased was duly made and filed in said court; that the personal property of the estate of the said Henry M. Flagler, held by his executors, was in June, 1919, discovered by the tax assessor of St. Johns county to have been omitted from the tax assessment rolls of the county for the years 1914, 1915, 1916, and 1917, and thereupon he proceeded to assess such property for the years in which it had not been assessed as alleged. The completion of the tax assessment roll for 1919, its approval by the board of county commissioners, and delivery to the tax collector for St. Johns county, are alleged to have been done in the manner required by statute, and are set out in detail. Further, it is alleged that the tax collector has been unable to collect the taxes assessed in 1919 for the years 1914 to 1917, inclusive, which taxes are charged to be valid liens on the property so held by the executors, and are enforceable only in a court of chancery.

To this bill a general demurrer for want of equity was filed by the defendants and sustained by the circuit judge hearing the cause. From this order the complainants have appealed.

The first and principal question presented by the record in this case is whether or not there was any legal authority for the assessment for taxation of personal property for past years in which such property had escaped taxation, either through the mistake or error of the tax assessor or his failure to discover it, or through the failure of the owner to return it for taxation.

We may assume as settled law that, in order to enforce the payment of an ad valorem tax, through and by means of the instrumentalities provided by law, there must first be a valid assessment of the property upon which such tax is attempted to be imposed. McKeown v. Collins, 38 Fla. 276, 21 So. 103; Nail v. Browning, 73 Fla. 316, 74 So. 315; Florida East Coast Fruit Land Co. v. Mitchell, 80 Fla. 291, 85 So. 661.

That a state may, by appropriate legislation and action thereunder, reach backward and collect taxes upon taxable property which has escaped taxation for a given year or years through the mistake or error of the assessor or the failure or neglect of the owner to return it, is well settled in this state and elsewhere. Wade v. Murrhee, 75 Fla. 494, 78 So. 536.

This last-cited case intimates (without actually so deciding, the point not being presented for determination), and the great weight of authority holds that, in the absence of statute, back assessments for previous years on omitted property are not authorized. Pierson v. Minnehaha County, 28 S.D. 534, 134 N.W. 212, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 261, and cases therein cited. Additional cases holding this proposition are State v. Cage (Tex. Civ. App.) 176 S.W. 928; Perry County v. Selma, M. & M. R. Co., 58 Ala. 546; Ashland County v. Knight, 129 Wis. 63, 108 N.W. 208.

We have been cited to only one case apparently holding to the contrary, Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass. 230, 3 Am. Dec. 131, which was decided with reference to a statute requiring a school district tax to be assessed in 30 days after the clerk of the district should certify to the assessors the sum to be raised. This case was subsequently distinguished and limited, as to this point, in Eames v. Johnson, 4 Allen (Mass.) 382, holding that a highway tax cannot be assessed after the term in which it is made the duty of the assessor to assess it, though the court, after adverting to Pond v. Negus, and stating that it was decided under a different statute, admitted that it was----

'obnoxious to the objuction of allowing a tax to be assessed after the term in which it was made the duty of the assessors to assess the same, and we are not disposed to extend it.'

As this point was not discussed in Pond v. Negus, but seems to have been assumed as a matter of course, and as this case is opposed to the great weight of authority on this point, if not to practically all the other cases determining such question, it is neither enlightening nor persuasive. Expressions in Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass. 144, seemingly opposed to our holding, are merely obiter dicta.

From the permises it follows that to sustain the assessment of property for taxation for past years in which such property has escaped taxation, statutory authority must exist. On behalf of appellants it is contended that section 37, chapter 5596, Acts of 1907, confers such authority, and it is upon such authority that they principally rely to sustain the assessment under consideration. Unless it does, then this suit must fail.

Before attempting to ascertain the extent and meaning of this section, a consideration of some of the other provisions of the act in question may be of assistance in construing and interpreting its language, for, as it was said by this court in State ex rel. Triay v. Burr, 79 Fla. 290, 84 So. 61:

'The intent of a valid statute is the law, and

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