State v. Beaty, 6643

Decision Date05 May 1988
Docket NumberNo. 6643,6643
Citation158 Ariz. 232,762 P.2d 519
PartiesSTATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Donald Edward BEATY, Appellant.
CourtArizona Supreme Court

Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer III, R. Wayne Ford, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender by Stephen M.R. Rempe, Edward F. McGee, Asst. Deputies Maricopa County Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant.

CAMERON, Justice.

I. JURISDICTION

Defendant Donald Edward Beaty appeals from verdicts and judgments of guilt for the crimes of first-degree murder (A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1)) and sexual assault (A.R.S. § 13-1406). Defendant also seeks review of the denial of his petition for post conviction relief, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6 § 5(3) and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, -4033, and -4035.

II. QUESTIONS

We must answer the following issues:

1. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO DR. O'CONNOR BECAUSE:

a. The statements were protected by the physician-patient privilege?

b. The statements were not voluntarily made?

c. The statements were made in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1062, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)?

2. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO BAR THE ADMISSION OF PHOSPHOGLUCOMUTASE (PGM) TEST RESULTS?

3. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR UNDER A.R.S. § 13-703(D) IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY?

4. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN CONSIDERING VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE AT THE SENTENCING PHASE OF THE TRIAL?

5. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR MURDER AND SEXUAL ASSAULT?

6. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY FAILING TO STATE ON THE RECORD OR IN ITS SPECIAL VERDICT THAT IT FOUND THE EXISTENCE OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS TO HAVE BEEN PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT?

7. IS ARIZONA'S DEATH PENALTY STATUTE A.R.S. § 13-703 UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE:

a. The statute fails to require the trial court to support its findings in the special verdict?

b. The statute fails to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors?

c. The statute mandates that a death sentence be imposed whenever the court finds one aggravating and no mitigating circumstances regardless of the trial court's belief that a death sentence is unwarranted under the facts of the case?

d. The statute allows inadequate standards to be utilized by the trial court in balancing aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances?

e. The appellant is denied his sixth amendment right to a jury trial on the issues of the existence or nonexistence of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances as well as on the issue of the propriety of a death sentence?

8. WAS THE DEATH PENALTY IN THIS CASE PROPORTIONAL TO OTHER DEATH SENTENCES FOR CRIMES OF A LIKE NATURE?

9. WAS DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF DUE TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL PROPERLY DENIED?

III. FACTS

The victim, Christy Ann Fornoff, a 13-year-old female newscarrier for the Phoenix Gazette, disappeared on 9 May 1984 while attempting to collect her newspaper accounts at the Rock Point Apartments in Tempe, Arizona. The victim's mother had accompanied her and waited outside the apartment complex while the victim went inside. The victim did not return. A search of the apartment complex took place. The victim's collection book was discovered by a fence near the complex, but the victim was not found.

Two days later, Donald Edward Beaty, the defendant and resident maintenance manager at the apartment, reported to the Tempe police that he had found the victim's body near a trash container in the parking lot of the apartment complex. The body was wrapped in a white sheet. Evidence was collected, including pubic hairs and fibers that were consistent with the pubic hairs of the defendant and fibers found in the apartment of the defendant. There was also a vomit-like substance on the victim's face and the sheet which matched vomit found in defendant's apartment. From the autopsy it appeared that the victim lost consciousness due to asphyxiation and never regained it before she died. The autopsy also indicated that the victim was sexually assaulted either contemporaneous with or shortly after death.

Defendant's first trial began 29 January 1985 and ended on 18 March 1985 with a mistrial when the jury was unable to arrive at a unanimous verdict. The defendant's second trial began on 8 May 1985 and ended on 20 June 1985. Retrial involved most of the same evidence presented in the first trial, some additional evidence and the testimony of Dr. George O'Connor, given over defendant's objection.

The jury convicted defendant of one count of first-degree murder and one count of sexual assault. The trial judge imposed the death penalty for murder finding one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances. A.R.S. § 13-703. The judge also imposed an aggravated, enhanced sentence of 28 years imprisonment for the sexual assault. The court then ordered that the latter be served consecutively to the sentence imposed on the murder count. At the sentencing phase of the trial, the judge received victim impact statements from various sources.

After filing a notice of appeal, the defendant filed a petition for post conviction relief, pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The appeal was stayed pending the outcome of the Rule 32 proceeding. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.4(a)(1). The trial court denied relief and defendant petitioned this court for review. The appeal and the petition for review were consolidated pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.4(b)(2).

IV. ISSUES

1. ADMISSIBILITY OF DR. O'CONNOR'S TESTIMONY

Dr. O'Connor is a psychiatrist employed by the Maricopa County Jail which houses adult inmates. He first contacted the defendant shortly after his arrest as part of a routine check on the prisoners. Dr. O'Connor referred the defendant for orthopedic surgery on his foot and prescribed pain medication. No major psychiatric problems were noted.

In August, the defendant was transferred from the main jail to the hospital unit at Durango. The transfer was made partly because prison officials thought that his foot would heal better at Durango, where he would have access to an outside yard where he could exercise. Dr. Jack Potts, also a psychiatrist, was to be his treating physician for the foot injury. The move was also made to put him in an area where his safety could be better protected because he was being harassed by other prisoners at the main jail.

Defendant was not transferred to receive psychiatric treatment. Even though the Durango facility offered group therapy sessions and individual counseling sessions on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, defendant did not attend these sessions.

The defendant did, however, participate in group counseling sessions involving five women and four other men on Tuesdays and Thursdays. The purpose of these sessions was to see if by bringing prisoners closer together they would not see each other as sex objects, but rather as human beings and become more respectful toward one another. The facility had previously had problems with inmates creating disturbances by yelling profanities back and forth. The defendant was asked to volunteer because he had been displaying adolescent-type behavior toward the female inmates. The group was experimental and organized as a research project for Dr. O'Connor, although the leaders hoped it would be beneficial to the participants. Dr. O'Connor testified that he was not treating the defendant in particular during the sessions. Rather, it was a group activity for all ten people. Testimony during the trial revealed that:

A. [By Dr. O'Connor] In the jail, most of the male inmates tend to become extremely lax in their attitudes, especially their behavior when they are around female staff members, personnel and other female inmates that they may meet going back and forth to Court. They can get quite vulgar and profane.

It was our hope to experiment and see if we brought them into a closer proximity, closer contact, that they could then start to have a feeling that, indeed, that that was not simply a sex object over there but a human being, and become more respectful.

What we were hoping to show was that the consequence to that type of group activity, there [would] be a great assemblance of respect and dignity in our unit, and we were hoping to extrapolate that to the entire jail.

* * *

* * *

Q. [By Mr. Thurston] Your testimony is that it was or wasn't treatment? What were you treating Mr. Beaty for?

A. I wasn't treating Mr. Beaty in particular at that particular time. It was a group activity for all ten of the people.

Prior to participating in this group counseling, the defendant signed a document entitled:

"Interpersonal Relationships Group Contract"

Please read the following guidelines and sign below.

1. I will attend each group meeting unless I have other "official" committments e.g. court because I am an important part of this group; I AM this group.

2. I have the ability to observe my own behavior; I can distinguish my actions as [appropriate] or inappropriate. Should I choose to behave inappropriately, I will be asked to leave the group.

3. I understand that all group communication is confidential and therefore group business cannot be discussed outside of group. Only in this way can I feel free to express my feelings.

4. I am committed to myself, and therefore to this group to learning about myself, my feelings and my behavior about relationships. I understand that growth will come from examining my thoughts, feelings and behavior in my relationships. Finally I accept the responsibility of being good to myself.

I, Donald E. Beaty have read the guidelines...

To continue reading

Request your trial
130 cases
  • Lewis v. Jeffers
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • June 27, 1990
    ..."depraved" "are considered disjunctive; the presence of any one of three factors is an aggravating circumstance." State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 242, 762 P.2d 519, 529 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3200, 105 L.Ed.2d 708 (1989). It is therefore more accurate to characterize t......
  • Walton v. Arizona
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • June 27, 1990
    ...terms are considered disjunctive; the presence of any one of three factors is an aggravating circumstance." State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 242, 762 P.2d 519, 529 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3200, 105 L.Ed.2d 708 (1989). At the sentencing phase in the present case, the Stat......
  • State v. West
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • September 30, 1993
    ...on the relevant sentencing factors and to set aside the irrelevant, the inflammatory, and the emotional factors. State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 244, 762 P.2d 519, 531 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3200, 105 L.Ed.2d 708 (1989); see also Fierro, 166 Ariz. at 548, 804 P.2d at E......
  • State v. Fierro
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • December 18, 1990
    ...to focus on the relevant sentencing factors and to set aside the irrelevant, the inflammatory, and the emotional factors." 158 Ariz. 232, 244, 762 P.2d 519, 531 (1988). Fierro presented no evidence of the trial court's bias or prejudice in this case. Unless there is evidence to the contrary......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
12 books & journal articles
  • Privilege
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Is It Admissible? Part I. Testimonial Evidence
    • May 1, 2022
    ...49 In Arizona, for example, a state statute governing doctor-patient privilege treats the psychiatrist just as a doctor. State v. Beaty , 762 P.2d 519 (1988) . 50 United States v. Talley , 790 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1986). 51 Cunningham v. Southlake Center for Mental Health, Inc ., 125 F.R.D. ......
  • Privilege
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Is It Admissible? - 2015 Part I - Testimonial Evidence
    • July 31, 2015
    ...46 In Arizona, for example, a state statute governing doctor-patient privilege treats the psychiatrist just as a doctor. State v. Beaty , 762 P.2d 519 (1988) . 47 United States v. Talley , 790 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1986). §9.504 Is It Admissible? 9-186 Psychotherapy is another matter. What co......
  • Privilege
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Is It Admissible? - 2017 Testimonial evidence
    • July 31, 2017
    ...46 In Arizona, for example, a state statute governing doctor-patient privilege treats the psychiatrist just as a doctor. State v. Beaty , 762 P.2d 519 (1988) . 47 United States v. Talley , 790 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1986). 48 Cunningham v. Southlake Center for Mental Health, Inc ., 125 F.R.D. ......
  • Privilege
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Is It Admissible? - 2014 Part I - Testimonial Evidence
    • July 31, 2014
    ...46 In Arizona, for example, a state statute governing doctor-patient privilege treats the psychiatrist just as a doctor. State v. Beaty , 762 P.2d 519 (1988) . 47 United States v. Talley , 790 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1986). 9-27 Privilege §9.504 Psychotherapy is another matter. What constitutes......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT