State v. Beckman
| Decision Date | 29 December 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 19676,No. R-1,R-1,19676 |
| Parties | STATE of Colorado, Plaintiff in Error, v. Irwin BECKMAN and Daniel J. Shannon, as Justices of the Peace, and Frank M. Stanbro, as Treasurer of the County of Jefferson, State of Colorado, and individually, and The Board of County Commissioners of the County of Jefferson, Jefferson County School District, a quasi-municipal corporation, Intervenor, Defendants in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff in error.
Thomas J. Carney, Golden, J., Fred Schneider, Denver, Roy H. McVicker, Jr., Wheatridge, for defendants in error.
Harold D. Lutz, Arvada, for intervenor.
Reference to the parties to this action will be as follows: the plaintiff State of Colorado as the 'State'; the defendants, the Justices of the Peace, the County Treasurer and the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Jefferson, respectively as 'Justices of the Peace,' 'Treasurer,' and 'Board,' and collectively as the 'County'; and the intervenor Jefferson County School District No. R-1 as the 'School District.'
A three-cornered controversy over the disposition of moneys collected since January 1959 by fines and forfeitures of bail by Justices of the Peace for violations of C.R.S. '53, 13-3 and 13-4 () resulted in a judgment favorable to the County. The State seeks reversal, and a direction from this court that judgment enter in its favor for fifty percent of such fines and forfeitures. The School District asks for a revision of the judgment to the effect that it is entitled to all fines and forfeitures collected by such Justices of the Peace.
Each suitor points to certain statutory provisions as a vindication of its position: the State relies upon C.R.S. '53, 13-3-36 and 13-4-133, the Board upon C.R.S. '53, 13-2-16 and 79-15-16, and the School District upon C.R.S. '53, 123-3-3. Finding internal conflict in the motor vehicle laws as expressed in C.R.S. '53, 13-3-36, 13-4-133 and 13-2-16 making reconciliation insoluble, the trial court held these sections to be 'void and inoperative.' It also found C.R.S. '53, 123-3-3 invalid, apparently on the ground of confusing conflict regarding the disposition of fines and forfeitures collected by the Justices of the Peace. The trial court thereupon held that the 'original organic act,' C.R.S. '53, 79-15-16, was effectual and operative, and by virtue thereof declared that all such fines and forfeitures were payable to the County Treasurer.
The basic Justice of the Peace Act was passed in 1861 and has been continually re-enacted unchanged up to the present. It is now entitled C.R.S. '53, 79-15-16:
C.R.S. '53, 123-3-3, upon which the School District bases its claim, was enacted an 1876 as part of the school law first codified as G.L. § 2514:
* * *' (Emphasis supplied.)
This law remained unchanged until codified in 1935 as C.S.A. 146, § 34. The words 'this act' were changed to read 'this law.' Finally, when enacted as 123-3-3, C.R.S. '53, the important word 'this' was omitted entirely. Another change was effected by the revision. The exceptions appearing in Section 2514, quoted above, were changed by a period after the word 'committed' and the commencement of a new sentence beginning 'The clear proceeds of all fines,' etc.
Statutes must be construed in pari materia and if possible be reconciled. Generally a specific statute prevails over a general one. Burton v. City and County of Denver, 99 Colo. 207, 61 P.2d 856, 107 A.L.R. 564. Adoption of the rule enunciated in Creacy v. Industrial Commission, 148 Colo. ----, 366 P.2d 384, that the retention in substantial form and wording of prior laws in the Colorado Revised Statutes 1953 works a continuation of such laws and not a new enactment, requires the construction of C.R.S. '53, 123-3-3 with the word 'this' and the words 'except as otherwise provided by law * * * the clear proceeds of all fines collected within the several counties of the state for breach of the penal laws,' etc., included as still part of the law.
As so construed, two limitations are present: (1) the act relates only to fines, penalties and forfeitures provided by this act which pertains to schools; and (2) since there are, as will hereinafter appear, exceptions otherwise provided by law, C.R.S. '53, 123-3-3, becomes inapplicable to this case.
In 1931, as Chapter 122, the Uniform Motor Vehicle Act was passed. All fines imposed under the provisions of this act were to be credited to the County Fund:
'All magistrates, Justices of the Peace or other officers imposing or receiving fines and penalties collected under the provisions of this Act shall transmit all moneys so collected to the Treasurer of the County to be credited to the general fund of the County.' L. 31, Ch. 122, Sec. 18.
This original act had five parts: Part I, Motor Vehicle Department; Part II, Registration; Part III, Operators and Chauffeur's Licenses; Part IV, Operation of Vehicles on the Highway; Part V, Coordination. Section 18 of Part I directs moneys collected as a result of fines to be turned over to the County General Fund.
In 1935, as Chapter 164, Parts III and IV of the 1931 act were amended and further broken down into articles. Section 42(c) provides that fines collected for violations of this act are to be sent 50% to State and 50% to County Fund. Section 42 is in Part III. We quote Section 42(c):
'All fines and forfeitures collected upon conviction or upon forfeitures of bail of any person charged with any violation of any of the provisions of this Act constituting a misdemeanor or felony shall be disposed of in the following manner.
(Emphasis supplied.) L. 35, Ch. 164, Sec. 42(c).
Section 172 of Part IV requires a similar disposition of funds collected under provisions of the act:
'(a) All fines and forfeitures collected upon conviction or upon forfeiture of bail of any person charged with any violations of the provisions of this Act constituting a misdemeanor or felony shall be disposed of in the following manner:
'Any Justice of the Peace * * * shall forward within ten days of any conviction within his court, fifty (50) percentum of the fine so collected to the Motor Vehicle Department; the Motor Vehicle Department shall within (10) days pay such moneys to the State Treasurer who shall credit such moneys to the State Highway Fund; * * * provided further, the remaining fifty (50) per centum shall be forwarded by the Justice of the Peace * * * to the Treasurer of the county maintaining the court in which such conviction was had and said County Treasurer shall credit the same to the County's 'General Fund' of that respective County.' (Emphasis supplied.) L. 35, Ch. 164, Sec. 172.
Note that this act of 1935 relates only to Parts III and IV of the act of 1931. The word 'act' as therein used must mean Parts III and IV. That the 1935 amendment treats Parts III and IV of the 1931 act, as changed, as separate and distinct appears from the provision that it shall be 'cited as the Uniform Safety Code of 1935,' whereas the entire 1931 act was known as 'The Uniform Motor Vehicle Law.'
The codification of 1935 (...
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