State v. Benavidez
| Decision Date | 06 February 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. A-9081,A-9081 |
| Citation | 365 S.W.2d 638 |
| Parties | The STATE of Texas, Petitioner, v. Ramon A. BENAVIDEZ and 32 Bottles of Beer, Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Will Wilson, Atty. Gen., Austin, Charles R. Lind, Sam R. Wilson, Norman V Suarez and Paul Phy., Asst. Attys. Gen., Stephen L. Haley, County Atty., Seminole, for petitioner.
Arthur G. Smith, Seminole, for respondent.
This is an action brought by the State of Texas to forfeit 32 bottles of beer alleged to be 'illicit beverages' under the Texas Liquor Control Act, Article 666-42, Vernon's Annotated Texas Penal Code. Defendant Benavidez (respondent here) was tried in the county court of Gaines County for the crime of possessing alcoholic beverages in a dry area for the purpose of sale. The jury in that case found respondent not guilty and the county court rendered a judgment of acquittal. Thereafter, the State brought this suit in the district court of Gaines County to declare a forfeiture of the beer. Respondent's defensive pleadings in the forfeiture suit included a plea in bar, in support of which respondent introduced the county court judgment of acquittal. When the State's objection to the introduction of the county court judgment was overruled, the State and respondent entered into an agreed statement in which the parties stipulated the county court judgment and that both would introduce the same evidence as that adduced at the criminal trial on the issue of whether defendant possessed the liquor for purpose of sale or for private consumption. The district court sustained the plea in bar, stating '* * * the court being of the opinion that forfeiture in such cases may be predicated only upon a conviction of the defendant, the State's application for forfeiture is in all things denied and refused * * *.' The case was dismissed without trial on the merits. The Court of Civil Appeals has affirmed. 356 S.W.2d 845.
The State contended in the Court of Civil Appeals that the trial court erred (1) in holding that the county court judgment of acquittal was admissible and (2) in holding that the county court judgment was a bar to the forfeiture suit. The respondent's theory of the case is that the forfeiture proceeding is in fact criminal in nature, though civil in form, and that bar by prior acquittal operates.
The Court of Civil Appeals devoted most of its opinion to the question of admissibility of the county court judgment in the district court forfeture proceeding, holding it to be admissible and summarily holding that it operates as a bar by res judicata or estoppel by judgment. The Court of Civil Appeals overruled respondent's contention that the forfeiture is criminal in nature. The State of Texas is petitioner. Both parties make essentially the same arguments in this court as made in the Court of Civil Appeals.
Article 666-4(b) of the Texas Liquor Control Act provides:
'(b) It shall be unlawful for any person in any dry area to * * * possess for the purpose of sale, * * * any liquor, * * * beer or ale. * * *'
Article 666-3a(4) of the Act defines 'illicit beverage' as:
'(4) 'Illicit Beverage' shall mean and refer to any * * * alcoholic beverage possessed, * * * with intent to manufacture, sell, * * * in violation of the provisions of this Act.'
Article 666-42 authorizes seizure, forfeiture and sale:
'(a) All illicit beverages as defined by this Act * * *, may be seized * * *.
Thus a finding on the fact issue as to whether or not the respondent possessed the beer for the purpose of sale defines both criminal liability (Art. 666-4) and an 'illicit beverage' for purposes of forfeiture under Article 666-42.
There are but two grounds upon which respondent's plea in bar can be sustained: first, bar by prior acquittal. By the express terms of Article 666-42(b) the forfeiture proceeding is made a civil action; suit is brought in the name of the State of Texas against the beverage and not against the owner or possessor. Furthermore, the Texas cases have uniformly held that such forfeiture actions are civil suits. State v. Gray, 141 Tex. 604, 175 S.W.2d 224; State V. Meyers, 328 S.W.2d 321 (Tex.Civ.App. 1959) writ ref'd n. r. e. See also State v. Compton, 142 Tex. 494, 179 S.W.2d 501; Lorance v. State, 172 S.W.2d 386 (Tex.Civ.App. 1943) writ ref'd. Thus the owner or possessor of contraband sought to be forfeited is not being criminally tried in the forfeiture...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kuhl
...(1944); Frierson v. Jenkins, 72 S.C. 341, 51 S.E. 862 (1905); Smith v. Phillips, 43 Tenn.App. 364, 309 S.W.2d 382 (1956); State v. Benavidez, 365 S.W.2d 638 (Tex.1963); Smith v. New Dixie Lines, 201 Va. 466, 111 S.E.2d 434 (1959); Forney v. Morrison, 144 W.Va. 722, 110 S.E.2d 840 (1959); Cf......
-
City of El Paso v. Alvarez
...matter is not res judicata or estoppel by judgment to a subsequent civil action involving that same fact issue. State v. Benavidez, 365 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tex.1963) (forfeiture action); State v. Narvaez, 900 S.W.2d 846, 847-48 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); City of Houston v. Dillo......
-
State Farm v. Carter
...action is not ordinarily admissible evidence in a subsequent civil prosecution involving common fact issues."); State v. Benavidez, 365 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex.1963)("Ordinarily, acquittals in criminal actions are not admissible as evidence in subsequent civil proceedings involving common fact......
-
State v. $217590.00 in U.S. Currency
...in nature. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 274 (1996); State v. Rumfolo, 545 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. 1976); State v. Benavidez, 365 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tex. 1963); see also Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 59.05(b). Texas' forfeiture statute specifically provides that forfeiture cases "shall p......