State v. Bentz

• Decision Date: 26 June 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 1–16–17,1–16–17
• Citation: 2017 Ohio 5483,93 N.E.3d 358
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Justin A. BENTZ, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

93 N.E.3d 358

2017 Ohio 5483

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Justin A. BENTZ, Defendant–Appellant.

NO. 1–16–17

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Allen County.

Date of Decision: June 26, 2017

Eric E. Willison, Hilliard, for Appellant

Todd C. Schroeder, for Appellee

PRESTON, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Justin A. Bentz ("Bentz"), appeals the April 14, 2016 judgment entry of sentence of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

{¶ 2} This case stems from allegations that Bentz, who was a police officer for the city of Lima, engaged in nonconsensual sex with 16–year–old K.A. on June 11, 2015. Bentz met K.A. through Kelli A. ("Kelli"), the girlfriend of Bentz's roommate, David Irwin ("Irwin"). K.A., Kelli's sister, was staying the night at the residence Irwin and Kelli shared with Bentz. On July 16, 2015, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Bentz on: Count One of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a first-degree felony; Count Two of kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), a first-degree felony; Count Three of sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(2), a third-degree felony; Count Four of sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(13), a third-degree felony; and Count Five of offenses involving underage persons in violation of R.C. 4301.69(A), a first-degree misdemeanor. (Doc. No. 3). Bentz pled not guilty to the counts of the indictment on July 23, 2015. (Doc. No. 221).

{¶ 3} On July 20, 2015, Bentz filed a motion for a bill of particulars, which the State provided on August 11, 2015. (Doc. Nos. 8, 17). The State filed an amended bill of particulars on November 5, 2015. (Doc. No. 119).

{¶ 4} On January 21, 2016, Bentz filed a motion to dismiss Count Four of the indictment. (Doc. No. 184). In that motion, Bentz argued that (1) he was not a "peace officer" at the time of the alleged offense or (2) R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is unconstitutional. (Id. ). On January 21, 2016, Bentz filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner ("SANE"), Ronda Norris ("Norris"). (Doc. No. 185). The State filed memorandums in opposition to Bentz's motion to dismiss and motion in limine on February 4, 2016. (Doc. Nos. 187, 188).

{¶ 5} On February 8, 2016, the trial court denied Bentz's motion to dismiss and motion in limine. (Doc. Nos. 191, 192).

{¶ 6} The case proceeded to a bench trial on February 16 and 17, 2016. (Feb. 16–17, 2016 Tr., Vol. I, at 1); (Feb. 16–17, 2016 Tr., Vol. II, at 309). The trial court found Bentz guilty of all of the counts of the indictment on February 23, 2016. (Doc. No. 221); (Feb. 23, 2016 Tr. at 5–7). The trial court filed its "judgment entry of conviction" on February 24, 2016. (Doc. No. 221).

{¶ 7} On April 8, 2016, the State filed a motion conceding that the rape and sexual-battery offenses of which Bentz was found guilty are allied offenses of similar import and subject to merger. (Doc. No. 225). The State indicated in its motion that it elected to pursue the offense of rape for purposes of conviction and sentencing. (Id. ). Bentz filed a memorandum in opposition to the State's motion arguing that the kidnapping offense of which he was found guilty is an allied offense of similar import to the rape and sexual-battery offenses of which he was found guilty. (Doc. No. 226).

{¶ 8} The trial court held a sentencing and a sex-offender registration hearing on April 14, 2016. (Apr. 14, 2016 Tr. at 1, 31). The trial court agreed with the State's argument as to merger and merged Counts One, Three, and Four, and denied Bentz's motion requesting that Count Two be merged with those counts. (Id. at 24). The trial court sentenced Bentz to ten years in prison on Count One, four years in prison on Count Two, and 60 days in jail on Count Five. (Id. at 25–28); (Doc. No. 232). The trial court ordered that Bentz serve the terms for Counts One and Two consecutively, and ordered that Bentz serve the term for Count Five concurrently to Counts One and Two, for an aggregate sentence of 14 years. (Id. at 28–29); (Id. ). The trial court also classified Bentz as a Tier III sex offender. (Apr. 14, 2016 Tr. at 31). The trial court filed its judgment entries of sentence and sex-offender classification on April 14, 2016. (Doc. Nos. 231, 232).

{¶ 9} Bentz filed a notice of appeal on April 20, 2016.¹ (Doc. No. 237). He raises five assignments of error for our review. For ease of our discussion, we will first address Bentz's third and fourth assignments together, followed by his first, second, and fifth assignments of error.

Assignment of Error No. III

The Trial Court Erred When it Convicted the Defendant of Kidnapping When There was no evidence of Force or Threat of Force or Flight. [R. R.221 [sic] and 250 Transcript of Verdict Hearing Pages [sic] 6 Lines 4–13]

Assignment of Error No. IV

The Trial Court Erred when it Convicted the Defendant of all charges except RC 4301.69(A) Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence. [R. R.221 [sic] and 250 Transcript of Verdict Hearing Pages 5–8 Lines 10–05]

{¶ 10} In his third and fourth assignments of error, Bentz argues that his kidnapping conviction is based on insufficient evidence and that his rape, sexual battery, and kidnapping convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 11} Manifest "weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are clearly different legal concepts." State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). As such, we address each legal concept individually.

{¶ 12} "An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds , State v. Smith , 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). Accordingly, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. "In deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact." State v. Jones , 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C–120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, 2013 WL 5864591, ¶ 33, citing State v. Williams , 197 Ohio App.3d 505, 2011-Ohio-6267, 968 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.). See also State v. Berry , 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-03, 2013-Ohio-2380, 2013 WL 2638704, ¶ 19 ("Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy rather than credibility or weight of the evidence."), citing Thompkins at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541.

{¶ 13} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, " ‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider [ ] the credibility of witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ " Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin , 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist. 1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass , 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard, "[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court's judgment." State v. Haller , 2012-Ohio-5233, 982 N.E.2d 111, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter , 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 119.

{¶ 14} At trial, the State offered the testimony of 11 witnesses. First, the Chief of Police for the Lima Police Department, Kevin Martin ("Martin"), testified that Bentz was employed as a peace officer with the Lima Police Department. (Feb. 16–17, 2016 Tr., Vol. I, at 24–27). Martin testified that Bentz was fired from his employment on June 11, 2015 based on K.A.'s allegations against Bentz. (Id. at 29–30).

{¶ 15} Next, Norris was qualified as an expert witness in the areas of registered nursing and sexual-assault exams. (Id. at 56). Norris testified that, as part of her duties as a registered nurse with St. Rita's Medical Center Emergency Department, she handles the responsibilities of a SANE, and is to report to the hospital when a sexual-assault victim arrives at the hospital. (Id. at 44–45, 59).

{¶ 16} She testified that she was called to the hospital on June 11, 2015 to examine K.A. after she arrived at the hospital and alleged that she had been sexually assaulted. (Id. at 58–60). First, K.A. described to Norris "what happened." (Id. at 60–62). According to Norris, K.A. was "confused; appeared kind of confused. I [sic] didn't really know * * * how to explain what had happened. She was having difficulty with naming certain parts of the body and what happened." (Id. at 62). Norris prepared a handwritten narrative as K.A. described the alleged assault. (Id. at 61). Norris identified State's Exhibit 14 as "a copy of her sexual assault examination," which includes her handwritten narrative. (Id. at 62–63). Norris read her handwritten narrative for the trial court,

"Was [sic] at my sister's house." "Was [sic] on Skype with one of my friends." ["]He, and then in parenthesis, because [Norris] asked * * * who he was, and she said * * * Justin Bentz, got home from work." "It was between 1:30 and 3:00 when this happened." ["]He got home around 1:00."

["]We were sitting on two

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