State v. Beorchia
| Decision Date | 15 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 24233, No. 24827. |
| Citation | 26 P.3d 603,135 Idaho 875 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Christiano F. BEORCHIA, Defendant-Appellant. Christiano F. Beorchia, Petitioner-Appellant, v. State of Idaho, Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
John B. Kugler, Pocatello, for appellant.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; T. Paul Krueger, II., Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. T. Paul Krueger, II. argued.
Beorchia appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence for nonpayment of child support and from the district court's denial of his application for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
In May 1997, Christiano F. Beorchia, was charged with felony nonsupport of his children as mandated by the support provisions of his divorce decree. I.C. § 18-401(2). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state recommended probation and restitution. Beorchia pled guilty and was sentenced to a unified term of nine years, with a minimum period of confinement of three years.1 Beorchia filed a motion for a new trial—which the district court treated as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea—and an I.C.R. 35 motion for leniency. Following a hearing, the district court denied both motions.
In April 1998, Beorchia filed an application for post-conviction relief asserting that his judgment of conviction was unsupported by legal evidence, that he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and that the sentence imposed by the district court was excessive. Beorchia based his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on his trial counsel's failure to procure a written and binding I.C.R. 11 plea agreement and failure to discover an alleged lack of in personam jurisdiction in regard to the child support order in Beorchia's divorce. Beorchia asked the district court to set aside his guilty plea and judgment of conviction. The state failed to respond to Beorchia's application in a timely manner. Beorchia filed a motion for summary disposition. The district court denied the motion and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Beorchia's application for post-conviction relief after determining that there was valid evidence to support Beorchia's judgment of conviction, that Beorchia had failed to show that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance, and that Beorchia's guilty plea was legally binding.
Beorchia appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence. Beorchia also appeals the district court's denial of his application for post-conviction relief. These two appeals have been consolidated for the purposes of review.
Beorchia first argues that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for summary disposition in respect to his application for post-conviction relief. An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct.App. 1992). Summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c), a "court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Beorchia's motion for summary disposition was based on the state's failure "to answer or respond by motion as required by I.C. § 19-4906(a)." Idaho Code Section 19-4906(a) "requires that the state file any responsive document to the application for post-conviction relief within thirty days of the date of its original filing, or within any further time that the court may fix." Bjorklund v. State, 130 Idaho 373, 378, 941 P.2d 345, 350 (Ct.App.1997). In this case, the state concedes that it failed to file a response to Beorchia's application within the thirty-day period set forth under the statute. In addition, the record shows that the district court did not grant an extension. Beorchia asserts that, because the state failed to file a response to his application for post-conviction relief within the thirty-day period and no extension was granted, he was entitled to summary disposition under I.C. § 19-4906(c). We are not persuaded.
The state's failure to file an answer to an application for post-conviction relief within the thirty-day period set forth under I.C. § 19-4906(a) does not necessarily entitle the applicant to summary disposition. As previously stated, a grant of summary disposition is only proper where the record before the district court presents no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Instead, the purpose of the thirty-day requirement set forth in I.C. § 19-4906 is to properly frame any factual and legal issues before the district court so that it can make an intelligent ruling on the application. Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418, 825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991). "When the state fails to respond the district court is operating without the benefit of such pleadings and is placed in the indefensible position of ruling on an application for post-conviction relief without any factual or legal issues first being framed." Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho 128, 130 n. 2, 578 P.2d 244, 246 n. 2 (1978). In this case, after denying Beorchia's motion for summary disposition, the district court ordered the state to file an answer to Beorchia's application2 and set a date for an evidentiary hearing. As a consequence, the factual and legal issues were properly framed before the district court prior to its ruling on the substantive merits of Beorchia's application, and the timeliness of the state's answer was rendered moot. Moreover, the conclusory allegations contained in Beorchia's application for post-conviction relief were insufficient to entitle him to a grant of summary disposition. Thus, the district court properly denied Beorchia's motion for summary disposition, and Beorchia has shown no error in this regard.
As previously stated, an application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. Murray 121 Idaho at 921, 828 P.2d 1323 at 1326. Thus, like a plaintiff in a civil action, an applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907; Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct.App.1990).
In reviewing the district court's granting or denying of post-conviction relief following a hearing as provided in I.C. § 19-4907, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct.App.1994). An evidentiary hearing was held at which both Beorchia and his trial counsel testified extensively regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Thus, we will not disturb the lower court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Russell, 118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656. The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 764 P.2d 439 (Ct.App.1988). We exercise free review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct.App.1992). Beorchia asserts that the district court erred when it determined that he had not received ineffective assistance of counsel during the underlying criminal proceedings. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct.App.1992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct.App.1995); Russell, 118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656; Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct.App.1989). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Russell, 118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Russell, 118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656. There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance falls within the wide range of "professional assistance." Aragon, 114 Idaho at 760, 760 P.2d at 1176. An applicant must not only show incompetence, but must also show that the deficient conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard, 126 Idaho at 233, 880 P.2d at...
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