State v. Bernard
Decision Date | 08 November 2016 |
Docket Number | NO. 14–15–00822–CR,14–15–00822–CR |
Citation | 503 S.W.3d 685 |
Parties | The STATE of Texas, Appellant v. Albert Tyrone BERNARD, Appellee |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Jessica Ebbs, Galveston, TX, for Appellant.
Daniel Krieger, League City, TX, for Appellee.
Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Donovan, and Brown.
The State of Texas appeals from a pre-trial order granting Albert Tyrone Bernard's motion to suppress the warrantless stop and blood alcohol test results in a prosecution for misdemeanor driving while intoxicated.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On August 20, 2014, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Deputy Tracy Watson was traveling southbound on Highway 146, south of the City of Kemah, in Galveston County. Watson observed a vehicle, driven by Bernard, about a quarter of a mile in front of her and "swerving from lane to lane and even going into the center lane." Watson activated her emergency lights and pulled the vehicle over.2
Watson testified that Bernard was driving his vehicle at the correct speed, all equipment was functioning properly on the vehicle, the registration and insurance were valid, and he stopped his vehicle normally when he was pulled over. Watson further testified that Bernard's driving did not interfere with any other vehicles and there was nothing unsafe about his driving.
After stopping Bernard, Watson requested that Bernard pull his vehicle into a parking lot out of traffic. Bernard complied without incident. In response to Watson's queries, Bernard told her he had two shots of tequila prior to leaving work.
Deputy Jacob T. Manuel arrived at the scene to assist Watson. After speaking with Watson, Manuel approached Bernard. Manuel testified that Bernard admitting to consuming alcoholic beverages that evening and Bernard's eyes were glassy. Manuel further testified that he did not smell the odor of alcohol on or about Bernard; instead, he smelled cologne, which Manuel described as a "coverup" odor to mask the smell of alcohol. Manuel did not suspect any type of drug impairment and did not observe any type of open container of alcohol in the vehicle.
Manuel asked Bernard to step out of the car; he initially was uncooperative. Eventually, Bernard got out of the car but refused to participate in field sobriety tests. Manuel placed Bernard under arrest for driving while intoxicated and took him into custody.
Manuel asked Bernard if he would provide a specimen of his breath or blood for analysis, and he refused. Manuel prepared an affidavit for a search warrant to take Bernard's blood. The search warrant was issued about an hour and fifteen minutes after Manuel came in contact with Bernard.
Bernard was charged with the offense of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. Bernard filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, arguing that he was stopped and subsequently arrested without a warrant and without probable cause in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the laws and constitution of the State of Texas. He further asserted that the traffic stop and blood alcohol test results should be suppressed because each were in violation of his constitutional rights.
At the hearing on Bernard's motion, the State stipulated Bernard was arrested without a warrant. Additionally, the trial court took judicial notice of Section 545.060 of the Texas Transportation Code at Bernard's request.3 The trial court heard testimony from Watson and Manuel. Additionally, the trial court accepted into evidence two exhibits from the State—a video from the dash camera of Watson's police car and Manuel's affidavit for a search warrant to take Bernard's blood. The trial court granted Bernard's motion to suppress.
The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding its order granting Bernard's motion to suppress the warrantless stop and blood alcohol test results. Of the twenty-six findings of fact made by the trial court, the following are most pertinent to this appeal:
The trial court also made the following relevant conclusions of law:
In accordance with the requirements of 44.01(a)(5) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the State certified in its notice of appeal that "the present appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and the evidence is of substantial importance."4
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we give almost total deference to the court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports, especially when those fact findings are based on an evaluation of the witnesses' credibility and demeanor.5 Leming v. State , 493 S.W.3d 552, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) ; Guzman v. State , 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We accord the same level of deference to the trial court's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact if those decisions turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. Id . We review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on witness credibility. Id . Despite its fact-sensitive analysis, the "reasonableness" of a specific search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment is subject to de novo review. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Where, as here, the trial judge makes express findings of fact, we must first determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those findings. Valtierra v. State , 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We uphold the trial court's ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Iduarte , 268 S.W.3d 544, 548–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Thus, if supported by the record, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be overturned. Mount v. State , 217 S.W.3d 716, 724 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
In its first issue, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting Bernard's motion to suppress his arrest, maintaining there was reasonable suspicion that Bernard violated the traffic offense of failure to maintain a single lane under Section 545.060(a) of the Texas Transportation Code.
A warrantless automobile stop is a Fourth Amendment seizure analogous to a temporary detention, and it must be justified by reasonable suspicion. Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ; see Derichsweiler v. State , 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The reasonableness of a temporary detention is determined from the totality of the circumstances. Leming , 493 S.W.3d at 562 ; Zuniga–Hernandez v. State , 473 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). If an officer has a reasonable basis for suspecting a person has committed a traffic offense, then the officer legally may initiate a traffic stop. Id . Reasonable suspicion is present if the officer has "specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead [the officer] reasonably to conclude that the person ... is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Derichsweiler , 348 S.W.3d at 914 ; Zuniga–Hernandez , 473 S.W.3d at 848. "An officer's stated purpose for a stop can neither validate an illegal stop nor invalidate a legal stop because the stop's legality...
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