State v. Bilal

• Decision Date: 19 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. 20614-1-I,20614-1-I
• Citation: 776 P.2d 153,54 Wn.App. 778
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Khalid BILAL, a/k/a Larry Clinton, Defendant, and Cleophas Dean, Jr., and each of them, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 778

54 Wn.App. 778

776 P.2d 153

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Khalid BILAL, a/k/a Larry Clinton, Defendant and Cleophas Dean, Jr., and each of them, Appellant.

No. 20614-1-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington,

Division 1.

July 19, 1989.

Review Denied Oct. 5, 1989.

John Christiansen, Dawn Monroe, Wash. Appellate Defenders, for Cleophas Dean, Jr.

Reba Weiss, Deputy Pros. Atty., King County, for State.

COLEMAN, Chief Judge.

Cleophas Dean, Jr. appeals his conviction for first degree robbery. He contends the court erred in giving a special verdict instruction.

Dean's conviction results from his participation with another man in an armed robbery of a restaurant. Both were apprehended and charged with first degree robbery in an information that also included a deadly weapon enhancement allegation. The other man pleaded guilty and Dean was tried by jury. The trial court gave instruction 15, virtually identical to WPIC 2.07 (Supp.1986), which reads as follows:

For purposes of the special verdict

A deadly weapon is an implement or instrument which has the capacity to inflict death and, from the manner in which it is used, is likely to produce or may easily and readily produce death. The following instruments are included in the term deadly weapon: pistol, revolver or any other firearm.

The plaintiff must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime.

If one person is armed with a deadly weapon, all accomplices are deemed to be so armed, even if only one deadly weapon is involved.

(Emphasis added.) The jury returned a guilty verdict on the robbery charge and a special verdict finding that Dean had been armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the robbery.

Dean contends that in order to enhance his sentence under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) the State must prove that he had actual knowledge that his accomplice was armed. He argues that instruction 15 does not comply with the mandate of State v. McKim, 98 Wash.2d 111, 653 P.2d 1040 (1982), which requires the State to prove knowledge of the deadly weapon as a condition precedent to sentence enhancement. The State argues that the Legislature intended to change the rule in McKim by enacting the pertinent provisions of the SRA.

RCW 9.94A.125 provides in part:

Deadly weapon special verdict--Definition. In a criminal case wherein there has been a special allegation and evidence establishing that the accused or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime, the court shall make a finding of fact of whether or not the accused or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime, or if a jury trial is had, the jury shall, if it find[s] the defendant guilty, also find a special verdict as to whether or not the defendant or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime.

(Emphasis added.)

RCW 9.94A.310(3) provides:

The following additional times shall be added to the presumptive sentence if the offender or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon as defined in this chapter and the offender is being sentenced for one of the crimes listed in this subsection....

(Emphasis added.)

We begin our analysis with a review of the comments to WPIC 2.07, the source of the instruction in this case.

Accomplices. The Sentencing Reform Act created an ambiguity with regard to the liability of an accomplice. That ambiguity has not been fully resolved by the case law.

Under the former deadly weapon statute, the Supreme Court held that the enhanced sentence could be imposed only upon the person actually armed with the deadly weapon and upon those with actual knowledge that the other person was so armed. State v. McKim, 98 Wn.2d 111, 653 P.2d 1040 (1982). The court concluded that the legislature did not intend to impose strict liability upon accomplices who had no actual knowledge of the presence of a deadly weapon.

By contrast, the Sentencing Reform Act, in RCW 9.94A.125, refers to enhancement of a sentence when the "accused or an accomplice" is armed with a deadly weapon. The statute was possibly intended to reverse the holding in McKim.

Some commentators have observed that the statute may not reverse the holding in McKim because of a separate line of cases, undisturbed by the statute, holding that the liability of an accomplice depends upon proof of the accomplice's "mental culpability." A leading case was State v. Plakke, 31 Wn.App. 262, 639 P.2d 796 (1982). This requirement, if still viable, would assure that the enhanced sentence would continue to be imposed only upon the person armed with the deadly weapon and any accomplice with actual knowledge of the weapon's presence. [D. Boerner, Sentencing in Washington § 5.19 (1985) ].

Subsequent to the published commentary, however, the viability of the requirement was diminished by the overruling of State v. Plakke in State v. Davis, 101 Wn.2d 654, 682 P.2d 883 (1984). In Davis, the court held that a defendant may be convicted of being an accomplice to the crime of first degree robbery without proof that the defendant knew that the principal was armed with a deadly weapon during the commission of the crime.

In Davis, the Supreme Court was addressing the issue of an accomplice's guilt, not the sentence to be imposed upon an accomplice. The court acknowledged that it was departing from its approach to enhancing the sentence of an accomplice (i.e., in McKim ), but stated that the distinction was justified on the basis of statutory interpretation. Four Justices dissented.

A majority of the committee concluded that the overruling of State v. Plakke and the holding in State v. Davis signaled a trend towards greater liability on the part of an accomplice. A majority also concluded that the Sentencing Reform Act was intended to reverse the holding in State v. McKim. A majority of the committee thus believes that the last sentence in WPIC 2.07, shown in brackets, is an accurate statement of the law for all cases governed by the Sentencing Reform Act; i.e., for all cases in which the crime is alleged to have been committed on or after July 1, 1984.

WPIC 2.07 (Supp.1986), at 18-19.

We do not agree that the SRA created an ambiguity with regard to the liability of an accomplice. We do, however, agree that the SRA reversed the holding in State v. McKim, 98 Wash.2d 111, 653 P.2d 1040 (1982). We reach this conclusion based solely on the plain, unambiguous language of the statute which provides in pertinent part that "the jury shall, if it find[s] the defendant guilty, also find a special verdict as to whether or not the defendant or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime." (Emphasis added.) RCW 9.94A.125. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the statute's meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself. Bellevue Fire Fighters Local 1604 v. Bellevue, 100 Wash.2d 748, 751, 675 P.2d 592 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015, 105 S.Ct. 2017, 85 L.Ed.2d 299 (1985). It is only when intent is not clear from the language of the statute that a court may consider the legislative history. Department of Transp. v. State Employees' Ins. Bd., 97 Wash.2d 454, 458, 645 P.2d 1076 (1982).

The inclusion of the words "or an accomplice" leaves no doubt that the statute was intended to apply whenever the defendant or an accomplice was armed.

Our conclusion is further strengthened by a consideration of the previous deadly weapon enhancement statute. That statute, RCW 9.95.040, required a finding of fact as to whether the accused was armed with a deadly weapon. The statute made reference only to the accused, without any mention of an accomplice whatsoever. Accordingly, under that statute, an unarmed defendant would be subject to sentence enhancement on a complicity theory only. Complicity, however, is not required under the present statute in order to enhance a sentence because of the plain and unambiguous wording of RCW 9.94A.125. Professor Boerner's opinion to the contrary referred to in the WPIC commentary is no longer supportable in light of the overruling of State v. Plakke, 31 Wash.App. 262, 639 P.2d 796 (1982), in State v. Davis, 101 Wash.2d 654, 682 P.2d 883 (1984).

The Davis court recognized a distinction between accomplice liability, which does not depend on the accomplice's knowledge that the principal was armed, and the deadly weapon enhancement statute, which required a finding that the accomplice was actually or constructively armed. Davis, at 658, 682 P.2d 883. The Davis reasoning was based on interpreting RCW 9A.08.020, the accomplice liability statute, and RCW 9.95.040, the deadly weapon enhancement statute. That latter statute was amended, however, in RCW 9.94A.125 topermit the enhancement of a sentence if the "defendant or an accomplice was armed." Accordingly, the distinction recognized by Davis no longer exists in the present statutory scheme. The trial court did not err in giving instruction 15.

Alternatively, even if it is assumed that there was instructional error and that the State was required to prove, for purposes of sentence enhancement, beyond a reasonable doubt that Dean had knowledge that the coparticipant was armed, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The courts of this state apply the overwhelming evidence test in determining harmless error. State v. Guloy, 104 Wash.2d 412, 426, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 1208, 89 L.Ed.2d 321 (1986). Where the error involves an erroneous jury instruction, the test is whether the evidence is so overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a finding of guilt; here, a finding that Dean was armed or knew that his accomplice was armed. State v. Belmarez, 101 Wash.2d 212, 676 P.2d 492 (1984). Accord, State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash.2d 403, 756 P.2d...