State v. Biron

Decision Date16 August 1963
Docket NumberNo. 38808,38808
Citation123 N.W.2d 392,266 Minn. 272
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. John Francis BIRON, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

Under the facts recited in the opinion an 18-year-old defendant was convicted of murder in the third degree. At trial he objected to the introduction of a confession by which he implicated himself in the offense. The confession was signed after the defendant had been persuaded by statements and arguments of officers that he might receive juvenile court treatment or in any event the charge against him might be ultimately disposed of on the basis of a lesser offense than that to which he confessed. In determining the issue of voluntariness of a confession given by a defendant in a criminal case, the test is whether the confession is made freely and voluntarily and without compulsion of any sort. Following Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513, It is held on the basis of the record that the statements and representations made by the officers to the defendant constituted a sufficient inducement to deprive the confession of its voluntary character and that the defendant was denied due process of law by its use against him in the trial.

Lewis E. Lohmann, Public Defender, Gerald M. Singer, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Robert G. Share and Henry W. Pickett, Jr., Minneapolis, for Minnesota Branch, American Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae.

Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, George M. Scott, County Atty., Gerard W. Snell, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.

MURPHY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of murder in the third degree. Defendant asks that the judgment be set aside asserting as error the introduction in evidence of a written confession which he alleges was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

From the record it appears that in the early morning hours of March 10, 1962, one Mrs. Anne Danielski, an elderly woman, was attacked and beaten. Her body was found some hours later. She died shortly after having been taken to the hospital. Death was attributed to a combination of injuries and exposure. Defendant was apprehended as a result of information received by the Police Department of Minneapolis and taken into custody on the afternoon of March 16. At the time of his arrest the defendant was 18 years of age. He had left home and was residing with his married sister. He had a ninth-grade education and had no work record. At the time of his arrest he was under parole supervision by state authorities as a juvenile offender.

From admissions made by the defendant and a written confession, the voluntariness of which is the central issue in this case, it appears that on the evening of March 9, 1962, the defendant, in company with two juvenile companions, Walter White and Leonard Belcour, went to the latter's home about 10 p.m. Sometime between 10 and 11 p.m. they met an intoxicated woman on the street. They attacked her and took from her 64 cents, which was apparently all of the money she had. The record indicates that this offense was never reported to the authorities. The group then went to the home of the defendant's sister where they took the family automobile without permission and drove it about the streets until sometime after midnight. In the meantime they had consumed a quantity of wine which they had gotten from some other boys. While proceeding down a street in Northeast Minneapolis, they observed a woman walking alone and decided to steal her purse. From the statement it appears that they all got out of the car to take the purse from the woman. She struggled with White, whereupon he struck her. In his confession the defendant admitted that he joined in the theft and struck the woman twice in the jaw and on the cheek. Belcour clubbed the woman with his arm which was in a cast. It should be noted that the defendant repudiated this confession within an hour after he signed it.

Reference should be made to the circumstances leading up to the signing of the confession as they appear from the record. It appears that the defendant was apprehended March 16 at about 4:30 p.m. In one of his first interviews with the officers at police headquarters he admitted his part in the theft of 64 cents taken from the intoxicated woman on the night of March 9. This interview took place at the police headquarters, homicide division, between 6 and 8 p.m. and continued for a period of 1 hour and 35 minutes. It was tape recorded and comprises a part of the record on appeal. The defendant said he would like to have his sister call a lawyer. He did not indicate the name of a lawyer, but a telephone was made available to him. During this interview the detectives urged him to tell the truth and advised him that it would be in his own interest to do so. He persisted in his denial of any part in the attack upon Mrs. Danielski.

Sometime later on the evening of March 16 he was taken to the office of the inspector of the homicide division where a tape-recorded confession made by his companion, Walter White, was played back to him. By this confession White implicated the defendant as a participant in the attack upon Mrs. Danielski. This interview lasted for about 20 minutes. The next interview occurred apparently on the morning of Saturday, March 17, after the defendant had given the officers a sample of his hair. During this interview, which was likewise tape recorded, the defendant continued to profess his innocence. Between 1:30 and 2:30 in the afternoon of March 17 the defendant was again interviewed by the police officers. At this time the defendant expressed a fear of being sentenced to the state penitentiary on a murder charge and discussed the possibility of having his case disposed of in the juvenile court. As we have already indicated, the defendant was familiar with juvenile court proceedings. It was suggested by the officers that although the defendant was just past 18 years of age he might, nevertheless, be permitted to plead as a juvenile offender in view of the fact that his two companions were under 18 years of age. 1 At that point the defendant refused to admit any knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the robbery and death of Mrs. Danielski. Detective Russell Krueger informed him that if he wished to make a statement later on he should have the jailer get in touch with him. Krueger testified that about 6 p.m. of the same day he was called to come and see the defendant, who informed him that he wanted to give a statement. The defendant said that he was sorry for what he had done and he would like to make amends to Mrs. Danielski's relatives. The defendant was informed that whatever statement he made could be used in court against him after which he gave the statement, the substance of which has already been recited.

At each of the interviews referred to, two or three police officers or detectives participated in the questioning of defendant. It is very apparent from an examination of what occurred at these interviews that the police officers were eager to secure a written confession in order to make an airtight case for the prosecution. They presented to the defendant various arguments and reasons why he should sign a confession. While much of what the officers said to the defendant was proper, and there was no evidence of threats or abuse of any kind, it is apparent from the record as a whole that their questions and statements were calculated to sell the defendant on the idea that he ought to sign a confession. In accomplishing this purpose they held out to the defendant the possibility that he might be charged with a lesser offense, or that he might, in view of his age and the age of his juvenile companions, be given the benefits of juvenile court proceedings. The defendant was made aware of the fact that he was in serious trouble. He was told, 'You're in lots of trouble. Now, it's your problem to get out of a little bit of it anyhow.' He was told that the best way he could help himself was by helping the police officers. When the defendant persisted--'I told you all I know. That's all I am going to tell.'--Detective Rieman told him that they could prove by comparing his hair with some they had that the defendant was implicated and 'then we can take you right into * * * courtroom * * * (a)nd then we can throw the key away because you're not smart enough to try and help yourself.'

The detective also approached the subject from the degree of the offense with which the defendant might be charged. He said:

'* * * This thing wavers, it can be murder or it can be manslaughter. Now, if we get a young fellow that gets himself fouled up like you boys have done, and I am telling you, you done it. I ain't lying to you, you done it, you fouled up. You're in the crap, but good, right up to your ears. But the whole thing what you go to court for is determined on how you act when you are talking to us. The whole thing boils down to this; what kind of fellow was he, did he come in and say, 'Yes, we took her purse, we tried to take her purse, we didn't mean to hurt the woman.' But, I want to tell you a little about the law now. When you went after that purse, that's a felony; when a death results in the commission of a felony that's murder in the first degree. But, if a fellow has got brains enough to realize what a spot he is in it can go the other way, the people can say, the people that determine these things, our superiors, they can determine: 'Did these boys commit murder in the act of a felony or is it just a simple case of manslaughter?"

He then asked the defendant:

'Isn't it much better to go up for manslaughter than to go up for murder, number 1?'

After warning the defendant that by his failure to admit his part in the offense he was exposing himself to a long sentence, one of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
47 cases
  • State v. Ezeka, A18-0828
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • July 15, 2020
    ...treatment in exchange for a confession may render the confession involuntary. See Nelson , 886 N.W.2d at 505 ; State v. Biron , 266 Minn. 272, 123 N.W.2d 392, 397–99 (1963). But we have also been clear in numerous cases that we will not find the confession involuntary when it was not reason......
  • State v. Ware
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • March 28, 1973
    ...v. Brommel, 56 Cal.2d 629, 15 Cal.Rptr. 909, 364 P.2d 845 (1961); Kier v. State, 213 Md. 556, 132 A.2d 494 (1957); State v. Biron, 266 Minn. 272, 123 N.W.2d 392 (1963); State v. Watson, 82 N.M. 769, 487 P.2d 197 (1971); State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis.2d 284, 124 N.W.2d 47 We now hold Ware's incrimin......
  • State v. Merrill
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • December 1, 1978
    ...at 513, 83 S.Ct. at 1343, 10 L.Ed.2d at 521; State v. Raymond, 305 Minn. 160, 174, 232 N.W.2d 879, 888 (1975); State v. Biron, 266 Minn. 272, 282, 123 N.W.2d 392, 398 (1963). If the circumstances indicate that the accused's will was overborne, his confession is not voluntary. See, Lynumn v.......
  • People v. Diaz
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • July 17, 1980
    ...--- Mass. ---, 387 N.E.2d 527 (1979); People v. Tanser, 75 Ill.App.3d 482, 31 Ill.Dec. 414, 394 N.E.2d 616 (1979); State v. Biron, 266 Minn. 272, 123 N.W.2d 392 (1963); State v. Mullin, 249 Iowa 10, 85 N.W.2d 598 In a robbery that occurred on March 26, 1974, one man was stabbed to death and......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT