State v. Blakeney

• Decision Date: 13 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 203A98.,203A98.
• Citation: 352 N.C. 287,531 S.E.2d 799
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina, v. Roger McKinley BLAKENEY.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

531 S.E.2d 799

352 N.C. 287

STATE of North Carolina, v. Roger McKinley BLAKENEY.

No. 203A98.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

July 13, 2000.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by William N. Farrell, Jr., Senior Deputy Attorney General, for the state.

Marilyn G. Ozer and William F.W. Massengale, Chapel Hill, for defendant-appellant.

MARTIN, Justice.

On 13 May 1996 defendant Roger McKinley Blakeney (defendant) was indicted for the first-degree murder of Callie Washington Huntley (the victim). Defendant was also indicted for arson, common law robbery, felonious breaking and entering, felonious larceny, and felonious possession of stolen goods. Defendant was tried capitally at the 25 August 1997 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Union County. At the close of the evidence, the state voluntarily dismissed the larceny charge. In addition, the charge of felonious possession of stolen goods was not submitted to the jury. The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder on the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. The jury also found defendant guilty of first-degree arson, common law robbery, and felonious breaking and entering. Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a sentence of death for the first-degree murder conviction, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with that recommendation. The trial court also entered judgments sentencing defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment for the remaining convictions.

The state presented evidence at trial which is summarized as follows: On 15 April 1996, between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon, defendant, age thirty-three, opened and crawled through a back window in his mother's home for the purpose of stealing something of value that he could sell. Defendant stole three of his mother's rings, a brown leather pouch, approximately $4.00 in change, a small herringbone chain, and his mother's savings account deposit book. Defendant then telephoned his wife and told her he would be home in a few minutes.

After defendant finished speaking with his wife, the victim, age seventy-six, drove behind the house. The victim had lived with defendant's mother for over twenty years. Defendant hid in a small room behind the refrigerator as the victim entered the residence. According to defendant's confession, which was admitted into evidence at trial, defendant entered the kitchen, and the two began arguing. Defendant told authorities that he turned to leave, but the victim grabbed him. Defendant charged at the victim, grabbed and wrestled a .22-caliber revolver out of the victim's hand, and hit the victim in the back of the head with the butt of the gun. The victim fell facedown on the kitchen floor and started bleeding. According to defendant, after some additional period of physical struggle, a metal can of kerosene was accidentally spilled. Defendant also claimed that a cigarette he was smoking fell out of his mouth at some time during the struggle. According to defendant, at some point, he pulled the victim off the floor, sat him in a chair, and wrapped an electrical cord around his hands and legs. Defendant then removed $78.00 from the victim's wallet, exited the residence, and departed the area in defendant's vehicle.

Terry Lee Bivens (Bivens), defendant's longstanding friend, worked at a nearby business and observed defendant departing his mother's residence on the day in question. Bivens recognized defendant's vehicle. Seconds later, Bivens noticed smoke coming from the residence. Bivens and several other witnesses looked on as the house began to burn.

Firefighters arrived at the scene and discovered the victim's wire-bound body as they fought the fire. Agent Van Worth Shaw, Jr. (Agent Shaw), an arson investigator for the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), determined that the fire had two distinct points of origin and was caused by the use of a flammable liquid. In contrast to defendant's statement, all accidental causes were eliminated during the investigation, and Agent Shaw opined that the fire was intentionally set. The investigation revealed traces of kerosene on samples taken from the couch in the den and on the victim's clothing.

Dr. Robert Thompson, a forensic pathologist with the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, performed an autopsy on the victim's body. The autopsy revealed that seventy-five percent of the victim's skin was charred. Dr. Thompson also observed that the victim had received a wound to the back and a wound to the left temporal area of the head, which resulted in injury to the brain. Dr. Thompson opined that the victim was conscious for approximately three to five minutes after the fire started, that the victim died within approximately ten minutes, and that the cause of death was carbon monoxide poisoning produced by the fire.

On 16 April 1996 law enforcement officers located defendant at a friend's residence, sitting in the passenger seat of his vehicle. Defendant consented to a search of his vehicle, where the officers found his mother's stolen jewelry, leather pouch, and savings deposit book in the glove compartment. The authorities later recovered the .22-caliber revolver that defendant had taken from the victim. Defendant had exchanged the gun for a loan. The investigation also revealed that bloodstains found on defendant's clothing were consistent with the victim's blood.

Defendant did not present evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of trial.

Additional facts will be provided as necessary to discuss specific issues pertaining to defendant's assignments of error.

JURY SELECTION

By assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his written and oral motions to dismiss the jury venire based on an alleged underrepresentation of African-American citizens. Defendant does not argue that the jury selection process in this case involved systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the jury pool. Rather, defendant contends that affirmative efforts should have been made to ensure that the jury venire called for his trial was racially proportionate.

Defendant attached a copy of the 1994 census for Union County in support of his written motion to dismiss the venire. The census revealed that African-Americans comprised 16.15% of the county's population. Defendant does not state, and the record does not otherwise indicate, the percentage of African-Americans that were represented in the venire summoned for jury service. Rather, defendant bases his argument on the venire that actually reported for jury service.

The venire that actually reported for jury service consisted of 8 .3% African-Americans. Defendant argues that the difference between the percentage of African-Americans in the general population compared to the venire, without more, violated his constitutional right to have a jury drawn from a venire representative of the community.

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by a jury of his or her peers. U.S. Const.amend. VI; N.C. Const. art. I, §§ 24, 26. "This constitutional guarantee assures that members of a defendant's `own race have not been systematically and arbitrarily excluded from the jury pool which is to decide [his] guilt or innocence.'" State v. Bowman, 349 N.C. 459, 467, 509 S.E.2d 428, 434 (1998) (quoting State v. McNeill, 326 N.C. 712, 718, 392 S.E.2d 78, 81 (1990)), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1040, 119 S.Ct. 2403, 144 L.Ed.2d 802 (1999). The Sixth Amendment does not, however, "guarantee[ ] the defendant the right to a jury composed of members of a certain race or gender." State v. Norwood, 344 N.C. 511, 527, 476 S.E.2d 349, 355 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1158, 117 S.Ct. 1341, 137 L.Ed.2d 500 (1997).

To establish a prima facie case of disproportionate representation in a venire, a defendant must show:

(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community;

(2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and

(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579, 587 (1979); see Bowman, 349 N.C. at 467-68, 509 S.E.2d at 434; State v. McNeill, 326 N.C. 712, 717, 392 S.E.2d 78, 81 (1990); State v. McCoy, 320 N.C. 581, 583, 359 S.E.2d 764, 765 (1987).

The state does not dispute that the first prong of the Duren test has been satisfied. Rather, the dispositive issue is whether defendant has established the second and third prongs.

The second prong of the Duren test requires us to determine whether the representation of African-Americans in the venire was fair and reasonable. 439 U.S. at 364,99 S.Ct. at 668,58 L.Ed.2d at 587. This Court has previously addressed cases in which similar census data was presented as a basis for alleged underrepresentation of African-Americans in the venire. See Bowman, 349 N.C. at 468,509 S.E.2d at 434; State v. Price, 301 N.C. 437, 447, 272 S.E.2d 103, 110 (1980). The disputed evidence in Bowman revealed that African-Americans made up 23% of the summoned jury pool, while the county's population was 39.17% African-American, a difference of 16.17%. See Bowman, 349 N.C. at 467-68,509 S.E.2d at 433-34. Upon reviewing that data, this Court stated, "[W]e cannot conclude that this figure, standing alone, is unfair or unreasonable." Id. at 468, 509 S.E.2d at 434.

Similarly, in Price, the evidence showed that African-Americans made up 17.1% of the jury pool, while the county's population was 31.1% African-American, a difference of 14%. Price, 301 N.C. at 447, 272 S.E.2d at 110. Based on that data, this Court stated, "[W]e are unable to conclude as a matter of law that the applicable percentages are sufficient to establish that the representation of [African-Americans]...