State v. Blakney, 5266.
| Decision Date | 20 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 5266.,5266. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent/Appellant, v. Anthony K. BLAKNEY, Appellant/Respondent. Appellate Case No. 2012–207286. Appellate Case No. 2012–212966. |
Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant/Respondent.
Tommy Evans Jr., South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, of Columbia, for Respondent/Appellant.
These consolidated appeals involve two sentencing determinations related to violations of a two-year community supervision program (CSP) administered by Respondent/Appellant, the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (Department). Appellant/ Respondent, Anthony K. Blakney, seeks review of the sentence imposed by the circuit court for his April 2011 CSP violations. The circuit court (hereinafter, “the first CSP judge”) revoked Blakney's community supervision, gave him credit for prison time served,1 and required him to begin a new two-year CSP.
Blakney argues he was no longer subject to community supervision because he had satisfied the terms of the original sentence for his first degree burglary conviction, which was fifteen years, suspended on the service of thirty months. Blakney contends once he served an aggregate amount of thirty months in prison for his burglary conviction and subsequent CSP violations, he could no longer be imprisoned for successive CSP revocations or be required to participate in a CSP.
The Department appeals an order issued by the circuit court (“the second CSP judge”) after a revocation hearing relating to CSP violations allegedly committed by Blakney in April 2012. The second CSP judge did not consider the alleged violations. Rather, he concluded Blakney had satisfied the terms of his burglary sentence when he completed thirty months of imprisonment and, thus, Blakney was no longer subject to community supervision. We affirm the first CSP judge's ruling, reverse the second CSP judge's order, and remand for a new hearing on the violations allegedly committed by Blakney in April 2012.
In 2008, Blakney was convicted of first degree burglary, a “no parole offense.”2
On November 6, 2008, the sentencing judge imposed on Blakney the following sentence:
On April 30, 2010, Blakney was released from prison and placed on two years of community supervision.4 On November 3, 2010, Blakney was arrested for violating the terms of his CSP. After a revocation hearing on February 25, 2011, the first CSP judge revoked Blakney's community supervision but gave him credit for time served, which was three months and fifteen days, and released him. At this point, Blakney began a new two-year CSP.5
On May 13, 2011, Blakney was arrested for additional CSP violations. On December 9, 2011, the first CSP judge conducted another revocation hearing. At this hearing, counsel for Blakney argued that Blakney should not be sanctioned for CSP violations because he had already completed the unsuspended portion of his sentence, i.e., thirty months of imprisonment. In response, the Department argued that, under State v. Picklesimer,6 the limit for the aggregate amount of service upon successive CSP revocations is the term of the original sentence, i.e., in Blakney's case, the full fifteen years. Counsel for Blakney asserted that this case is distinguishable from Picklesimer because the sentencing judge had not imposed a term of probation as part of Blakney's sentence.
The first CSP judge took the issue under advisement. After a hearing on January 19, 2012, the first CSP judge revoked Blakney's community supervision, gave him credit for time served, and released him to begin a new two-year CSP. Blakney's appeal followed.
On April 27, 2012, Blakney was arrested once again for CSP violations. After conducting a revocation hearing on August 17, 2012, the second CSP judge issued an order finding Blakney had satisfied the terms of the original sentence for his burglary conviction and was no longer subject to community supervision.7 The Department's appeal followed. Although the second CSP judge's order effectively nullified the first CSP judge's ruling requiring Blakney to begin a new CSP, Blakney did not withdraw his appeal of the first CSP judge's ruling. After the Department appealed the second CSP judge's order, its appeal was consolidated with Blakney's appeal.
Has Blakney satisfied the terms of his original sentence such that he is no longer subject to community supervision?
“In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only.” State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). Thus, an appellate court is bound by the circuit court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.
Section 24–21–560(D) of the South Carolina Code states, in pertinent part:
(emphases added).
In State v. McGrier, 378 S.C. 320, 331, 663 S.E.2d 15, 21 (2008), our supreme court held that revocations for successive CSP violations “should not extend or exceed the term of incarceration that was originally ordered for the underlying offense.” The court explained that section 24–21–560(D) limits “the total amount of time an inmate could be incarcerated after a CSP revocation to ... the length of the remaining balance of the sentence for the ‘no parole offense.’ ” Id. at 332, 663 S.E.2d at 21.
Subsequently, in Picklesimer, our supreme court applied section 24–21–560(D) to a ten-year sentence that had been suspended on the service of five years' imprisonment and five years' probation. 388 S.C. at 265, 695 S.E.2d at 846. The court held the “original sentence,” as referenced in section 24–21–560(D), included “both the suspended and unsuspended portions of a circuit court's sentence.” Id. at 268, 695 S.E.2d at 848. The court explained “it is, in fact, the total sentence handed down by the court.” Id.
Here, the thirty months served by Blakney was the unsuspended portion only. The total sentence for Blakney's burglary conviction was fifteen years. Therefore, the aggregate amount of time Blakney is required to serve in prison or participate in a CSP may not exceed fifteen years. See id. at 270, 695 S.E.2d at 848–49 (). In other words, to satisfy his burglary sentence, Blakney must either successfully complete a CSP or continue in a CSP due to violation revocations until the end of the fifteen-year sentence.8 See S.C.Code Ann. § 24–21–560(E) (); Picklesimer, 388 S.C. at 270, 695 S.E.2d at 848 (); id. at 271, 695 S.E.2d at 849 ().
The second CSP judge found Blakney's circumstances were distinguishable from the circumstances in Picklesimer. The second CSP judge reasoned that, unlike the sentence imposed in Picklesimer, Blakney's sentence for his burglary conviction did not include a term of probation. However, the existence of a term of probation for the prisoner in Picklesimer did not make its holding any less applicable to CSP revocations that do not involve a term of probation. The identification of the “original sentence” employs the same uncomplicated analysis in both situations. We read Picklesimer's interpretation of section 24–21–560(D) as applying to all CSP revocations, whether or...
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