State v. Blakney
Decision Date | 25 February 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 14534,14534 |
Citation | 641 P.2d 1045,39 St.Rep. 436,197 Mont. 131 |
Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Larry L. BLAKNEY, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Smith, Connor & Van Valkenburg, Missoula, Fred Van Valkenburg, argued, Missoula, for defendant and appellant.
Mike Greely, Atty. Gen., Helena, Mary B. Troland, argued, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena, Robert L. Deschamps, III, County Atty., Missoula, for plaintiff and respondent.
This case is before the Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378. Blakney v. State of Montana, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 2999, 69 L.Ed.2d 384. This Court reheard the case en banc on October 19, 1981, after both the State and the appellant submitted new briefs.
The facts involved are discussed fully in our opinion in State v. Blakney (1979), Mont., 605 P.2d 1093, 36 St.Rep. 2193, and need not completely be repeated here. However, when certain facts are considered together with those in Edwards, it becomes apparent that Edwards is inapposite both factually and legally to the case before us.
The crime for which the appellant was convicted occurred on the evening of Friday and Saturday, June 10 and 11, 1977. The appellant was not arrested until June 14, 1977. He was interviewed by the police on four separate occasions. Before each interview the appellant was advised of his rights and signed separate waivers to those rights. Between interviews, the appellant was not detained and was free to consult his friends and an attorney, if he desired one. A polygraph examination that took place between the second and the third interviews indicated appellant was not telling the truth. After this examination appellant confessed. In the fourth interview a tape was made of that confession.
In Edwards, supra, the defendant was arrested and informed of his Miranda rights. He acknowledged his understanding of those rights and was then interrogated. During questioning he indicated a desire to speak to an attorney. At that point the interrogation ceased, and he was returned to his jail. The next day, after Edwards told the detention officers he did not wish to speak with anyone, he was informed that he had to talk with officers there to interview him. After those officers played a taped statement of an alleged accomplice of Edwards, he made a statement to them about his part in the crime.
The United States Supreme Court held that the use of Edwards' confession against him at trial violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as construed in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The Court enunciated two distinct grounds for disapproving the Arizona Supreme Court's judgment.
First, the Court found that the state court had applied an "erroneous standard" in determining a waiver because it did not focus on the "knowing and intelligent" aspect of Edwards' purported waiver separately from the issue of voluntariness. According to the Supreme Court, consideration of an alleged waiver of right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment requires this two-pronged evaluation.
The Supreme Court also reconfirmed and clarified its ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, that when an accused asserts his right to counsel during a custodial interrogation, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Justice White, speaking for the Court said:
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d at 386.
Here, the trial judge, in an order denying a motion to suppress evidence and to change venue, issued complete findings of fact and conclusions of law. That order, which followed a full hearing, was not fully contained in our previous opinion, but is here set forth in toto:
In spite of the Supreme Court's apparent need to reconfirm Miranda, it is our opinion the Court did not intend to impede legitimate methods of law enforcement by further expanding Miranda :
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 485-86, 101 S.Ct. at 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d at 387.
On reconsideration the appellant contends that the Montana courts' rulings on his confession suffer from the same inadequacy as the ruling rendered against Edwards by the Arizona Supreme Court-failure to meet the two-pronged test of a "voluntary" and "knowing and intelligent" waiver. A...
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State v. Main, DA 09-0475
...but also an actual relinquishment of those benefits, as evidenced by the actions or statements of the accused." State v. Blakney, 197 Mont. 131, 138, 641 P.2d 1045, 1049-50 (1982). The "existence of a valid waiver 'must depend, in each case, upon thePage 12particular facts and circumstances......
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City of Kalispell v. Salsgiver
...Mont. 450, 178 P.3d 91 (citations omitted). The State must meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Blakney , 197 Mont. 131, 141, 641 P.2d 1045, 1051 (1982) (citing Lego v. Twomey , 404 U.S. 477, 488-89, 92 S. Ct. 619, 626-27, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972) ). ¶18 This Court......
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State v. Main
...also an actual relinquishment of those benefits, as evidenced by the actions or statements of the accused.” State v. Blakney, 197 Mont. 131, 138, 641 P.2d 1045, 1049–50 (1982). The “existence of a valid waiver ‘must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surroundi......
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...Edwards was applied without discussion of retroactivity. See State v. Monroe, 103 Idaho 129, 645 P.2d 363 (1982); State v. Blakney, 197 Mont. 131, 641 P.2d 1045 (1982). While not conclusive, it is of interest to note that this Court, on at least two occasions in addition to Solem v. Stumes,......