State v. Blizzard

• Citation: 280 N.C. 11,184 S.E.2d 851
• Decision Date: 15 December 1971
• Docket Number: No. 28,28
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Lonnie BLIZZARD.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 851

184 S.E.2d 851

280 N.C. 11

STATE of North Carolina v. Lonnie BLIZZARD.

No. 28.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 15, 1971.

Robert Morgan, Atty. Gen., and Myron C. Banks, Asst. Atty. Gen., by Ronald M. Price, Staff Atty., Raleigh, for the State.

Grady Mercer, Jr., Beulaville, for defendant appellant.

HIGGINS, Justice.

The defendant's exception to the consolidation of the three cases for trial presents a rather serious question. However, at the time the consolidation was ordered, the court accepted the State's theory that the defendant may have committed the several offenses in order to terrorize the family of his girl friend, Dorothy Jones. However, at the close of the evidence the court dismissed the malicious injury warrant and reduced the assault charge from a felony to a misdemeanor. We are inclined to hold, therefore, that the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to paint its entire picture on a single canvas. G.S. § 15--152; State v. Arsad, 269 N.C. 184, 152 S.E.2d 99; State v. Bryant, 250 N.C. 113, 108 S.E.2d 128; State v. Combs, 200 N.C. 671, 158 S.E. 252.

On the house burning charge, Julian Jones, a witness for the State, testified that in January, 1970, he lived in a house near Jonestown. '. . . I rented it from Bobby Heath. I did not lease the house; Heath just let me move there. . . . There was an attempt to burn . . . Thursday before it was burned the next Wednesday. It was burned on January 14, 1970.' Mr. Jones further testified: 'I left home on the 14th and went to my son's house about three miles away. . . . I was away from the house about five minutes. I heard the siren's whistle when I arrived at my son's house. The fire trucks were going towards my house and I went back home. When I got home I discovered that the house was afire. . . . I do not know what time the siren went off, but I had not been left the house . . . five, six, or seven minutes. . . . I had not noticed anything unusual about my house before I left. . . . It was not over six minutes from the time I left home until I heard the fire whistle.'

Chief of Police, Herman B. Dale, testified that he was at a V.F.W meeting and at 7:05 p.m. the fire alarm sounded. He called the fire station and was advised that the Julian Jones house was burning. 'I left immediately and overtook the fire truck at the scene of the fire. Mr. Smith (referring to Woodrow Smith), the owner of the house, went with me. I got there approximately five minutes from the time I started. . . . The center room was burning. Most of the blaze was on the outside. . . . I smelled the odor of some fuel, gasoline, around the burned area outside the house.'

The State offered Mr. Lynn Williamson, Deputy Commissioner of Insurance, who testified in substance that he arrived at the scene of the fire between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. He was permitted to testify that he made an examination and discovered 'There was an inflammable odor of some type on the ground under the edge of the house. It had the odor of gasoline.' Over objection, he was permitted to express this opinion: 'I think it was a man-made fire beginning on the outside of the house.'

Mr. Joseph Kornegay testified that during the week preceding the fire the defendant came to his filling station, had his car tank and a gallon vinegar jug filled with gasoline. Mr. Kornegay was shown the jug introduced in evidence which was similar to the jug he filled for the defendant. On cross examination he testified that he knew the defendant and that he was of good character. 'I have sold him gas in a jug several times.'

State's witness, Edward Howard, testified that he left home at 7:00 o'clock on the date of the fire. 'I saw a 1968 Plymouth parked about one-hundred and twenty-five yards North from my house. . . . I saw somebody walking around behind the car; I do not know if there was an occupant of the vehicle or not. . . . I asked him if I could help him. He said 'no'. I had never seen the person before. He was a white male person.'

Mrs. Larry Howard testified that she lived about a mile and a quarter from the Julian Jones house and between 6:00 [280 N.C. 15] and 7:00 o'clock on January 14th she saw a 1968 blue and white Plymouth parked on the side of the road about one and one-quarter miles from Julian Jones' house.

On the morning following the fire the officers discovered that along the side of the road about sixty feet from the Julian Jones house were a number of shoe tracks which showed the indenture 'X' on the sole of the shoe which made the tracks. The tracks showed a tread design the same as defendant's combat boots.

The State made no effort to disclose the identity of the person who discovered and reported the fire. It would seem to be of importance to know what the conditions were at the time of the discovery, especially whether the fire was on the outside or on the inside of the building.

S.B.I. Agent Warran Campbell testified that on January 24, 1970, he followed automobile tracks on an old road through the woods in Duplin County to a point about one mile from the highway. There he came upon the defendant's Plymouth automobile and a Cadillac. The defendant and Dorothy Jones were sitting together in the Cadillac. The officers arrested the defendant. With his permission they searched his automobile and found in the trunk a pair of combat boots with an 'X' mark on the sole, a one gallon plastic jug and a 30--30 Marlin rifle. These articles were seized by the officers and introduced in evidence by the State at the trial.

The defendant testified that at the time of the fire alarm he was in the Deep Run Barber Shop five or six miles from the scene when the fire department's truck answered the call and passed on its way to the fire. He admitted he had been meeting Dorothy Jones frequently at night near her home and had parked his automobile and made tracks around it while he was waiting for her. He admitted that sometimes he wore combat boots. A large number of witnesses testified as to his good character.

Mr. Bernell Kennedy testified as follows:

'I own and operate Bernell's Barber Shop in Deep Run. I saw Lonnie Blizzard in my Barber Shop on January 14. I cut his hair, I don't recall what time it was when he came in. As to if it was before or after the fire whistle blew, it was while the whistle was blowing, the fire alarm was going off. No sir, I did not notice anything unusual about his dress or the way he looked.'

The defendant's explanation of the presence of his automobile and the tracks made by combat boots does not at all contradict the State's evidence, but his version does explain the manner in which they were made.

The evidence of the defendant's purchase of a gallon jug of gasoline earlier in the week does not permit an inference the gasoline from the jug started the fire. The defendant, according to the State's witness, was in the habit of making an occasional purchase of a jug full of gasoline. It is a matter of common knowledge that many persons own lawn mowers and different types of machine tools powered by small gasoline motors. The purchase of a gallon jug full of gasoline, therefore, is neither unlawful nor incriminating. The defendant's evidence does not contradict, but explains and rebuts inferences of guilt on the house burning count.

To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the facts and circumstances must be sufficient to constitute substantial evidence of every essential element of the crime charged. State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 93 S.E.2d 431. Guilt must be a legitimate inference from facts established by the evidence. When the facts and circumstances warranted by the evidence do no more than raise a suspicion of guilt, they are insufficient to make out a case and a motion to dismiss should be allowed.

The applicable rules with citations of authority appear in this Court's opinion in State v. Bruton, 264 N.C. 488, 142 S.E.2d 169:

'On a motion to nonsuit, the defendant's evidence which explains or makes clear the evidence of the State may be considered. (Citing authorities.)

On a motion for nonsuit, the foregoing rule also permits the consideration of defendant's evidence which rebuts the inference of guilt when it is not inconsistent with the State's evidence.'

This case fits the pattern described by Chief Justice Stacy in State v. Cranford, 231 N.C. 211, 56 S.E.2d 423. 'A careful scrutiny of the evidence leaves us with the impression that it falls short of the degree of proof required to convict a defendant in a criminal prosecution.'

The evidence against the defendant on the charge of malicious burning of the dwelling house was insufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.

In Case No. CR 70 2483 the charge is that on January 18, 1970, the defendant feloniously and in a secret manner assaulted Dorothy Jones and seven others (naming them) with a deadly weapon, to wit: a 30--30 rifle with intent to feloniously kill and murder the said named persons.

We note that the bill of indictment did not charge that the defendant intentionally discharged a firearm into an occupied building. Hence...