State v. Sheetz, 7921SC966
Decision Date | 20 May 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 7921SC966,7921SC966 |
Citation | 265 S.E.2d 914,46 N.C.App. 641 |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Charles Steven SHEETZ. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen. John R. B. Matthis and Asst. Atty. Gen. Alan S. Hirsch, Raleigh, for the State.
Morrow, Fraser & Reavis by Bruce C. Fraser, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant's initial assignment of error concerns the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the introduction of evidence. We find it necessary to review the propriety of the orders to resolve this contention.
The order issued on 10 October 1978 was entitled "ORDER FOR EXAMINATION OF BUSINESS AND BANK ACCOUNT RECORDS." The language of the order provided for an examination of the business and working records of defendant's business, as well as those of the banks named therein. The order was different from those issued on 4 December and 13 December. We believe this difference was of constitutional magnitude.
Normally, an order to produce documents, a subpoena, or subpoena duces tecum, is not thought to invoke the strictures of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
However, a subpoena is subject to the Fourth Amendment stricture against indefiniteness. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 31 S.Ct. 538, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911). Thus, the nature of the order being considered is of significance.
The present order is akin to those called for by the United States Supreme Court in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967); and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967), i. e., administrative search warrants. G.S. 15-27.2 expressly authorizes issuance of administrative and inspection warrants. "But '(i)f the authorities are seeking evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, the usual standard (of probable cause) will apply.' " Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 508, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1950, 56 L.Ed.2d 486, 498 (1978), and the warrant must be viewed as a criminal investigative search warrant. 1 Michigan v. Tyler, supra. With this in mind, we look to see if the search warrant and its issuance meet the constitutional requirements embodied in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
State v. Riddick, 291 N.C. 399, 406, 230 S.E.2d 506, 511 (1976), reh. denied, 293 N.C. 261, 247 S.E.2d 234 (1977). The affidavit upon which the order of 10 October 1978 was issued alleged in pertinent part:
State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 130-31, 191 S.E.2d 752, 756 (1972).
In State v. Campbell, supra, a special agent for the State Bureau of Investigation had sworn under oath that he had probable cause to believe that defendant Campbell had certain illegal drugs in the described house. The facts allegedly justifying issuance of a warrant were the agent's possession of arrest warrants for defendant and his cohorts and the fact that:
" 'Peter Michael Boulus, Special Agent; N. C. State Bureau of Investigation; being duly sworn and examined under oath, says under oath that he has probable cause to believe that Kenneth Campbell; M. K. Queensberry and David Bryan has on his premises certain property, to wit: illegally possessed drugs (narcotics, stimulants, depressants), which constitutes evidence of a crime, to wit: possession of illegal drugs. . . .' "
Id. at 130, 191 S.E.2d at 756. One of the grounds upon which our Supreme Court held the seizure of the drugs unconstitutional was that nowhere in the affidavit was there a sufficient statement of underlying circumstances from which the magistrate could have concluded that probable cause existed. We believe that the affidavit in question contains the same flaw. The allegation that agents have conducted an investigation which has disclosed evidence of irregularities which, if supported by evidence and found to be true, would constitute serious violations of the law on the part of the defendant, without the disclosure of facts from which the magistrate could ascertain the existence of irregularities that would constitute serious violations of the law, does not meet the constitutional standard for issuance of a search warrant. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); accord, State v. Macri, 39 N.J. 250, 188 A.2d 389 (1963).
Defendant's motion to suppress introduction of the records or evidence gleaned from the records seized from him personally and the Clemmons Florist and Gift Shop pursuant to the order dated 10 October 1978 should have been allowed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); see also G.S. 15A-974.
Evidence seized during an unlawful search cannot constitute proof against the victim of the search, 2 and the exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such invasions. Wong Sun v. United States, supra, and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). As stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, Id. at 392, 40 S.Ct. at 183, 64 L.Ed. at 321:
Subsequent case law has restated this requirement thusly:
"(T)he more apt question in such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' "
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 455 (1963). Thus, we must look to see if the evidence obtained pursuant to the orders dated 4 December 1978 and 13 December 1978 was obtained by exploitation of the unlawful search and seizure or by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.
The orders of 4 December 1978 and 13 December 1978 are subpoenas, and evidence procured by subpoenas is normally not subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 31 S.Ct. 538, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911). Thus, evidence obtained pursuant to these orders can only be...
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