State v. Bloom

• Decision Date: 06 November 1986
• Docket Number: No. 68900,68900
• Citation: State v. Bloom, 497 So.2d 2, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 573 (Fla. 1986)
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 573 STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Philip BLOOM, etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 2

497 So.2d 2

11 Fla. L. Weekly 573

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v.Philip BLOOM, etc., Respondent.

No. 68900.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 6, 1986.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Richard E. Doran, Capital Collateral Coordinator, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for petitioner.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, and Karen M. Gottlieb, Asst. Public Defender, Miami, for respondent.

OVERTON, Judge.

The State of Florida petitions this Court for a writ prohibiting the respondent, a circuit judge, from determining prior to trial the appropriateness of the death penalty in the event the defendant is convicted of first-degree murder.Petitioner also seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the circuit judge to excuse jurors who are unable to recommend a sentence of death.We have jurisdiction.Art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.We grant the writ of prohibition and hold that a circuit judge lacks authority to decide pre-trial whether the death penalty will be imposed in a first-degree murder case.

This petition arises from two separate proceedings in which a defendant was indicted and charged with first-degree murder, armed burglary, and armed robbery.Before his trials, the defendant moved to preclude impanelment of death-qualified juries, contending the state lacked sufficient evidence for the death penalty's imposition in either case.The circuit judge held that he would consider the death penalty in only one case.He granted the defendant's motion in the other case and directed the state to proceed with the first-degree murder trial as a non-capital case.In this petition, the state argues that the circuit judge has no authority to prejudge the death penalty's appropriateness because such a ruling unconstitutionally infringes on an executive function exclusively within a prosecutor's discretion.

A writ of prohibition is the appropriate remedy when a trial court attempts to interfere with the prosecutorial discretion of a state attorney.SeeCleveland v. State, 417 So.2d 653(Fla.1982).Under Florida's constitution, the decision to charge and prosecute is an executive responsibility, and the state attorney has complete discretion in deciding whether and how to prosecute.Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const.; Cleveland;State v. Cain, 381 So.2d 1361(Fla.1980);Johnson v. State, 314 So.2d 573(Fla.1975).In State v. Jogan, 388 So.2d 322(Fla. 3d DCA1980), the Third District Court reversed a trial court's dismissal of an information against a defendant conditioned on his military enlistment.The district court held that the pre-trial decision to prosecute or nol-pros is a responsibility vested solely in the state attorney.While recognizing a court's latitude and discretion during post-trial disposition, Jogan reiterated the state has absolute discretion at pre-trial.In considering similar circumstances, federal courts have held:

[T]he decision of whether or not to prosecute in any given instance must be left to the discretion of the prosecutor.This discretion has been curbed by the judiciary only in those instances where impermissible motives may be attributed to the prosecution, such as bad faith, race, religion, or a desire to prevent the exercise of the defendant's constitutional rights.

United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771, 782(5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 59, 50 L.Ed.2d 76(1976)(citations omitted).We apply these...