State v. Bonamarte
| Decision Date | 21 July 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. DA 08-0036.,DA 08-0036. |
| Citation | 351 Mont. 419,213 P.3d 457,2009 MT 243 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Mark BONAMARTE, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: William F. Hooks, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana.
For Appellee: Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General, John Paulson, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Susan L. Wordal, City Prosecutor, Bozeman, Montana.
¶ 1 Mark Bonamarte appeals his conviction of Partner or Family Member Assault under § 45-5-206, MCA. We affirm.
¶ 2 We consider the following issues:
¶ 3 1. Did the District Court err by concluding the Municipal Court properly excluded evidence offered by Bonamarte to prove the victim's motive and to impeach the victim?
¶ 4 2. Did the District Court err by concluding the Municipal Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony regarding "battered woman" syndrome?
¶ 5 On April 30, 2004, a jury seated in the Bozeman Municipal Court convicted Bonamarte of misdemeanor Partner or Family Member Assault. The Municipal Court, Hon. Patricia Carlson presiding, sentenced Bonamarte to one year in jail with all but thirty days suspended, and ordered him to pay fines and restitution. The Municipal Court instructed the State to arrange a hearing to determine the amount of restitution within sixty days. Prior to the expiration of sixty days, Bonamarte appealed to the District Court, challenging the Municipal Court's evidentiary rulings and its order requiring payment of restitution. The District Court affirmed the rulings and remanded the case to the Municipal Court for entry of a final order regarding the amount of restitution. Bonamarte appealed to this Court, and we dismissed the case without prejudice, concluding the appeal was premature. State v. Bonamarte, 2006 MT 291, 334 Mont. 376, 147 P.3d 220.
¶ 6 On March 1, 2007, the Municipal Court issued its final order on the amount of restitution. Bonamarte again appealed his conviction to the Eighteenth Judicial District Court. Both parties resubmitted their prior briefs to the District Court, which again affirmed the Municipal Court's evidentiary rulings. Bonamarte appeals the District Court's final order affirming his conviction.
¶ 7 On January 15, 2003, Bozeman police officers responded to a report of domestic violence. At the scene, Lynette Felix told the officers that Bonamarte had struck her several times, and though he had left the apartment, she feared for her and her children's safety. Bonamarte was subsequently arrested and charged with misdemeanor Partner or Family Member Assault in violation of § 45-5-206, MCA.
¶ 8 Felix and Bonamarte had been romantically involved for three years prior to this incident. Each of them also shared in the operation of a car-wash business, which Felix ultimately purchased from Bonamarte. Felix testified that their relationship had been characterized by violence and threats by Bonamarte and by his efforts to control her and her family. She testified that he had beat her about 100 times over a period of a year and a half, that she had been reluctant to tell anyone, and during that time she had undertaken efforts to cover up her injuries with make-up and clothing.
¶ 9 Prior to trial, the State orally moved the Municipal Court to prohibit Michael Richards, of Mountain West Bank, from testifying at trial. Through Richards' testimony, Bonamarte intended to introduce a loan application Felix submitted to the bank. On the application, Felix falsely represented to the bank that she anticipated receiving a large amount of money through an inheritance. Bonamarte sought to use this evidence to demonstrate that Felix was not credible. The Municipal Court granted the State's motion, expressing concern that this evidence was potentially misleading and could confuse the issues to be put before the jury, noting that this case was not about bank fraud but assault. However, the court permitted Bonamarte to cross-examine Felix regarding the falsity of the bank application. The court added that if Felix were to perjure herself about the application, it would re-consider the use of extrinsic documentary evidence.
¶ 10 When asked, Felix admitted she provided false information to the bank on her application. She explained that she had done so because she was required to do so by Bonamarte. Bonamarte further examined her regarding their business ventures. Bonamarte then attempted to introduce several documents, other than the loan application, which he contended contradicted Felix's testimony about the poor financial health of their business. The court denied admission of these documents, citing possible confusion of the jury. Bonamarte testified to the effect that the business was in sound financial condition and about other issues he believed established a motive for Felix to lie. His theory was that Felix was motivated to falsely claim she had been assaulted in order to remove Bonamarte from the business by a restraining order, allowing her to take additional sums from the business to service her significant debt.
¶ 11 Immediately prior to the State's calling of Kathy Coles to testify as an expert witness, Bonamarte moved the court to exclude her testimony as irrelevant and prejudicial. The court responded that Bonamarte could have raised this objection much earlier. The court declined to preemptively exclude Coles' testimony, stating it would consider any objections Bonamarte might make to her testimony after she was qualified as an expert. When Coles began to testify about police recognition of victim and abuser profiles observed in domestic disturbances, Bonamarte objected on relevance grounds and improper vouching of Felix. The Court sustained Bonamarte's objection and cautioned the prosecutor to elicit only testimony that would help the jury understand the evidence presented at trial. Bonamarte again objected when the prosecutor questioned Coles about the role of power and control in domestic violence, arguing that "syndrome testimony" was inadmissible. The court overruled this objection.
¶ 12 On appeal, the District Court concluded that the Municipal Court did not abuse its discretion by its evidentiary rulings.
¶ 13 A district court's review of a municipal court's orders and judgment is limited to review of the record and questions of law. State v. Ditton, 2006 MT 235, ¶ 18, 333 Mont. 483, 144 P.3d 783. This Court reviews a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct. Ditton, ¶ 18. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Ditton, ¶ 18; State v. Nelson, 2002 MT 122, ¶ 9, 310 Mont. 71, 48 P.3d 739. A court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, and a substantial injustice results. State v. Sanchez, 2008 MT 27, ¶ 15, 341 Mont. 240, 177 P.3d 444.
¶ 14 1. Did the District Court err by concluding the Municipal Court properly excluded evidence offered by Bonamarte to prove the victim's motive and to impeach the victim?
¶ 15 Bonamarte argues the Municipal Court's decision to exclude Richards' proffered testimony about Felix's untruthful loan application and its refusal to admit certain financial documents, denied him his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him and prevented him from mounting a successful defense. The State responds that Bonamarte did not raise a constitutional argument in the Municipal Court, and that the court properly exercised its discretion under Montana Rules of Evidence 403 and 608.
¶ 16 As the District Court noted, we held in Nelson, "the trial court's discretion in exercising control and excluding evidence of a witness's bias or motive to testify falsely becomes operative only after the constitutionally required threshold level of inquiry has been afforded the Defendant." Nelson, ¶ 13 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, "a trial court has broad discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination to those issues it determines are relevant to the trial" and "limiting the scope of cross-examination does not necessarily violate a defendant's right to confront an adverse witness." Nelson, ¶ 15 (citations omitted). While the trial court's rulings regarding admission of evidence and cross-examination were necessarily related to Bonamarte's right of confrontation, he made no separate constitutional argument in the Municipal Court, challenging only the court's application of the rules of evidence. Therefore, our review is confined to whether the court's rulings were erroneous under those rules.
¶ 17 Rule 608(b), M.R. Evid. prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances of conduct for the purpose of attacking a witness's credibility. Rule 608(a) permits opinion testimony concerning a witness's credibility under certain conditions, but Bonamarte did not offer such opinion evidence here. Rule 608(b) permits the use of extrinsic evidence regarding specific instances of conduct probative of the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness during cross-examination, subject to the proper exercise of discretion by the trial court. See State v. Gommenginger, 242 Mont. 265, 271-75, 790 P.2d 455, 459-61 (1990). Under Rule 403, a court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
¶ 18 Bonamarte's arguments are similar to those made by the defendant in State v. McClean, 179 Mont. 178, 587 P.2d 20 (1978). McClean argued the trial court had erred by not permitting him to present witnesses who were able to testify that the State's primary witness, an undercover officer, was also a drug user and dealer and thus...
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