State v. Boucher

Decision Date30 May 2002
Docket NumberNo. 00-803.,00-803.
Citation48 P.3d 21,309 Mont. 514,2002 MT 114
PartiesSTATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert John BOUCHER, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

For Appellant: Mark E. Jones, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana.

For Respondent: Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Cregg W. Coughlin, Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana, M. Shaun Donovan, County Attorney, Superior, Montana.

Justice JIM RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Robert John Boucher (Boucher) appeals the denial of his appeal to the Fourth Judicial District Court. Boucher entered a plea of guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol in Mineral County Justice Court. After judgment, Boucher moved to withdraw the plea, and the Justice Court denied the motion. Boucher appealed to the District Court, which both found that Boucher's plea had been entered voluntarily and dismissed the appeal due to lack of jurisdiction. This Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction by deeming Boucher's filing in the District Court as a petition for postconviction relief. On the basis that the record does not support a finding that Boucher entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, we reverse and remand.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Boucher received a citation for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), in violation of § 61-8-401, MCA, on November 11, 1999. He appeared in Mineral County Justice Court the following day and entered a plea of not guilty. At the time of his initial appearance, Justice of the Peace Wanda James advised Boucher of his constitutional rights, and Boucher signed a form that stated, in pertinent part:

I understand that if you [sic] willingly and knowingly enter a guilty plea in this case, you [sic] are giving up your [sic] right to appeal this case to the district court.

¶ 3 On March 31, 2000, Boucher, his attorney and the county attorney appeared in Justice James' court and discussed the possibility of amending the charge to DUI per se and some of the ramifications of a guilty plea. The State amended the original complaint and Boucher entered a plea of guilty to a DUI per se violation, under § 61-8-406, MCA, by telephone conversation with Justice James on April 3, 2000. Justice James testified she did not recall whether she had reiterated or discussed waiver of Boucher's right to appeal over the telephone at the time he changed his plea. The court issued a written judgment memorializing the sentence, which was mailed to Boucher. The judgment included the following statement:

The Defendant may appeal this Judgment to the district court by filing written notice of the appeal within ten days.

¶ 4 Boucher then learned that as a result of his guilty plea his driving privileges would be revoked in the State of Washington where he worked on a temporary construction job. On April 7, 2000, Boucher filed a motion in Justice Court to withdraw his plea, stating the following basis:

The plea was entered with the [Defendant's] understanding that he could continue driving. Subsequent events of no fault of any of the parties have proven this to be impossible.

The Justice Court denied Boucher's motion.

¶ 5 On April 12, 2000, Boucher filed a pro se, hand-written notice to the District Court of an appeal "to [his] guilty plea." The State immediately moved to dismiss the appeal. Boucher, with the assistance of counsel, filed a response to the motion, alleging that his plea was not knowing or voluntary because he had not been apprised by the Justice of the Peace at the time he entered the plea on April 3, 2000, that he was waiving his right to appeal.

¶ 6 At the hearing held on September 14, 2000, the District Court reviewed the Justice Court's denial of Boucher's motion to withdraw his plea. The court found Boucher had been informed at the time of his initial appearance on November 12, 1999, that a guilty plea waived the right to a trial and appeal. The court also found that Justice James admonished Boucher on several occasions that any collateral consequences of his guilty plea, specifically including the effect on his driving privileges in Washington, were unknown to the court and would have to be determined exclusively by Boucher with the assistance of counsel. The court noted that the Justice of the Peace did not make mention of any right to appeal the judgment when Boucher entered his guilty plea by telephone.

¶ 7 The District Court concluded that Boucher entered his guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. Further, the court held that the Justice Court's oral judgment, which contained no mention of any right to appeal, controlled over the subsequent written judgment, which stated that the defendant could appeal within 10 days. On the issue of jurisdiction, the court concluded Boucher was not entitled to appeal to the district court as a matter of law and granted the State's motion to dismiss.

¶ 8 Boucher filed a notice of appeal from the District Court's dismissal of his appeal. On October 20, 2000, the District Court stayed Boucher's sentence pending the outcome of the appeal to this Court.

¶ 9 The threshold issue before this Court is whether the District Court has jurisdiction to review a postconviction denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea in Justice Court. The underlying issue is whether the District Court correctly concluded that Boucher entered his guilty plea in Justice Court voluntarily.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 Whether to dismiss a claim based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine if they are correct. In re Marriage of Skillen, 1998 MT 43, ¶ 9, 287 Mont. 399, ¶ 9, 956 P.2d 1, ¶ 9. A district court may permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea for good cause. Section 46-16-105(2), MCA. This Court reviews denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. State v. Bowley (1997), 282 Mont. 298, 304, 938 P.2d 592, 595.

I

¶ 11 Did the District Court have jurisdiction to review a postconviction denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea in Justice Court?

¶ 12 The issue of a court's subject matter jurisdiction may be presented at any time. Balyeat Law, PC v. Pettit, 1998 MT 252, ¶ 15, 291 Mont. 196, ¶ 15, 967 P.2d 398, ¶ 15. A party can never waive or consent to subject matter jurisdiction where there is no basis for the court to exercise jurisdiction. In re Marriage of Skillen, ¶ 10. Pursuant to § 46-17-203(2), MCA, entry of a guilty plea in justice court waives a defendant's right to a trial de novo in district court. This Court recently held there is no statutory right of appeal from a justice court's order denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Feight, 2001 MT 205, ¶ 22, 306 Mont. 312, ¶ 22, 33 P.3d 623, ¶ 22; State v. Fox, 2001 MT 209, ¶ 17, 306 Mont. 353, ¶ 17, 34 P.3d 484, ¶ 17.

¶ 13 The State asserts on appeal that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Boucher's appeal because Montana law does not provide for an appeal to district court after a defendant enters a plea of guilty in a court of limited jurisdiction. Boucher acknowledges that a defendant who enters a guilty plea in justice court waives the right of trial de novo in district court, pursuant to § 46-17-203(2), MCA, but contends his guilty plea is not valid, and challenges the Justice Court's acceptance of the plea on the grounds that his plea and waiver were not entered voluntarily. Boucher cites State v. Waymire (1987), 226 Mont. 406, 736 P.2d 106, for the proposition that reason, justice and public policy dictate that an appeal of a guilty plea in justice court may be tried anew in district court provided the appeal is properly perfected.

¶ 14 In State v. Waymire, the Court addressed two separate cases where defendants sought to withdraw their guilty pleas. Jeffery Waymire alleged that the justice court entered a plea on his behalf but without his consent. The other defendant, Charles Metcalf, voluntarily entered a guilty plea in justice court but was dissatisfied with his sentence. Although the defendants presented very different legal issues, we held that the remedy for both was trial de novo in district court. Waymire, 226 Mont. at 408-09, 736 P.2d at 108.

¶ 15 Following the Waymire decision, the Legislature limited the right of appeal from courts of limited jurisdiction by amending § 46-17-311, MCA, in 1991 to read, in pertinent part:

Appeal from justices', municipal, and city courts. (1) Except ... for cases in which legal issues are preserved for appeal pursuant to XX-XX-XXX, all cases on appeal from a justice's or city court must be tried anew in the district court ... (2) The defendant may appeal to the district court by filing written notice of intention to appeal within 10 days after a judgment is rendered following trial ....

Sec. 217, Ch. 800, L.1991 (words of amendment in italics). Subsequently, we determined § 46-17-311(2), MCA, as amended, procedurally requires adjudication of a matter by trial in a justice or city court as a prerequisite to an appeal in district court for a trial de novo. Feight, ¶ 15. We also held that § 46-17-311, MCA, provides the exclusive statutory remedy for appeals from the courts of limited jurisdiction. Feight, ¶ 15. At present, unless a specific issue has been preserved for appeal prior to final judgment, our laws provide no appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere entered in a court of limited jurisdiction. Feight, ¶ 12. Accordingly, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be granted or denied at the discretion of a justice or city court that has original jurisdiction, with no right of direct appeal.

¶ 16 On appeal to this Court, the State argues that after the Justice of the Peace denied Boucher's request to withdraw his guilty plea, Boucher's remedy was to petition the District Court for postconviction relief on the grounds...

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