State v. Bower

• Decision Date: 28 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 25642.,25642.
• Citation: 135 Idaho 554,21 P.3d 491
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael James BOWER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

21 P.3d 491

135 Idaho 554

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael James BOWER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 25642.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

February 28, 2001.

Ronaldo A. Coulter, State Appellate Public Defender; Sara B. Thomas, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Sara B. Thomas argued.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Karen A. Hudelson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Karen A. Hudelson argued.

LANSING, Judge.

When paramedics responded to a report that a man had passed out in the shower of a motel room, they found Michael James Bower lying unconscious in the shower, and also observed drugs and drug paraphernalia in the room. They notified police, who came to the room and seized the evidence. After Bower was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, he moved for suppression of the evidence found in his motel room. The motion was denied, and Bower pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Bower had been residing in a motel room with his four-year-old daughter. One morning, the motel manager found Bower's daughter crying in the parking lot. After she indicated there was something wrong with her father, the manager found Bower lying unconscious in the shower of his motel room. The manager then called for paramedics. When county paramedics and firemen responded, they found Bower unconscious and barely breathing, with the little girl sitting on the bed. While Bower was being attended by paramedics, one of the firemen, a former police officer, noticed what appeared to be drugs and drug paraphernalia in an open drawer. He notified his captain, who instructed him to call for police assistance. Officers who arrived shortly thereafter were informed that the paramedics had been treating an unconscious man and that drug paraphernalia were visible in the room. By that time, Bower had regained consciousness and was refusing further treatment, but when officers crossed the threshold he was still lying on the floor, with paramedics tending to him. The officers entered the room and seized the paraphernalia, which included several syringes and a spoon with burn marks and residue indicative of narcotic cooking. Bower was questioned and admitted to the officers that he had just overdosed on heroin.

Bower was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, Idaho Code § 37-2734A, injury to a child, I.C. § 18-1501(2) and two counts of possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c). Bower filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his motel room on the ground that the entry by police was unlawful. The district court determined that exigent circumstances justified the police intrusion, and therefore denied the motion. Bower entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a controlled substance and to possession of drug paraphernalia, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The remaining charges were dismissed.

On appeal, Bower argues that the police officers' warrantless entry into his motel room violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and therefore the evidence they seized must be suppressed.

II. ANALYSIS

Whether a search complies with the Fourth Amendment is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 400, 958 P.2d 22, 26 (Ct.App.1998). The Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures protects against the warrantless entry of a home by government agents. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2096, 80 L.Ed.2d 732, 741 (1984)

; State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225 (1993). This constitutional protection extends to a temporary home, such as a motel room. State v. Hall, 132 Idaho 751, 753, 979 P.2d 624, 626 (1999). When a warrantless search or seizure has occurred, the State bears a heavy burden to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement. Welsh at 749-50, 104 S.Ct. at 2097-98,

80 L.Ed.2d at 742-43; Curl, supra; State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432, 434, 925 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Ct.App.1996). Recognized justifications include an exigent circumstance in which there is "a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant." Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 56 L.Ed.2d 486, 498 (1978); Sailas, supra. Exigencies which justify a warrantless entry include "the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling." Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 109 L.Ed.2d 85, 95 (1990); Sailas, 129 Idaho at 435,

925 P.2d at 1134. This encompasses situations where government agents "reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 300 (1978). However, a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justified its initiation." Id.,

437 U.S. at 393,

98 S.Ct. at 2413,

57 L.Ed.2d at 300 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908 (1968)).

If police are lawfully within a home, and see contraband or other evidence of a crime in plain view, they may seize the evidence without a warrant. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2305, 110 L.Ed.2d 112, 120 (1990); State v. Claiborne, 120 Idaho 581, 586, 818 P.2d 285, 290 (1991); State v. Hagedorn, 129 Idaho 155, 158, 922 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Ct.App.1996). This plain view doctrine applies if the officer is lawfully in a position to view the evidence and it is immediately apparent to the officer that the items observed are subject to seizure. Id. at 159, 922 P.2d at 1085.

Here, Bower does not question that his medical emergency was an exigent circumstance that justified the entry into his room by paramedics and firemen, nor does he dispute that the drugs and paraphernalia were in the plain view of persons legally in the room. However, Bower argues that the exigency had passed by the time police officers arrived because he was by that time awake and declining treatment and because the officers were not there to handle the medical emergency but, rather, to conduct a criminal investigation.

The State responds that the police may accompany or follow emergency medical personnel who lawfully enter a residence in exigent circumstances. This is true, the State asserts, regardless of whether the police are responding to the emergency because the presence of police where other state officers are present does not increase the lawful intrusion.

Before addressing the State's argument, we must consider Bower's objection that the State is raising a new issue on appeal. According to Bower, because the prosecutor below did not argue that the police officers' entry into the hotel room could be considered an extension of the paramedics' entry, he has been prejudiced because he was not put on notice of the need to present evidence pertinent to this issue.

We find Bower's position to be untenable for a number of reasons. First, the overarching "issue" presented both to the trial court and on appeal was raised by Bower's motion, not by the State. That issue is whether the officers' entry into the motel room violated the Fourth Amendment. Second, the State was not obligated to notify Bower in advance of the hearing of each of the warrant exceptions the State deemed applicable nor to give him advance notice of all its legal arguments respecting those exceptions.¹ When a defendant has demonstrated that a warrantless search or seizure occurred, it becomes the State's burden to prove through presentation of evidence that an exception to the warrant requirement applied. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576 (1971); State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218-19, 984 P.2d 703, 706-07 (1999); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 481, 988 P.2d 700, 707 (Ct.App.1999),cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1038, 120 S.Ct. 1533, 146 L.Ed.2d 348 (2000). It then becomes the judge's duty to determine whether the proven facts demonstrate that the search met the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. While prosecutors may customarily address some written or oral argument to the court presenting the State's legal theories as to why the search or seizure was lawful, the prosecutor is not obligated to do so; nor is the trial court precluded from ruling that the evidence was lawfully acquired on a theory different from that advanced by the prosecutor. We have held that a court's analysis of the constitutionality of a search is not circumscribed by the intent or belief of the officer at the scene regarding the reason or justification for the search. State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 863, 934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct.App.1997); State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 121, 124, 795 P.2d 15, 18 (Ct.App.1990). See also Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2782-83, 86 L.Ed.2d 370, 377-78 (1985)

; Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-38, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168, 177-78 (1978). Similarly, the court is not limited by the prosecutor's argument or the absence thereof. "The lawfulness of a search is to be determined by the court, based upon an objective assessment of the circumstances which confronted the officer at the time of the search." Shepherd, 118 Idaho at 124,

795 P.2d at 18.

Finally, it must be remembered that the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which disallows the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence at the trial of an accused, is to deter law enforcement officials from violating constitutional protections. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3051, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1086 (1976); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). Use of the exclusionary rule imposes a price upon...