State v. Bowers
Decision Date | 10 November 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 2019-1282,2019-1282 |
Citation | 163 Ohio St.3d 28,167 N.E.3d 947 |
Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. BOWERS, Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Anton Lapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Stagnaro, Hannigan, Koop, Co., L.P.A., and Michaela M. Stagnaro, Cincinnati, for appellee.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Craig M. Jaquith, Assistant State Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Office of the Ohio Public Defender.
O'Connor, C.J. {¶ 1} This appeal concerns the trial court's decision to sentence appellee, Adam Bowers, to 25 years to life in prison for rape under R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(c) based on its finding that Bowers had compelled the victim to submit by force. We hold that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that such a finding be made by a jury. We therefore affirm the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals reversing Bowers's sentence.
Relevant Background
{¶ 2} Bowers was convicted of rape of a child under the age of 13 in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b).1 The victim was Bowers's stepniece, who was approximately five to six years old at the time of the events leading to Bowers's conviction. Based on the victim's age, the jury also found Bowers guilty of a specification that the victim was under the age of ten. No other specification was set out in the indictment or contained in the verdict form submitted to the jury. That includes the specification relevant to this case—that the victim was compelled to submit by force or the threat of force—as we explain below.
{¶ 3} The trial court had the option of sentencing Bowers to either a definite sentence of life in prison without parole under R.C. 2907.02(B) or a sentence under R.C. 2971.03. It imposed an indefinite sentence of 25 years to life in prison under R.C. 2971.03(A). See State v. Bowers , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150024, 2016-Ohio-904, 2016 WL 901119, ¶ 39.
{¶ 4} On appeal, the First District reversed in part, holding that the trial court had erred by imposing a sentence under R.C. 2971.03(A), because that provision applies only to certain crimes with sexually-violent-predator specifications and no such specification was found in this case. Id. at ¶ 41-42. The court of appeals therefore remanded the case for resentencing under the correct provision, R.C. 2907.02(B).
{¶ 5} When a trial court does not sentence a defendant convicted under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) to life in prison without parole under R.C. 2907.02(B), R.C. 2971.03(B) provides three possible indefinite sentences that may be imposed instead: 10 years to life, 15 years to life, or 25 years to life. R.C. 2971.03(B)(1) provides:
{¶ 6} On remand, the trial court again sentenced Bowers to 25 years to life in prison. At the sentencing hearing, it did not make any factual findings, including any findings concerning the factors set out in R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(c). The court indicated that it believed that a sentence of 25 years to life was its only option if it declined to sentence Bowers to life in prison without parole.
{¶ 7} On appeal, a new panel of the First District reversed, holding that a sentence of 15 years to life under R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(b) was also an option. State v. Bowers , 2018-Ohio-30, 102 N.E.3d 1218, ¶ 5, 14 (1st Dist.) (" Bowers II "). It therefore reversed Bowers's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for it to impose a new sentence, this time with the correct understanding of its sentencing options.
{¶ 8} In reaching this holding, however, the First District also considered whether a sentence of 25 years to life under R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(c) was permissible. First, it stated that such a sentence was permissible because "there was ample evidence that Bowers compelled his victim to submit by force," Bowers II at ¶ 11. It also indicated that it believed that the trial court had expressly found that Bowers had used force in the commission of the rape, stating that "[i]n this case, the judicial finding of ‘force’ under R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(c) altered neither the mandatory minimum or available maximum sentence." Id. at ¶ 17. It further concluded that the fact that the trial court, rather than the jury, had made that finding did not violate Bowers's Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at ¶ 17-19, 20.
{¶ 9} At the second resentencing, the trial court again did not make any express factual findings concerning R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(c). Instead, it proceeded on the understanding that in accordance with the First District's decision in Bowers II , its options in sentencing Bowers were life in prison without parole under R.C. 2907.02(B), 15 years to life under R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(b), and 25 years to life under R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(c). The trial court stated that it believed that the last of these was appropriate and therefore sentenced Bowers to 25 years to life under R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(c). It did not otherwise explain why it was declining to impose a sentence of 15 years to life or life in prison without parole.
{¶ 10} On appeal for the third time, a new panel of the First District reversed. It held that Bowers's sentence was not authorized, because none of the prerequisites for such a sentence under R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(c) —the use of force or the threat of force in the commission of the offense, a prior conviction for rape of a child under 13, or serious physical harm caused to the victim of the offense—was present. The First District stated that its conclusion in Bowers II that the trial court had found that Bowers used force was incorrect; no such finding had been made. It also stated that its related statements in Bowers II that the Sixth Amendment permits such a finding to be made by the trial court rather than the jury were nonbinding dicta. Finally, it concluded that permitting a trial court to make a finding of force for the purpose of imposing a sentence under R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(c) would violate the Sixth Amendment based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). Specifically, the court of appeals noted that the verdict form submitted to the jury did not ask it to determine whether any of the factors under R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(c) had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the only specification contained on the verdict form asked whether Bowers was guilty of raping a child under the age of ten. The jury found that he was, and the court of appeals held that that finding made a sentence of 15 years to life under R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(b) an option. But because the jury had not found that any of the R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(c) factors had been proved, the court of appeals concluded that a sentence of 25 years to life was not an option.
{¶ 11} The state appealed to this court. We accepted jurisdiction over the state's second and third propositions of law:
See 157 Ohio St.3d 1510, 2019-Ohio-5193, 136 N.E.3d 499.
Analysis
{¶ 12} The interpretation of a statute is a question of law. State v. Straley , 139 Ohio St.3d 339, 2014-Ohio-2139, 11 N.E.3d 1175, ¶ 9. We therefore review the First District's decision de novo. Id.
{¶ 13} Both of the state's propositions of law implicate the holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Alleyne , 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314. In Apprendi , the court held that the Sixth Amendment requires that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum," except for the fact of a prior conviction, "must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. In Alleyne , the court held that this principle applies equally to facts increasing mandatory minimums: "Facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence are * * * elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt." Alleyne at 108, 133 S.Ct. 2151 ; see also United States v. Haymond , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 2369, 2379, 204 L.Ed.2d 897 (2019), quoting Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (...
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