State v. Boyd

Decision Date30 September 2022
Docket Number20 MA 0131
Parties STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert BOYD, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Atty. Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecutor, Atty. Ralph M. Rivera, Assistant Chief, Criminal Division, Office of the Mahoning County Prosecutor, 21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor, Youngstown, Ohio 44503, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Atty. Edward F. Borkowski, Jr. P.O. Box 609151, Cleveland, Ohio 44109, for Defendant-Appellant.

BEFORE: Carol Ann Robb, Gene Donofrio, Cheryl L. Waite, Judges.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Robb, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Robert Boyd appeals after being convicted of rape and other offenses in the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court. He sets forth arguments related to the denial of his suppression motion, sufficiency of the evidence, weight of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and sentencing. For the following reasons, the trial court's judgment is upheld and Appellant's convictions are affirmed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

{¶2} Appellant was indicted on two counts of rape for purposefully compelling two victims to submit to sexual conduct by force or threat of force. See R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), (B) (first-degree felonies). Count one related to anal sex with victim A, who was 17 years old at the time of the March 31, 2017 incident. Count two related to anal sex with victim B, who was 14 years old at the time of an April 17, 2016 incident. As to victim B, Appellant was also charged with gross sexual imposition for touching this boy's penis by force or threat of force. See R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), (C) (fourth-degree felony).

{¶3} Three counts of disseminating matter harmful to juveniles were brought based on Appellant's texting of photographs of his penis to victim C, who was 16 years old at the time of the March 2017 communications. See R.C. 2907.31(A)(1), (F) (first-degree misdemeanors). Appellant was also charged with nine counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material for possessing or viewing certain photographs found on a hard drive during the execution of search warrants at his residence. See R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), (B) (fifth-degree felonies).

{¶4} Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his Instagram account and the later search of his residences. The affidavits and warrants issued on 4/5/17 and 5/12/17 were admitted at the suppression hearing and are reviewed in detail in assignment of error one. The trial court denied the suppression motion. (11/27/2019 J.E.).

{¶5} After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted on all counts with the exception of count four (one of the three disseminating charges). The testimony presented at trial is reviewed where relevant within assignments of error two, three, and five (which address sufficiency of the evidence, weight of the evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel). As discussed further in assignment of error five, Appellant was sentenced to maximum consecutive sentences for two rapes and gross sexual imposition and a combination of concurrent and consecutive sentences for the other offenses, for a total sentence of 24.5 years. He filed a timely notice of appeal from the December 2, 2020 sentencing entry.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE: SUPPRESSION

{¶6} Appellant sets forth five assignments of error, the first of which alleges:

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS."

{¶7} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The exclusionary rule was judicially created to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Hoffman , 141 Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio-4795, 25 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 24, citing United States v. Calandra , 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). By Ohio rule, a request for a search warrant must be accompanied by a sworn affidavit "establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant." Crim.R. 41(C)(1). A search warrant will be issued if the judge finds probable cause for the search exists based on the information in the affidavit. Crim.R. 41(C)(2) ("The finding of probable cause may be based upon hearsay in whole or in part, provided there is a substantial basis for believing the source of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished.").

{¶8} "An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause * * *." Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). In evaluating probable cause in an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant, the duty of the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant is to consider all of the circumstances in the affidavit and "make a practical, common-sense decision" as to whether there is "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Id. at 238-239, 103 S.Ct. 2317. "The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances." Maryland v. Pringle , 540 U.S. 366, 370-71, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003).

{¶9} The court evaluates the nexus between the alleged crime and the objects to be seized or the place to be searched. State v. Castagnola , 145 Ohio St.3d 1, 2015-Ohio-1565, 46 N.E.3d 638, ¶ 34. The affiant can make reasonable inferences, and the facts behind any significant inferences should be disclosed to the issuing judge, who can make their own inferences. Id. at ¶ 39-41.

{¶10} The probable cause decision examining the totality of the circumstances is entitled to great deference and doubtful cases must be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant. State v. Jones , 143 Ohio St.3d 266, 2015-Ohio-483, 37 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 13-14. Search warrant affidavits "must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area." United States v. Ventresca , 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).

{¶11} Upon the establishment of probable cause in the affidavit, the aforequoted Fourth Amendment also states the warrant must set out the scope of the authorized search with particularity. Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 584, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The purpose of requiring the search warrant to "particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized" is to avoid "wide-ranging exploratory searches." Maryland v. Garrison , 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). "In search and seizure cases where a warrant is involved, the requisite specificity necessary therein usually varies with the nature of the items to be seized. Where, as here, the items are evidence or instrumentalities of a crime, it appears that the key inquiry is whether the warrants could reasonably have described the items more precisely than they did." State v. Benner , 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 307, 533 N.E.2d 701 (1988). Even a search warrant with broad categories of items to be seized is proper when the description is as specific as the criminal activity being investigated allows. Castagnola , 145 Ohio St.3d 1, 2015 -Ohio- 1565, 46 N.E.3d 638 at ¶ 80.

{¶12} Appellant initially contests the denial of his suppression motion related to the Instagram warrant. He contends the affidavit to obtain the search warrant for his Instagram account lacked probable cause and the warrant was overbroad by authorizing a general exploratory search.

{¶13} The affidavit for the Instagram warrant explained the investigation began when a father called the Boardman police to report finding an Instagram message on his 15-year-old son's phone suggesting he regularly bought tobacco products from Appellant. The father saw the following message from another juvenile to his son: "if you got 10 lets go Bobs and get a blizzy." (The father explained this is what his son called a black and mild cigar.) When the father responded while pretending to be his son, he discovered Robert Boyd had been providing alcohol and tobacco to juveniles at his residence in Boardman and other locations.

{¶14} On April 3, 2017, the school resource officer (a Boardman police sergeant) met with the juvenile (who is not one of the victims in this case). The juvenile admitted Appellant provided him with alcohol and tobacco and additionally reported that at the beginning of March 2017, Appellant asked via Instagram if he could give the juvenile a "blowjob" (and then asked the juvenile to delete the message after his request was rejected). It was noted that Appellant's Instagram username (robertboyd5515) was Appellant's first and last name combined with the street address at his house on West Boulevard. The police were provided with screenshots of conversations between this username and the reporting juvenile.

{¶15} On March 18, 2017, the juvenile asked Appellant for a "favor" by stating: "All I have is a dollar and I really need a black and mild" and "I'd ask for a pack but I don't have enough to get u back." Appellant arranged to meet the juvenile at a gas station, telling him to "jump in the mustang so no one sees me giving it to ya" after noting, "You showed me you can keep a secret."

{¶16} On March 22, 2017, the juvenile asked for "blacks with that bottle, I got money for em, don't forget what the bottle is for lol." Appellant asked, "No school tomorrow?" The juvenile disclosed he had been expelled, and Appellant arranged to meet him at a certain address.

{¶17} On March 28, 2017, Appellant reminded the juvenile, "Delete our...

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