State v. Boyle

• Citation: 10 S.E. 696,104 N.C. 800
• Parties: STATE v. BOYLE.
• Decision Date: 16 January 1890
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

10 S.E. 696

104 N.C. 800

STATE v. BOYLE.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

January 16, 1890

Appeal from superior court, Wake county; ARMFIELD, Judge.

Indictment for rape. Verdict of guilty, and appeal by prisoner from the judgment pronounced.

For concurring opinion, see 10 S.E. 1023.

Fuller & Snow and Battle & Mordecai, for appellant.

The Attorney General and Devereux & Wilder, for the State.

MERRIMON C.J.

In this state it has ever been the duty of the judge presiding in courts over jury trials to give the jury appropriate instructions as to the law applicable to the issues on trial. He is not allowed to "give an opinion whether a fact is fully or sufficiently proven, such matters being the true office and province of the jury;" but he is expressly required by the the statute (Code, § 413) to "state in a plain and correct manner the evidence given in the case, and declare and explain the law arising thereon." This statutory requirement, enacted first substantially as it now appears in 1796, has always since then been regarded as imposing on the judges to whom it applied a very important necessary, and, in many cases, difficult duty to discharge properly. The purpose of it is to have the law made intelligible to the jury; to have them on such trials instructed by the court clearly, explicitly, and correctly as to the law bearing upon the evidence submitted to them as a whole, and upon every material aspect of it, whether there be many or few such aspects; and likewise to have the court while it carefully abstains from the slightest expression of any opinion as to the weight of the evidence, or that a fact is or is not fully or sufficiently proven, help the jury, by a "plain, and correct statement of the evidence to apprehend, comprehend, appreciate, apply and determine the weight of it properly." Such statement of the evidence should embrace an explanation of its nature, purpose bearings, and groupings, and freeing it from possible misapprehension, occasioned by inadvertence, mistake, or the undue zeal of counsel in their argument to the jury or otherwise. The office of the judge in such connection is to help the jury to see the evidence bearing on the issue, and the law arising thereon, clearly, stripped of redundant improper, and merely confusing matters and things, whether of evidence, argument, of counsel, or law. Jurors are generally plain, honest, sensible men, unskilled in the law, and not much accustomed to nice discriminations and distinctions in matters of evidence and fact. They need and require the superintending, guidance, and help of a learned and just judge in reaching correct conclusions. Indeed, experience has shown that without them jurors seldom render intelligent and satisfactory verdicts. Hence the duty of the court on jury trials, particularly where there is much evidence, more or less conflicting, presenting several aspects of it, and it is peculiar or unusual in its nature, purpose, and application, is matter of serious moment, and not to be neglected or ignored. This is especially so in cases involving human life. There can be no intelligent or satisfactory trial by jury in cases of importance without a faithful discharge of such duty on the part of the court; and, when it appears that the party complaining may have been prejudiced by a neglect of it in whole or in part, this will be ground for a new trial. An erroneous impression seems to prevail to some extent that it is discretionary with the court whether it will or will not in any case state the evidence to the jury, and explain the law arising thereon.

This court seems to say so to some extent in State v. Morris, 3 Hawks, 388, and perhaps there are like intimations in other cases. But such cases, properly interpreted, apply only to plain cases that do not require such statement of the evidence and explanation of the law. Otherwise, they are not in harmony with a multitude of other decisions of this court to the contrary, nor are they consistent with the plain words of the statute cited above.

In State v. Moses, 2 Dev. 452, the court, after saying that the statute "restrains the judge from giving an opinion whether a fact is fully or sufficiently proven," adds: "At the same time it imposes another duty, which is to state in a full and explicit manner the facts given in evidence, and declare and explain the law arising thereon. *** The act must be so construed as to leave the two duties compatible with each other; for neither clause must overrule the other. The full and explicit statement of the facts required from the judge cannot mean a mere repetition from his notes of the testimony in the order in which it was delivered. That would be a vain and empty ceremony, consuming time without conveying instruction. If the judge is to say anything, and not to be a mere automation, his statement must be such as to exhibit to the jury the nature of the plaintiff's cause of action and of the defense in point of law, the matters of fact in issue in the record, and also those in dispute between the parties upon the testimony actually given, tending to maintain, on either side, the main fact contained in the issue. To do this with the least prospect of affording aid to the jury, the judge is obliged to present the evidence in such a light as will divest it of all those immaterial parts that necessarily more or less incumber every trial, and to collate the residue so as to bring it to bear with the strength of combination on the points in controversy. He is so to present each fact, that it may have its fullest legitimate operation on the conclusion sought for; and, if on each side the evidence is thus exhibited, it cannot but ease the labors of the jury, lead them, through the convictions of their understanding, to a just determination, and give certainty and dignity to the course of justice."

In Bailey v. Poole, 13 Ired. 404, the court said: "We do not consider a judge, under the act of 1794, in delivering his charge on the facts of a case, to be a mere machine to detail to the jury the evidence just as it occurred and in the order it occurred; but it is his duty, when he does charge upon it, to collate it, and bring it together in one view, on each side, with such remarks and illustrations as may properly direct their attention."

In State v. Dunlop, 65 N.C. 288, the court again said "We concur with the counsel for the prisoner in his view of the charge of the judge. We think it did not give that distinct and plain response to the questions raised which the statute requires. On this point, the statute is only declaratory of the common law. It is impossible to frame any general formula which can supersede the distinct application of the law to the particular alleged state of facts, or dispense on the part of the judge with the active exercise of his intelligence. This duty is the special duty of the judge; for this mainly is he required to possess ability and learning; and to evade or slight it is to renounce the most difficult, but also the most useful and honorable, duty of his office. All lawyers know that to eliminate facts, to put those which are material in their proper order, and to apply the law to them, as a whole, taxes many times the strongest intellect, and always requires an amount of learning and practiced ability which a jury is not supposed to possess,...