State v. Boyle

• Decision Date: 16 January 1890
• Citation: 10 S.E. 1023,104 N.C. 800
• Parties: STATE v. BOYLE.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

10 S.E. 1023

104 N.C. 800

STATE v. BOYLE.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

January 16, 1890

For majority opinion, see 10 S.E. 696.

AVERY J., (concurring.)

Without dissenting from the opinion of the court, I prefer to concur in the conclusion reached upon different grounds.

Dr Hines, an acknowledged expert in all matters pertaining to surgery and medicine, was offered as a witness for the state. After he had described in his examination in chief the laceration he discovered in making a private examination of the prosecutrix, and expressed the opinion that her condition was caused by recent carnal connection with a man, he stated in reply to a question on cross-examination, in response to the nature of the apparent injuries to her person, that she presented just the appearance he would expect to find in a bride on the second or third morning after marriage, and that he heard no complaint of any bruises elsewhere on her body. On redirect examination the prosecuting attorney asked the witness the hypothetical question: "Suppose the jury should find as a fact that there was a bruise on her right shoulder behind, finger prints on both arms above the elbow, a bruise and blister on both elbows, a bruise on the small of her back, and a red knot on the left side of her chest. Would you expect to find these, together with the condition of the private parts, as testified to by you, in a young woman on the second or third day after marriage?" The witness was permitted by the court--the prisoner objecting--to answer that he would not. The prisoner excepted. Another witness had testified that she found just such bruises as counsel mentioned on the person of the prosecutrix. This court has held that the opinion of a well-instructed and experienced medical man upon a matter within the scope of his profession, and based upon personal observation and knowledge, should possess a higher value in determining the mental as well as the physical condition of one attended by him, than that of an unprofessional man, and should be considered carefully and weighed by a jury in rendering their verdict. Flynt v. Bodenhamer, 80 N.C. 205; State v. Slagle, 83 N.C. 630. If, therefore, the testimony was not competent, its admission was an error that tended to prejudice the rights and imperil the safety of the prisoner in a degree proportionate to the respect that the jury entertained for the opinion of a learned physician, as we must assume that they acted upon the idea that his skill and training fitted him in a peculiar manner for judging from such external bruises as were described by other witnesses whether the admitted carnal connection between the prisoner and the prosecutrix was against her will, or with her consent. Upon the decision of that question, their verdict and his life depended. The courts of this country have laid down very clearly the tests for fixing the limit to the peculiar domain of expert witnesses; yet, in applying the principles to particular cases, it has often been found difficult to distinguish between expert and ordinary testimony, especially to determine upon what subjects and to what extent educated and experienced surgeons should be allowed to give an opinion as witnesses. When the subject-matter of inquiry partakes of the nature of science, art, or trade, persons possessing peculiar knowledge, skill, or experience derived from previous practice, study, or training are allowed to give an opinion, if such opinion is calculated to assist inexperienced persons in arriving at a proper solution of the question. When, however, the injury is of such a nature that a person of sound judgment might be reasonably expected to arrive at a conclusion as correct and just without as with the advantage of such special study or experience, then the opinion of the expert witness is not admissible, because it gives no new light to the jury, who are presumed to be capable of bringing to their aid a fair share of intelligence, common sense, and reason in drawing inferences from the facts, and thereby reaching a verdict. Rog. Exp. Test §§ 6, 7; Lawson, Exp. Ev. rule 28. An apt illustration and application of the rule we have stated is found in the case of Cook v. State, 24 N. J. Law, 843, where it was held that a physician was not competent to testify that a rape could not have been committed in a particular manner that had been described by the prosecutrix. The court say: "No peculiar knowledge of the human system was necessary to answer it. It was a mere question of relative strength or mechanical possibility, which an athlete or mechanic could have answered as well as a physician, and every man upon the jury as well as either." So it has been held that what is the proximate cause of the injury is not a question of science or of legal knowledge, but is a fact to be determined by a jury from surrounding circumstances. Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469.

The question, then, which involves the test of the correctness of his honor's ruling upon the admissibility of the testimony of Dr. Hines is whether his knowledge of surgery, or experience in the practice of his profession, was such as to enable him to give a more satisfactory opinion than an intelligent and observant juror upon the question whether the bruises upon the arms and back of the prosecutrix (which had not been examined by him, but which had been described by witnesses in his hearing) could have been caused by the voluntary coition of the prosecutrix, a girl of 17 years, with the prisoner on the floor of his own chamber, or whether these marks were unmistakable evidence of violence used by the prisoner to overcome resistance on her part. However the fact may be, we can see no reason why the physician should be able from his training to judge more accurately than any other intelligent man whether the injuries to her person were not such as a bride might have suffered from the difficulties incident to her first act of carnal connection with her husband at the same place. Yet it is manifest that the jury may have been misled by considering the answer of the physician to the question objected to as an expression of his opinion, founded upon his observation and experience, that the marks upon the body of the prosecutrix must have been made in a violent struggle to protect her virtue.

In the case of State v. Slagle, supra, the physician, an expert, was permitted to give the opinion that a certain bottle contained poisonous drugs, though he had not analyzed its contents because he had testified that he could tell the ingredients from the smell, taste, and appearance. At most, in doubtful cases of this kind, the testimony should be received by the courts, as in State v. Clark, 12 Ired. 151, only "when assured by them [physicians] that the principles of their science, applicable to a particular subject of inquiry, established certain results," or "when they swear" they can draw the proposed distinction by reason of their peculiar professional skill and training. In State v. Sheets, 89 N.C. 543, Justice ASHE, for the court, says: "When the professors of science, as physicians, for instance, swear that they are able to pronounce an opinion in any particular case, although they say at the same time that precisely such a case had not before fallen under their observation, or under their notice, in the course of their reading, it is competent to give in evidence their opinion. "To the same effect is Horton v. Green, 64 N.C. 64. It would have been easy to apply the test by which this court determined the competency of expert evidence in the four cases cited, by asking the witness (Dr. Hines) if, from his observation in his practice and his reading, he thought he could tell whether the bruises described were such as could be caused by violence on the part of the prisoner, or whether they might have been naturally incident to a voluntary connection with a young woman. It may be that he would have answered that his opinion upon such a subject was worth no more than that of a member of the jury, and in that event we have no idea that counsel would have insisted upon propounding the questions objected to. Where the judge, being unlearned in any art or science like medicine, is in doubt whether a knowledge of such science is calculated to give one peculiar advantages in solving a question before a jury, he can be relieved of embarrassment by asking an acknowledged expert whether his professional training is such as to enable him to give a more satisfactory opinion on...