State v. Braaten
| Decision Date | 08 August 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 33161.,33161. |
| Citation | 167 P.3d 357,144 Idaho 606 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Timothy G. BRAATEN, Defendant-Appellant. |
v.
Timothy G. BRAATEN, Defendant-Appellant.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Eric D. Fredericksen, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Rebekah A. Cudé, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
LANSING, Judge.
Timothy G. Braaten appeals from the district court order relinquishing jurisdiction over Braaten after he served a period of retained jurisdiction. Braaten contends that the district court violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution by basing its decision on Braaten's indigence.
Braaten pleaded guilty to sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen, Idaho Code § 18-1506. The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years with one and one-half years determinate and retained jurisdiction for 180 days pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601. At the end of the retained jurisdiction period, the district court suspended the sentence and placed Braaten on supervised probation. After Braaten served nearly two years of probation, the State filed a report of violation alleging that he had consumed alcohol and was not satisfactorily participating in sex offender treatment. The district court revoked
probation, but retained jurisdiction a second time and recommended that during the rider Braaten should receive treatment for alcohol addiction.
At the end of this second retained jurisdiction period, the court declined to again place Braaten on probation and instead relinquished jurisdiction. While acknowledging that Braaten's behavior during the rider had been appropriate and that the Department of Correction had recommended that he again be placed on probation, the court also noted that during the rider, the Department of Correction had reclassified Braaten's risk of reoffense from "low-to-moderate" to "moderate-to-moderately-high." Given this, the court expressed concerns about whether society would adequately be protected if Braaten were on probation when, because of his indigence, he would not be able to obtain proper housing and treatment. The district court's explanation of its reasons for denying probation included the following:
Well, this is a very difficult case, given the nature of the underlying charge, of course. The State's recommendation repetitively refers to danger to the community and safety for the community. . . .
The difficulty here, I think, is can the court continue to manage this case under the structure of probation and do so in a meaningful way that is acceptable as far as the community is concerned. Given, if in fact the underlying charge were something other than, of course, the sexual abuse against minor children . . . this type of a report with a recommendation of probation would routinely of course get approved without objection, and the defendant would be placed on probation . . . .
And in going through the report, there are some concerns as far as this court has in terms of being able to-whether we can effectively-court can effectively manage this case on probation
. . . .
[Defense counsel] says well, you are sentencing somebody to prison because they don't have any money. Well, yeah, that's probably exactly what we are doing. If he had more money he could afford transition housing. He could afford treatment. If he had more money he could do some of the things . . . which would allow the court to have a basis to rely upon in the face of the arguments of the threat to society and the danger to the community and unauthorized sexual contact. So, yeah, you have a situation where the nature of the case and the lack of money that the defendant has and the fact that they come up with the conclusion, that . . . probation really is not a good way for the court to try to manage this case. . . .
The court then relinquished jurisdiction but also reduced the determinate portion of Braaten's sentence to one year.
At the jurisdictional review hearing, Braaten objected to the court's consideration of his financial condition as a factor bearing on his fitness for probation, and he now appeals, contending that the district court's action violated his rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.
The decision to place a defendant on probation or relinquish jurisdiction after a period of retained jurisdiction is a matter within the trial court's discretion, State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 917, 120 P.3d 299, 305 (Ct.App.2005), but as with any exercise of judicial discretion, the court's decision must be consistent with any applicable law, including constitutional standards. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989); State v. Amy, 123 Idaho 287, 288, 846 P.2d 938, 939 (Ct.App.1992). Idaho Code § 19-2521 specifies that imprisonment should not be imposed upon a person convicted of a crime unless, "having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant," the court is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public. I.C. § 19-2521(1). Thus, a trial court may deny probation if it is of the opinion that imprisonment is necessary to protect society. The question presented here is whether a defendant's indigence may be factored into the analysis without violation of constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection.
The United States Supreme Court "has long been sensitive to the treatment of indigents in our criminal justice system," Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 664, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2068, 76 L.Ed.2d 221, 227 (1983), because "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 591, 100 L.Ed. 891, 899 (1956) (plurality opinion). Applying this principle, the Supreme Court has held that indigents generally must be given access to trial records, attorneys, and trial transcripts necessary for appeals. See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92 S.Ct. 410, 30 L.Ed.2d 372 (1971); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963); Griffin, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891. More relevant to the issue here is a line of cases addressing whether a defendant may be imprisoned solely because he is unable to pay a fine or restitution. The earliest two, Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), and Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971), hold that the state cannot subject a defendant to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely because he is too poor to pay a fine....
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