State v. Bradford
| Decision Date | 18 December 1899 |
| Docket Number | 11,890 - (27) |
| Citation | 81 N.W. 202,78 Minn. 387 |
| Parties | STATE v. ALFRED BRADFORD |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Defendant was indicted in the district court for Hennepin county for driving a team of horses attached to a sled upon a bicycle path. The case was tried before Simpson, J., and a jury, and resulted in a conviction. From an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appealed. Reversed.
Laws 1899, c. 43, § 1, construed, and held not void for uncertainty.
Held the section should be cut down by construction so as to apply only to cases of injuries to public bicycle paths.
Bicycle Paths.
Conceding, without deciding, that, prior to the passage of said chapter 43, the county commissioners had no authority to set apart a portion of a public highway for a bicycle path for the exclusive use of bicycles, held, that chapter by implication ratified the act of the commissioners in doing so, or attempting to do so, and also by implication authorized such commissioners thereafter to set apart a portion of a highway for such exclusive use.
Indictment Defective.
Held, the indictment is fatally defective in failing to allege that the bicycle path is a part of a public highway, or a public bicycle path. Rule applied that an indictment is not sufficient which merely follows the language of the statute, when the statute does not sufficiently define the crime, or set forth all of the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.
A. M. Higgins, L. W. Gammons and J. A. Peterson, for appellant.
Laws 1899, c. 43, § 1, cannot be intelligibly construed. If the act makes it a crime to drive a team of horses attached to a vehicle across a bicycle path constructed exclusively for use of bicyclists, the legislature has exceeded its powers. The legislature can make criminal only what interferes with the morals, health and good order of the community. Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655. The act is broad enough to cover a path on the land of the person driving across it. See Whiting v. Sheboygan, 25 Wis. 167, 188; Cooley, Const. Lim. 129, 175, 487; 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 587; City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36 Minn. 298; River v. Behr, 77 Mo. 91; Quintini v. Board, 64 Miss. 483; People v. Rosenberg, 138 N.Y. 410; Coe v. Schultz, 47 Barb. 64; Hutton v. City, 38 N.J.L. 122; City v. State, 118 Ind. 426, 447. The statute is too indefinite. There is no description of a "bicycle path" except that it must be made exclusively for use of bicyclists. Dorsey v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. App. 527; City v. Heitzeberg, 141 Mo. 375.
The indictment is insufficient. It is not enough to charge in the words of the statute unless all that is essential to constitute the offences is stated. State v. Howard, 66 Minn. 309, 312; State v. Comfort, 22 Minn. 271; State v. Abrisch, 41 Minn. 41. Nor is it charged that defendant knew it was a bicycle path. State v. Howard, supra.
The portion of the highway in question was not a bicycle path constructed exclusively for the use of bicyclists. Public highways belong to the public, and the public is entitled to free passage along every part not in actual use by some other traveler. 1 Woods, Nuis. § 252; Elliott, Highw. 18; Angell, Highw. § 226; 1 Hawkins, P.C. c. 76, § 49; State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185; Johnson v. Whitefield, 18 Me. 286; Addison, Torts, 328. It is doubtful whether the legislature can restrict the use in the manner here attempted, but there is no legislative enactment authorizing it. The county commissioners having no authority to denominate a part of the highway a bicycle path for the exclusive use of bicyclists, and to exclude the general public therefrom, the part of the highway in question was not a bicycle path constructed for the exclusive use of bicyclists. The board of county commissioners has no powers not expressly delegated. The term "bicycle path" has never been recognized or defined by the laws of this state.
W. B. Douglas, Attorney General, C. W. Somerby, Assistant Attorney General, and A. B. Choate, for respondent.
The act is sufficiently definite. The nature and purposes of bicycle paths are as much matter of common knowledge as are the nature and purpose of sidewalks constructed for the exclusive use of pedestrians. The law is as valid as are laws and ordinances prohibiting the driving of teams on sidewalks, or heavy traffic on public boulevards. The court will give to the act a reasonable construction.
The indictment is sufficient. When a statutory defense is completely defined, an indictment in the language of the statute is sufficient. State v. Comfort, 22 Minn. 271; State v. Barry, 77 Minn. 128; State v. Greenwood, 76 Minn. 207. Courts take judicial notice of the general direction of streets, and their limits, and numbering; and of the location of rivers, cities, sections, towns, and ranges. Skelly v. New York, 7 Misc. (N.Y.) 88; Canavan v. Stuyvesant, 7 Misc. (N.Y.) 113; Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn. 436; 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. 173, 174. "Wilfully" includes "knowingly." State v. Stein, 48 Minn. 466.
The part of the highway in question was a bicycle path constructed exclusively for the use of bicyclists. The building of the path was matter of public record and common knowledge. The power of the commissioners to construct bicycle paths is necessarily implied. The legislature has given them general supervision in improving county roads. The nature and extent of the improvements are for them to decide; and in absence of fraud or demonstrable mistake of fact the courts will not interfere with their determination. G.S. 1894, § 1846; State v. Judges of District Court, 51 Minn. 539.
The purpose of the law was to keep vehicles within their proper limits and to protect bicyclists, and the act is within the police power, and violates no constitutional right. Cook, Pen. Code (N.Y.) §§ 640, note, 652; Fisher v. Village, 133 N.Y. 527; Tiedeman, Lim. Pol. Pow. § 1; State v. Wagner, 45 Iowa 482; State v. Cargill Co., 77 Minn. 223; Emmons v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 503; State v. Smith, 58 Minn. 35; Butler v. Chambers, 36 Minn. 69; State v. Horgan, 55 Minn. 183; State v. Mrozinski, 59 Minn. 465; State v. Chapel, 64 Minn. 130; Johnson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 29 Minn. 425; Graffty v. City, 107 Ind. 502; Des Moines v. Des Moines, 73 Iowa 513.
The purposes and actual construction of a bicycle path may be shown by parol in the same manner that a county road may be so proved, the records not being conclusive. State v. District Ct. of Ramsey Co., 29 Minn. 62, 33 Minn. 164; G.S. 1894, § 1878; Village of Benson v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 62 Minn. 198, 200; Hall v. City of St. Paul, 56 Minn. 428, 431. A county road is a highway, and the commissioners have supervision thereof with power to improve it for travel by ordinary vehicles, horsemen and footmen, and to appropriate money therefor. The nature and extent of the improvement is left to the discretion of the board. G.S. 1894, §§ 1832, 1838, 1846; Cater v. N.W. Telephone Ex. Co., 60 Minn. 539; Gillette-Herzog Mnfg. Co. v. Board of Co. Commrs., 69 Minn. 297; Carli v. Stillwater St. Ry. & T. Co., 28 Minn. 373; Elliott, Roads & S. 300-304; 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. 363. A bicycle is a vehicle, may be used on a public highway, and is governed by the law of the road. State v. Collins, 16 R.I. 371; Thompson v. Dodge, 58 Minn. 555; Elliott, Roads & S. 331, 635. The improvement which the commissioners are authorized to make need not be for the use of all kinds of vehicles or of any certain number of them. Limitation of sidewalks to footmen is valid. Parkways may be constructed for designated vehicles. Elliott, Roads & S. 2, 7, 12, 301-305, 636, note; Boston v. City, 140 Mass. 87; Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind. 450; City of St. Paul v. Smith, 27 Minn. 364; G.S. 1894, §§ 1913, 6780, 7784, 7817. The public easement is not limited to any particular method of travel, but improved methods may be used. Holland v. Bartch, 120 Ind. 46; Cater v. N.W. Telephone Ex. Co., supra; Thompson v. Dodge, supra; Magee v. Overshiner, 150 Ind. 127; Carli v. Stillwater St. Ry. & T. Co., supra. The power of the legislature extends to regulation of the use of highways by omnibuses, street cars, bicycles, hacks, etc., and is usually conferred on local authority. State v. Yopp, 97 N.C. 477; State v. Collins, supra; Matter of Wright, 29 Hun, 357; Alberger v. Mayor, 64 Md. 1; Mercer v. Corbin, supra; Elliott, Roads & S. 327, 331, 614, 635; 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 656; Knobloch v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 402; Bohen v. City of Waseca, 32 Minn. 176; Newell v. Minneapolis, L. & M. Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 112.
Laws 1899, c. 43, § 1, reads as follows:
"Any person who wilfully injures, obstructs or destroys or drives any cattle, sheep, horse, swine or other animals, team or vehicle, except a bicycle, or wilfully allows his cattle, sheep, horse, swine or other animal to be led or driven upon, or to stray along a bicycle path constructed exclusively for the use of bicyclists, except for the purpose of crossing such paths at street intersections, and at private driveways leading from the street to adjoining premises, and for the purpose of crossing such paths to and from the street and adjoining premises where necessary, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof, be fined not less than five (5) dollars or more than fifty (50) dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than thirty (30) days, or both."
Under this section an indictment was found against the defendant by the grand jury of Hennepin county, the charging part of which indictment reads as follows:
"The said Alfred Bradford, on the 31st day of March, A.D. 1899, at the village of St. Louis Park,...
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