State v. Brandeberry, Court of Appeals No. L-16-1137
| Decision Date | 30 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. L-16-1137 |
| Citation | 2017 Ohio 5676 |
| Parties | State of Ohio Appellee v. Kassi Brandeberry Appellant |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Charlyn Bohland, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Kassi Brandeberry, appeals the May 25, 2016 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Appellant sets forth four assignments of error:
{¶ 3} In the early morning hours of May 2, 2015, appellant set a fire, using gasoline, at the house located at 253 Willard, Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio. As a result of the fire, a 14-year-old young man died and a 13-year-old young man was severely injured. A firefighter was also hurt while fighting the blaze. In addition, the family pets were killed in the fire and the family lost their house and most of the contents of the house.
{¶ 4} Appellant, who was 17 years old at the time of the fire, admitted to setting the fire at the house.
{¶ 5} On May 28, 2015, two complaints were filed in Lucas County Juvenile Court charging appellant with aggravated murder and burglary. The burglary charge stems from an incident which occurred in September 2014, when appellant was 16 years old, and which was unrelated to the May 2, 2015 fire.
{¶ 6} The state moved the juvenile court to transfer appellant to the general division of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas for prosecution as an adult. A hearing was held, after which the juvenile court found probable cause that appellant had committed the offenses charged. Appellant's case was transferred to the general division of the common pleas court.
{¶ 7} On June 30, 2015, the grand jury indicted appellant on the following charges: Count 1, aggravated murder; Count 2, murder; Counts 3, 5, 6, 7 aggravated arson; Count 4, attempt to commit aggravated murder; and Count 8, burglary.
{¶ 8} In April 2016, appellant pled guilty to Counts 2, 5 and 6 of the indictment, as well as to an amended Count 8, attempted burglary. In May 2016, the trial court sentenced appellant to a total prison term of 21 years to life, which included consecutive sentences. The trial court also found appellant was an arson offender, pursuant to R.C. 2909.01. The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed. Appellant timely appealed.
{¶ 9} Appellant asserts that although her trial counsel failed to raise a constitutional challenge to the mandatory transfer statutes, this court can review her claims under the plain error standard to find her constitutional rights were violated. Appellant argues R.C. 2152.10(A)(1)(a) and 2152.12(A)(1)(a) create an improper, irrebutable presumption that she is as culpable as an adult for the acts she committed and not amenable to treatment in the juvenile system. Appellant contends because of this irrebutable presumption, the juvenile court is prohibited from making an individualized determination of whether she is amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system. Appellant submits due process requires an amenability hearing before transferring a child to criminal court.
{¶ 10} Appellant notes the Supreme Court of Ohio recently ruled, in December 2016, in State v. Aalim, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8278 ("Aalim I"), that the mandatory transfer provisions in R.C. 2152.10(A) and 2152.12(A) were unconstitutional as they violate a child's right to due process.
{¶ 11} The state counters regardless of the Aalim I ruling, the issue here is whether a guilty plea forfeits a claim that Ohio's mandatory transfer provisions are unconstitutional. The state maintains a guilty plea bars all appealable errors except for claims that the plea was not entered voluntarily and knowingly. Even assuming arguendo appellant's claim survives a guilty plea, the state submits she cannot demonstrate the trial court committed plain error in applying the mandatory bindover statutes when those statutes have not been declared unconstitutional by appellate courts despite numerous challenges.
{¶ 12} In Aalim I, a complaint was filed in juvenile court alleging the 16-year-old juvenile engaged in conduct which would be considered aggravated robbery if committed by an adult. Id. at ¶ 2. The complaint also contained a firearm specification. The state of Ohio moved to transfer the juvenile to the general division of the common pleas court to be tried as an adult, pursuant to R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b). Id. The juvenile court held a hearing and found there was probable cause to believe the juvenile committed the act alleged in the complaint, including the firearm specification. Id. at ¶ 3. The juvenile court transferred the case to the general division. Id.
{¶ 13} After being indicted, the juvenile filed a motion to dismiss claiming the mandatory transfer provisions under R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b) violated his due process and equal protection rights and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Ohio Constitutions. Id. at ¶ 4. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed. Id. at ¶ 4-5. The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted jurisdiction as to whether the mandatory transfer provisions of the statutes violate juveniles' due process and equal protection rights. Id. at ¶ 6.
{¶ 14} The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled the mandatory transfer provisions under R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b) were unconstitutional in violation of juveniles' right to due process, but found the discretionary transfer process, set forth in R.C. 2152.10(B) and 2152.12(B) through (E), "satisfies fundamental fairness under the Ohio Constitution" and therefore severed the mandatory transfer provisions of R.C. 2152.10(A) and 2152.12(A). Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus, ¶ 28-29. The court declined to address the equal-protection issue because it concluded the mandatory transfer statutes violated juveniles' right to due process. Id. at ¶ 32.
{¶ 15} After appellant filed her appeal and the parties submitted their briefs, the Supreme Court of Ohio reconsidered Aalim I, and found the mandatory transfer of juveniles to the general division of the common pleas court did not violate either the Ohio Constitution or the United States Constitution. State v. Aalim, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-2956 ("Aalim II"). Specifically, the Supreme Court held:
Because this court failed in Aalim I, Ohio St.3d , 2016-Ohio-8278, N.E.3d , to consider the General Assembly's exclusive constitutional authority to define the jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas under Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution, we grant the state's motion for reconsideration pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.02. Upon reconsideration, we hold that the mandatory bindover of certain juvenile offenders under R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b) complies with due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the Ohio and United States Constitutions. We therefore vacate our decision in Aalim I, and we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the trial court's denial of Aalim's motion to dismiss his indictment. Id. at ¶ 38.
{¶ 16} With respect to a guilty plea, it is a complete admission of factual guilt, and a valid guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects in prior stages of the proceedings. State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 78; Crim.R. 11(B)(1). Thus, a guilty plea does not preclude claims which attack the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Fitzpatrick at ¶ 78, 79.
{¶ 17} Here, we find appellant, by entering a guilty plea, did not waive her right to raise a jurisdictional constitutional challenge with respect to the mandatory transfer provisions in R.C. 2152.10(A)(1)(a) and 2152.12(A)(1)(a). We therefore find, based on the holding in Aalim II, the juvenile court did not err when it transferred appellant's caseto the general division of the common pleas court since the mandatory transfer provisions in R.C. 2152.10(A)(1)(a) and 2152.12(A)(1)(a) are constitutional and do not violate a juvenile's right to due process. We further find the general division of the common pleas court had subject-matter jurisdiction over appellant's case. Accordingly, a...
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