State v. Brazil

• Decision Date: 19 December 1972
• Docket Number: CA-CR,No. 1,1
• Citation: 18 Ariz.App. 545,504 P.2d 76
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Gary Rogers BRAZIL, Appellant. 322.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 76

504 P.2d 76

18 Ariz.App. 545

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Gary Rogers BRAZIL, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 322.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

Dec. 19, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 1973.

Review Denied March 6, 1973.

Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. by William P. Dixon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

Flynn, Kimerer, Thinnes & Galbraith by John J. Flynn and Michael D. Kimerer, Phoenix, for appellant.

HAIRE, Chief Judge, Division 1.

The defendant-appellant, Gary Rogers Brazil, was charged with possession of narcotics for sale, possession of narcotics, possession of marijuana for sale, and possession of marijuana. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was denied. At the trial, the possession counts were dismissed on the prosecution's motion and at the conclusion of a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of possession of heroin for sale and of possession of marijuana for sale. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment in the Arizona State Prison for a period from five to fifteen years.

The defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict as well as his motion for a new trial were denied and a timely appeal was made to this Court.

Subsequently, the defendant filed in this Court a motion to suspend the appeal and to remand to the trial court for a hearing on newly discovered evidence. It was contended that the newly discovered evidence would show that the defendant was actually 'framed' by a police officer witness who was out to 'get him'. In responding, the County Attorney of Maricopa County did not oppose the motion for remand, stating, 'There have been serious charges and allegations made by the (defendant) which should be presented by both sides in a motion for a new trial.' This Court granted the motion for remand, and an evidentiary hearing was then held before the same trial judge who had presided at the original trial. This hearing on defendant's second motion for new trial involved six full days of testimony concerning the factual allegations made by defendant in his motion for new trial. At the close of the hearing, the trial judge entered the following order:

'Pursuant to the order of the Court of Appeals, Division 1, entered October 5, 1970, the Court took evidence in support of defendant's motion for new trial, both oral and documentary, and viewed the scene. Having considered the evidence, the affidavits, memoranda and arguments of counsel,

IT IS ORDERED denying or refusing defendant's motion for new trial.'

After entry of the above-quoted order, the appeal was reinstated before this Court, with defendant appealing not only from the original judgment and sentence, but also from the above order denying his motion for new trial.

We consider first defendant's contention that on the remanded hearing perjury was shown, and therefore the trial court should have granted his motion for new trial. The defendant's first question is:

'Does perjury by a police officer who is the state's key witness require reversal of the appellant's conviction?'

Assuming perjury of the magnitude alleged in this case, the obvious answer is that of course reversal would be required. However, the determinative question is not whether such perjury would require reversal, but rather whether the record made at the remanded hearing on defendant's motion for new trial requires a finding that perjury was in fact committed. We have reviewed the record, including specifically Officer Todd's testimony at the preliminary hearing, at the trial, and at the extended evidentiary hearing on the motion for new trial, and while many inconsistencies in his testimony are apparent, we do not find these inconsistencies to be of such a nature as to convince this Court that the witness was committing, or had committed, perjury. A fortiori, we cannot say that the evidence was such as to require that the trial judge grant the motion for new trial. As stated above the trial judge listened to the witnesses and had an opportunity to observe their demeanor in an evidentiary hearing which lasted six days. He also viewed the premises, the physical characteristics of which figured so prominently in defendant's allegations of perjury. In view of the trial judge's denial of the motion for new trial, we must conclude that he found that perjury was not committed, and in that finding, we concur.

Another question raised by defendant on appeal has a tangential relationship to defendant's allegation of perjury by the state's key witness, Officer Todd. The question, as stated by defendant, is as follows:

'Does collusion between a key witness, who could not be found to testify for the defense at the trial, and the chief police officer require a reversal?'

This question relates to the unavailability at the time of trial of a witness named Connie Green, and the subsequent discovery by defendant that Connie Green had at times functioned as a police informer in narcotics cases. Although defendant contends that the unavailability of this witness at the time of trial was due to collusion between the witness and Officer Todd, the state's key witness, there is ample evidence from which the trial judge could have found that such collusion did not exist. At the extended hearing on the motion for new trial, Connie Green testified that she had not been an informer for the state in connection with the charges against the defendant, and Officer Todd testified to the same effect. While defendant might suspect that Connie Green did inform against him and that Officer Todd had some hand in making her unavailable at the time of trial, the direct evidence is to the contrary, and the record as a whole certainly would not support reversing, on that basis, the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial.

Separate and apart from any question of perjury, the defendant contends that his motion to suppress should have been granted because Officer Todd's affidavit was insufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant. ¹ The affidavit which is set forth in full in footnote 1, constituted the only information submitted to the justice of the peace who issued the search warrant. Therefore, it must be determined whether the allegations contained in the affidavit were sufficient to support his conclusion that there was probable cause to believe that narcotics were being kept in the premises to be searched. Before considering the specific allegations contained in the affidavit, we state certain principles which must guide our deliberations.

The United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment prohibition is against 'unreasonable searches and seizures' and further provides that 'no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause'. Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).

The quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause must be differentiated from that necessary to support a finding of guilt. In establishing probable cause, there is no requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as is necessary in establishing guilt. As stated in Brinegar, supra:

'In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.' 338 U.S. at 175, 69 S.Ct. at 1310.

Stated another way,

'. . . sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. . . .'

Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 1111, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971).

In this regard, while hearsay is not admissible to establish guilt, hearsay is sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant '. . . so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented.' Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 80 S.Ct. 725, 735, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). In a recent opinion, the United States Supreme Court reviewed in some detail the function of hearsay evidence as forming a basis for a finding of probable cause by a magistrate, with special attention being given to the situation where such hearsay evidence is interrelated with evidence given by the requesting officer based upon his own knowledge of the reputation of the defendant gained in his official capacity as an officer, and also based upon specific facts resulting from his own personal observations (a situation similar to that presented by Officer Todd's affidavit in this case). United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971). After reviewing its recent decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), both of which set forth a two-pronged test for assessing the reliability of hearsay evidence when used as a basis for the issuance of a search warrant, the Court rejected any simple mechanical approach to the question, and reasserted the Jones, supra, 'substantial basis' test for crediting hearsay. This is not to say that the Court abandoned the two-pronged test of Aguilar and Spinelli. However, the Court in Harris made it abundantly clear that the basic question was whether, considering the evidence presented to the issuing magistrate as a whole, there were underlying facts or circumstances presented showing a substantial basis for supporting the hearsay and supporting a finding of probable cause. On the question of what facts or circumstances might be considered in assessing the reliability...