State v. Breaw
| Decision Date | 19 December 1904 |
| Parties | STATE v. BREAW. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Baker County; Robert Eakin, Judge.
George W. Breaw was indicted for forgery, and from an order denying his motion for an immediate trial on certain of the indictments at the term at which they were returned, or for the dismissal thereof, he appeals. Affirmed.
John L Rand, for appellant.
A.M Crawford, Atty. Gen., and J.G. Wilson, for the State.
This is an appeal from an order refusing to dismiss an information in a criminal action, under section 1559 of the Code, which reads as follows: "If a defendant indicted for a crime whose trial has not been postponed upon his application or by his consent, be not brought to trial at the next term of the court in which the indictment is triable, after it is found the court must order the indictment to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown." The defendant was arrested in August, 1903, and held to await the action of the grand jury, at the next term of the Baker county circuit court, for the crimes of embezzlement and forgery. On the first day of the term the district attorney filed nine informations against him for forgery. He was tried and acquitted on two of them, and moved for a trial on the others at the same term, or the dismissal thereof. This motion was overruled, and the causes continued until the next term, without the reasons for such continuance being entered of record. From the order in one case he appeals, and there is a stipulation that the others shall abide the result.
The defendant's position is that under the statute he was entitled to a dismissal of the information against him if he was not tried at the same term of the court at which it was found, unless good cause to the contrary was shown by the prosecution, and that such cause should appear in the record. Section 10 of article 1 of the state Constitution declares that justice shall be administered without delay, which is substantially the same as guarantying to a defendant in a criminal action a speedy trial. The statute quoted is intended to preserve this right by prescribing a definite and uniform rule for the guidance of courts in their practice but we do not think it means that the trial shall take place at the same term at which the indictment is found or the information filed. The language is that the court must order the indictment dismissed if the trial has not been postponed on the application or by the consent of the defendant, unless he is brought "to trial at...
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... ... 926, 928, the court said: ... '* * * The constitutional provision for a speedy trial was not intended to provide a loophole for the escape of one accused of the commission of an offense without trial when the same is had within a reasonable time. * * *' ... In State v. Breaw, 45 Or. 586, 588, 78 P. 896, the court describes the constitutional provision as giving [201 Or. 514] 'the right of a defendant in a criminal action to a trial as soon after the information or indictment is filed as the prosecution can with reasonable diligence prepare for the trial, and the delays ... ...
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