State v. Breazeale

Decision Date27 September 2001
Docket NumberNo. 69688-8.,69688-8.
Citation144 Wash.2d 829,144 Wn.2d 829,31 P.3d 1155
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Randy BREAZEALE and Sheila Berlanga-Hernandez, Respondents.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Jeffrey Sullivan, Yakima County Prosecutor, Kevin Gregory Eilmes, Deputy County Prosecutor, Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.

Nancy Lynn Talner, Kenmore, Mark W. Muenster, Vancouver, Amicus Curiae on Behalf of WACDL.

Aaron Hugh Caplan, Seattle, Amicus Curiae on Behalf of ACLU.

Christine Gregoire, Attorney General, Carol Smith-Merkulov, Assistant Attorney General, for Petitioner.

Dennis W. Morgan, Ritzville, for Respondents.

MADSEN, J.

Respondents in this case sought and received orders from Adams County Superior Court vacating their judgments and sentences and vacating their conviction records in accordance with the provisions of RCW 9.94A.230(1). The Washington State Patrol (Patrol), the agency charged with maintaining criminal records in Washington, declined to follow the orders contending that the Washington State Criminal Records Privacy Act (CRPA), chapter 10.97 RCW, obligates the agency to disseminate conviction records. Following a show cause hearing for contempt, the trial court reversed its earlier order and ruled that it lacked authority to order vacation of Respondents' criminal records. Accordingly, the court declined to find the Patrol in contempt of its previous order. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded with instructions to seal Respondents' records and to impose contempt sanctions on the Patrol. We affirm in part and hold that RCW 9.95.240 and RCW 10.97.060 provide statutory authority to vacate Respondents' conviction records. We also reverse in part and hold that the Patrol, while ill-advised in its handling of the matter, may not be held in contempt under the circumstances presented in this case.

FACTS

Mr. Randy Breazeale was convicted of second degree burglary in 1976. His sentence was deferred and he was placed on probation. In 1979, following completion of probation, the trial court entered an order vacating the finding of guilt and dismissing Breazeale's conviction.

Ms. Sheila Berlanga-Hernandez was charged with forging a check in 1976. She pleaded guilty and received a deferred sentence and was placed on probation. The court order stated that if she complied with all the terms and conditions of the sentence she could petition for dismissal of the charge. In 1978, the court granted her motion for dismissal.

In October 1996, the superior court granted Ms. Berlanga-Hernandez's motion for an order to expunge her criminal arrest record. A copy of the court order was sent to the Patrol. In a letter addressed to the Adams County Superior Court dated June 18, 1997, the identification and criminal history section replied that "we are unable to comply with your request for expungement based on a dismissal after initial conviction." Clerk's Papers (CP) (Berlanga-Hernandez) at 8. The letter continued: "The conviction will remain on the record until we receive a court order to vacate the sentence, pursuant to RCW 9.94A.230." Id. Upon vacation of sentence, the related criminal history record information is available for criminal justice purposes only and is not disseminated as public information.

In 1998, Ms. Berlanga-Hernandez and Mr. Breazeale retained counsel who then filed motions for orders vacating the judgments and sentences in both cases as recommended by the Patrol's letter. The court granted the motions on September 4, 1998, and the orders were mailed to the criminal identification section of the Patrol. In a letter addressed to the Adams County Superior Court the Patrol stated, "[p]lease be advised we are unable to comply with your request for vacation of the above noted offender's sentence. The procedure for vacating the offender's record only applies to defendants who have been convicted of a felony after June 30, 1984, and who have been discharged pursuant to RCW 9.94A.220." CP (Berlanga-Hernandez) at 18; CP (Breazeale) at 11.

Defense counsel then filed motions for orders directing the Patrol to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for its refusal to honor the court's orders vacating Respondents' convictions. Following the show cause hearing, the court concluded the Patrol could not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the court's previous orders to vacate and reversed its earlier order granting vacation. The court found that (1) Respondents' convictions predate RCW 9.94A.220 and .230; (2) RCW 9.95.240 does not authorize deletion of criminal records; (3) RCW 10.97.060 prohibits deletion of records subject to RCW 9.95.240, and; (4) the court lacks statutory authority and the inherent power to grant the vacation motions because conviction records can not be "destroyed." The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had both statutory and inherent authority to order the expungement or sealing of Respondents' criminal records. The court remanded to the trial court with instructions to seal the records and to impose sanctions for the Patrol's willful contempt of the court's orders. Review in this Court was granted on a petition from the Patrol.

DISCUSSION

The first issue presented is whether courts have authority to order the vacation, expungement, or sealing of conviction records dismissed pursuant to RCW 9.95.240.

Prior to adoption of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA), trial courts could suspend or defer imposition of sentence and place defendants on probation in lieu of prison. Upon successful completion of probation, the court could, under RCW 9.95.240, set aside a finding or plea of guilty, allow the defendant to plead not guilty, and then dismiss the information. Both Ms. Berlanga-Hernandez and Mr. Breazeale were granted dismissals of their convictions under RCW 9.95.240 in 1978 and 1979, respectively. That statute provides:

Every defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of his probation for the entire period thereof, or who shall have been discharged from probation prior to the termination of the period thereof, may at any time prior to the expiration of the maximum period of punishment for the offense for which he has been convicted be permitted in the discretion of the court to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty, or if he has been convicted after a plea of not guilty, the court may in its discretion set aside the verdict of guilty; and in either case, the court may thereupon dismiss the information or indictment against such defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been convicted. The probationer shall be informed of this right in his probation papers: PROVIDED, That in any subsequent prosecution, for any other offense, such prior conviction may be pleaded and proved, and shall have the same effect as if probation had not been granted, or the information or indictment dismissed.

RCW 9.95.240. Under that statute, the court may exercise its discretion to dismiss the information and the defendant is "released from all penalties and disabilities" but one: that the conviction information may be used in a subsequent prosecution.

In adopting the SRA, the Legislature provided a procedure in RCW 9.94A.230(1) which parallels RCW 9.95.240 and provides:

"Every offender who has been discharged under RCW 9.94A.220 may apply to the sentencing court for a vacation of the offender's record of conviction. If the court finds the offender meets the tests prescribed in subsection (2) of this section, the court may clear the record of conviction by: (a) Permitting the offender to withdraw the offender's plea of guilty and to enter a plea of not guilty; or (b) if the offender has been convicted after a plea of not guilty, by the court setting aside the verdict of guilty; and (c) by the court dismissing the information or indictment against the offender."

Under the SRA, the same procedure that results in a dismissal under the probation act allows the court to grant dismissal and clear the conviction record. RCW 9.94A.230(3) expressly clarifies the intended result:

Once the court vacates a record of conviction under subsection (1) of this section, the fact that the offender has been convicted of the offense shall not be included in the offender's criminal history for purposes of determining a sentence in any subsequent conviction, and the offender shall be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense. For all purposes, including responding to questions on employment applications, an offender whose conviction has been vacated may state that the offender has never been convicted of that crime. Nothing in this section affects or prevents the use of an offender's prior conviction in a later criminal prosecution.

Thus, the later statute differs in only minor respects: the court must apply the tests listed in subsection (2); the statute specifically provides for vacation of the conviction record in the same proceeding; and the statute expressly provides that the person may state that he or she has never been convicted of that crime.

The parties do not dispute that if the underlying felonies had been committed on or after July 1, 1984, Respondents would have been eligible for vacation under RCW 9.94A.230. RCW 9.94A.905. In that case, the Patrol would have complied with the court orders to vacate the conviction records and restrict public access to such records. The conviction records would be available only for use in a subsequent prosecution. The Patrol argues that in this case, however, Respondents have been granted dismissal only and that RCW 10.97.030(4) provides that "a dismissal entered after a period of probation... shall be considered [a] disposition[] adverse to the subject." RCW 10.97.030(3) pr...

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