State v. Bridges
| Decision Date | 24 April 1980 |
| Citation | 413 A.2d 937 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Dalton Leroy BRIDGES. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Charles K. Leadbetter (orally), Pasquale Perrino, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.
Nisbet, MacNichol & Ludwig, P. A., Francis M. Jackson (orally), Alexander MacNichol, South Portland, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C. J., WERNICK, GODFREY and GLASSMAN, JJ., and DUFRESNE, A. R. J.
In a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court, Cumberland County, defendant was convicted for murder of his estranged wife, Diane Bridges, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(A), and for aggravated assault upon Robert R. Richard, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 208 (Supp.1979). On appeal from the murder conviction, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of the requisite culpable state of mind, the burden of proof placed upon him to prove his defense of insanity, the Superior Court justice's refusal to consider a conviction for manslaughter, and three evidentiary rulings. We reject each of defendant's arguments and affirm his conviction for murder of his wife Diane. However, as the State concedes before this court, defendant's conviction for aggravated assault upon Mr. Richard must be reversed.
The Superior Court justice sitting without a jury was warranted in finding the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the early fall of 1978, Diane Bridges, after eight years of marriage, left defendant and sued for divorce. She and her two children moved in with a friend, Mrs. Katz, who lived in Portland, and tried to keep her whereabouts secret because of her fear of defendant. He eventually discovered where Diane was living. He also came to think that she was dating Mrs. Katz's son, Robert Richard, even though defendant admitted at trial he had no basis for that belief. Over a period of time, defendant told a number of acquaintances that he would "blow her head off" if Diane divorced him, and that "if he couldn't have her, no one would."
During the early morning hours of December 27, 1978, the day of the shootings, defendant was awakened by a telephone call from his wife, who said that she was going to work in Portland that morning. Defendant left his house in Portland and drove to Westbrook, where he bought milk and a newspaper, and chatted with several friends. At about 9:30 a. m. defendant called the babysitter in Westbrook to see if Diane had brought the children. Before the sitter could explain why Diane was not bringing the children that day, defendant hung up. Defendant drove back to Portland, where he bought gasoline for his car and tried to buy a bathroom tile to replace one he had broken earlier that morning.
As defendant was again driving on Brighton Avenue toward Westbrook, he met Diane driving the other way, with Robert Richard in the passenger's seat. Defendant made a U-turn and pursued the other car. During the pursuit, he opened his locked glove compartment, removed and loaded a gun, and rolled down the passenger-side window. Even by running a number of red lights, Diane was unable to get away from defendant. As defendant pulled alongside her car near Deering Oaks, he fired several shots that shattered her driver's window. After Diane came to a stop, defendant stopped also and walked over to her car. Pointing his gun through the driver's window, he shot Diane, who died soon thereafter. Mr. Richard received a head wound, apparently from a bullet ricocheting off the car's ceiling.
After the shooting, defendant drove off in his automobile, turned right onto Park Avenue, and drove to Sambo's Restaurant. Upon entering Sambo's, defendant recognized and nodded to an acquaintance. Defendant promptly made a telephone call to the Portland police, identifying himself as "Mr. Jones" and asking to see a police officer. As soon as officer Dering arrived at the restaurant, defendant volunteered his real name and the fact that "he had just caught his wife with another man." While being frisked by the officer, defendant said that he didn't have a weapon because he had thrown it out of the car onto Park Avenue. Defendant then asked to see a doctor.
Indicted for the murder of Diane and the attempted murder of Mr. Richard, defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. At trial, defendant testified that he remembered nothing about the events that occurred from the time he had first seen Diane and Mr. Richard driving down Brighton Avenue to some time several hours later in the police station. In support of his claim defendant called two witnesses, Dr. Bowman, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Bishop, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Bowman testified that defendant was suffering from mental disease, which he identified as either schizophrenia or chronic brain syndrome or hysterical neurosis, dissociative type, or a combination of the three. In his opinion, as a result of these mental diseases, defendant "went berserk" at the time of the shooting. Dr. Bishop's opinion was that defendant was suffering from hysterical neurosis, dissociative type, which disease prevented him from conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law. In his opinion, defendant did not intend to kill his wife.
In rebuttal the State's psychiatric expert, Dr. Jacobsohn, testified to his opinion that there was no evidentiary support for a diagnosis of hysterical neurosis, dissociative type, or any other "major neurological deficit." Dr. Jacobsohn believed that defendant was merely "repressing" the traumatic events of December 27, 1978, and that on that date defendant was not suffering from a mental disease or defect that would have substantially affected his intellectual and emotional functioning.
Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of the Superior Court justice that defendant acted intentionally or knowingly to kill his wife. Defendant preserved this issue for appellate review by unsuccessfully moving for a judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. 1 On the basis of the psychological and psychiatric testimony, although conflicting, and of defendant's actions before, during, and after the killing, the Superior Court justice was warranted in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted intentionally or knowingly when he shot and killed Diane.
Defendant's numerous threats against his wife's life in the months preceding the shooting are a preliminary indication that he intended to do her harm and that he was extremely jealous of Mr. Richard. On the day of the shooting, defendant engaged in a number of everyday activities in a rational, normal manner he bought a newspaper, gasoline, and milk; he tried to replace a recently broken bathroom tile; he conversed with acquaintances; and he called the babysitter to inquire about his children. The deliberate manner in which defendant carried out the shooting, including leaving his own car in order to walk over to Diane's car to fire one more shot before driving away, is a further indication of intentional behavior. Additionally, in the minutes immediately following the shooting, defendant had the presence of mind to call the police, give them first a fictitious name, describe some of the events of the shooting, and ask for a doctor.
As the factfinder the Superior Court had the responsibility for passing upon the credibility of the conflicting psychiatric testimony and deciding the weight to be accorded thereto. See State v. Mann, Me., 361 A.2d 897, 906 (1976). "(C)onsiderable deference must be accorded to the fact finder's determination" on an issue of defendant's mental state. Cf. State v. Foster, Me., 405 A.2d 726, 732 (1979). We cannot say that the Superior Court justice erred in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the requisite culpable state of mind, namely, that his action in shooting Diane was intentional or knowing.
In State v. Burnham, Me., 406 A.2d 889 (1979), decided after defendant's conviction below, this court reaffirmed the constitutionality of Maine's statutory provision relating to the defendant's "burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he lacks criminal responsibility as described in subsection 1." 2 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58(3) (Supp.1979); see State v. Burnham, supra at 892. We also noted the well-established rule that the State is constitutionally required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a mental state that is an essential element of the crime charged. Id. at 893-95; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Defendant concedes that this allocation of the burdens of proof does not violate due process of law in a case where a person may specifically intend to commit a crime "even though he may suffer from a mental disease or defect which causes him to formulate such an intent." State v. Buzynski, Me., 330 A.2d 422, 429-30 (1974). He claims, however, that in a case such as this where his particular brand of mental defect by definition precludes the capacity to intend to kill, the requirement that he prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence has the effect of placing upon him the burden of disproving intent, in violation of the principles declared in Winship.
Contrary to defendant's contention, we recognized and answered this very question in State v. Burnham, supra. There we stated that a "problem arises only when the mental disease or defect, rather than causing the formation of a culpable state of mind, destroys the defendant's capacity to form the intention required for the crime." Id. at 894 (emphasis in original). In such cases the factfinder, in either a unitary or a bifurcated trial, must consider any evidence of mental abnormality in order to determine whether a reasonable doubt exists as to the defendant's culpable state of...
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