State v. Briggs
| Decision Date | 19 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-263-C.A.,99-263-C.A. |
| Citation | 787 A.2d 479 |
| Parties | STATE v. Irving BRIGGS. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.
Jane M. Mcsoley, Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for plaintiff.
Catherine Gibran, Providence, for defendant.
This case came before the Court pursuant to the appeal of the defendant, Irving Briggs (defendant), who was convicted of four counts of first-degree sexual assault and one count of second-degree robbery after a Superior Court jury trial. The defendant, appearing at a portion of the trial pro se, now contends that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In addition, he argues that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and that the trial justice erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of larceny. Because the trial justice made a series of prejudicial comments during the trial that impermissibly affected the jury's ability to assess the defendant's culpability, we grant the defendant's request for a new trial. However, because of our separate disposition of the robbery conviction, a new trial is granted only for the sexual assault charges. The facts pertinent to this appeal are as follows.
On December 28, 1991, defendant attended a party at the apartment of Michelle Albin (Albin). Albin's apartment was on the first floor of a three-story tenement at 12 Chalapa Street in Woonsocket. That night, Sandra Cardillo (Cardillo) was in her apartment on the third floor, above Albin's residence. At trial, Cardillo said that she received an unexpected visitor (defendant), who came into her apartment, stole money, and raped her several times.
After the alleged sexual assault, Cardillo summoned her boyfriend, who, upon arrival, called the police. The defendant was arrested and charged with four counts of first-degree sexual assault, one count of entering a dwelling with intent to commit sexual assault, and one count of robbery. An eight-day trial began in the Superior Court on January 6, 1997. The defendant chose to represent himself during the first two days of the trial. After realizing the truth of Abraham Lincoln's insightful adage that "he who represents himself has a fool for a client," defendant agreed to be represented by an attorney for the rest of the trial.
The jury convicted defendant on all counts, except entry of a dwelling house with felonious intent. Following the verdict, the trial justice denied defendant's motion for new trial. The trial justice sentenced defendant to fifty years in prison at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) for each count of sexual assault in the first degree, with thirty-five years to serve and fifteen years suspended with probation. The defendant also was sentenced to thirty years in prison at the ACI for the count of robbery in the second degree. All sentences were to run concurrently. The defendant appealed.
Sixth Amendment Arguments
The defendant asserts that the trial justice made a series of improper comments during the trial, directed toward both himself and his attorney, which deprived defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. We agree.
"Improper comments by a trial justice may be grounds for a new trial." State v. Jackson, 752 A.2d 5, 11 (R.I.2000) (citing State v. Wiley, 567 A.2d 802, 805 (R.I.1989)). Here the improper comments were made throughout the trial. We address the most serious comments seriatim.
During the first two days of trial, in front of the jury, the trial justice expressed his frustration with defendant's lack of procedural knowledge.1 For example, the trial justice made inaccurate comments in front of the jury about defendant's alleged propensity for hiring and firing numerous attorneys. The trial justice stated:
2
The trial justice repeated this sentiment on two additional occasions. Even though the trial justice made these remarks after defendant's improper attempts to introduce evidence or impeach a witness, these comments were unnecessary and conveyed to the jury the trial justice's hostility toward defendant. The trial justice's demeanor did not change when defense counsel entered his appearance. While defense counsel cross-examined Cardillo, the following dialogue occurred in front of the jury:
* * *
This dialogue came while defense counsel attempted to rephrase a question. The trial justice made additional comments that undermined defense counsel's competency in front of the jury. During cross-examination, the trial justice asked the witness "[d]o you understand that question?" in response to defense counsel's arguably confusing interrogatory. When the witness replied in the affirmative, the trial justice stated "[y]ou're better than I am."
At another point in the trial, the trial justice admonished defense counsel that his questioning of a witness was too lengthy. Shortly after defense counsel began to cross-examine the witness, the trial justice became impatient. The trial justice stated:
The record reflects that this comment came after only seven pages of transcript, while the transcript of the prosecutor's examination of the same witness spanned over thirteen pages.
Toward the end of the trial, the trial justice engaged in improper questioning during defendant's direct examination. The trial justice interjected as follows:
"This [C]ourt has recognized that it is within the ambit of a trial justice's discretion to question a witness when he or she deems it necessary and proper to do so." State v. Evans, 618 A.2d 1283, 1284 (R.I. 1993) (citing State v. Giordano, 440 A.2d. 742, 745 (R.I.1982)). "When a trial justice chooses toengage in questioning a witness, he or she should do so only if his or her question or questions will elicit the truth and will clarify matters that may be otherwise confusing in the minds of the jurors." Id.
In this instance, the trial justice's interjection could have been construed by the jury as an attack on defendant's credibility. By referring to defendant's failure to know the drug source's name as "convenient," the trial justice could have been suggesting that he did not believe defendant. Regardless, this questioning did not serve to clarify a confusing matter for the jury since the issue of who defendant purchased narcotics from was not before the jury.
After review of the record, we conclude Evans, 618 A.2d at 1284. While each comment taken separately might not rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation, reviewed altogether, the trial justice's comments prevented the jury from engaging in its independent fact-finding role.
Relying on our decision in State v. Kryla, 742 A.2d 1178, 1186 (R.I.1999), the state argues that the trial justice's comments were not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. We caution against relying on Kryla for the proposition that improper judicial comments do not warrant a new trial. Our holding was specific to the facts of that case. In Kryla, we held that the trial justice's "comment crossed the bounds of impartiality," but that "the comment was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial." Id.3 The comment did not inflame the jury to the degree that the trial justice was required to pass the case because of the existence of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, including anadmission of culpability which offset the effect of the comment on the jury. Id. at 1185-86. In the instant case, the evidence of defendant's guilt was not of the same degree as that in Kryla. Thus, a new trial is warranted.
The state also argues that defendant's complaint was not properly preserved for failure to raise a timely or specific objection. "According to our well-settled `raise or waive' rule, issues that were not preserved by a specific objection at trial `sufficiently focused so as to call the trial justice's attention to the basis for said objection, may not be considered on appeal.'" State v. Oliveira, 774 A.2d 893, 907 (R.I.2001) (quoting State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 972-73 (R.I.1994)). In the instant case, this Court does not intend to disturb this long-standing raise-or-waive rule of procedure.
However, we have said that absent a timely request for a...
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...of the lesser included offense is implicit in, and part of, the jury verdict" [internal quotation marks omitted]), State v. Briggs, 787 A.2d 479, 486-87 (R.I. 2001) (approving sentencing remand when, although jury was not instructed on lesser offense, defendant's trial testimony constituted......
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