State v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 02 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-58-C.A.,98-58-C.A.
• Citation: 752 A.2d 5
• Parties: STATE v. Demetrius JACKSON.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

752 A.2d 5

STATE v. Demetrius JACKSON.

No. 98-58-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 2, 2000.

Present WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Jane M. McSoley, Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Catherine Gibran, Paula Rosin, Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

LEDERBERG, Justice.

Roger Williams Park was the backdrop for a brief but violent struggle that ended with the death of a park ranger and the serious injury of a Providence police officer. The defendant, Demetrius Jackson, has appealed from convictions resulting from the confrontation. For the reasons set forth below, we deny and dismiss the appeal and affirm the convictions in all respects.

Facts and Procedure

Shortly after midnight on October 12, 1995, an anonymous caller informed the Providence Police Department that two males wearing dark clothing and carrying guns were walking through Roger Williams Park (park) in Providence, Rhode Island. Park Ranger William Abrahamson (Abrahamson), spotted the trespassers, as did Providence police officer Brian Quirk (Quirk), who was responding to a dispatcher's alert. Quirk and Abrahamson left their vehicles and approached the two youths, later identified as defendant and Jason Lee (Lee).

The defendant was carrying a large knapsack that appeared to be sagging under the weight of its contents. Initially, the young men ignored Quirk's orders to "stop and raise [your] hands and drop to [your] knees." Quirk then drew his gun, and Abrahamson, who was unarmed, fell in behind him. Eventually, defendant and Lee obeyed Quirk's commands and placed their hands on the police cruiser. Quirk holstered his gun and began "patting down" defendant. At that point, defendant spun around and drew a .38-caliber revolver that he had concealed in the waistband of his trousers. Quirk attempted to wrest the gun from defendant's grip, and a struggle ensued.

As the pair wrestled for control of the gun, Patrolman Edward Ryan (Ryan) and Sergeant Walter Chin (Chin) arrived separately at the scene. Although the struggle was over within a matter of seconds, five shots were fired by defendant, three of which made contact with their targets: one bullet struck Abrahamson in his abdomen, one hit Quirk in his left elbow, and the last hit Quirk in his right arm. Quirk and defendant fell backwards in opposite directions. The defendant then pointed his gun at Chin's head.

As the gunman regained his footing and headed toward a nearby lake, Chin and Ryan ordered him to stop. When he ignored their commands, one or more of the officers fired at defendant, and he was struck by a bullet in the leg. He fell into the lake, and Chin pulled him from the water. The defendant was handcuffed, taken into police custody, and treated at Rhode Island Hospital for his gunshot wound, as were Abrahamson and Quirk. Unable to survive the massive blood loss he suffered from the gunshot wound, Abrahamson died six days later.

Later in the morning of the shooting, police searched the park and recovered the .38-caliber revolver and five spent .38-caliber shell casings. A search of defendant's knapsack revealed a loaded sawed-off shotgun, a box filled with twenty live rounds of .38-caliber ammunition, and two livesixteen-gauge shotgun shells. The bullets lodged in the bodies of Abrahamson and Quirk and a bag containing two sixteen-gauge shotgun shells, three twelve- gauge shotgun shells, and seventeen live.38-caliber rounds were seized at the hospital.

The defendant subsequently was charged by indictment on five counts: count 1, the murder of Abrahamson; count 2, assault with intent to murder Quirk; count 3, assault with a dangerous weapon upon Chin; counts 4 and 5, carrying a revolver without a license and possession of a sawed-off shotgun, respectively. The defendant was tried before a jury that returned a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder and guilty on the remaining charges. After hearing and denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the justice subsequently sentenced defendant to fifty years incarceration for the murder conviction, twenty years each for assault with intent to murder and assault with a dangerous weapon, and five years for each weapons charge, all to run consecutively. A timely notice of appeal was filed.

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

The defendant's first assertion of error was that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon upon Chin, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-5-2. The defendant's argument in this respect was twofold. First, he urged us to hold that a defendant's actual present ability to inflict harm on the victim with the weapon is an element of assault with a dangerous weapon. Second, defendant contended that he lacked the actual present ability to harm Chin because his weapon had fired all its ammunition by the time defendant allegedly pointed it at the police officer.

Under Rule 29(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure,

"[t]he court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment,information, or complaint after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense * * *."

We have consistently held that when a motion for judgment of acquittal is presented, the trial justice must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, drawing all reasonable inferences consistent with the guilt of a defendant. State v. Robertson, 740 A.2d 330, 332 (R.I.1999); State v. Lamoureux, 573 A.2d 1176, 1181 (R.I.1990). In deciding such a motion, the trial justice may not consider either the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Lamoureux, 573 A.2d at 1181. This Court reviews the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal by the same standard as that applied by the trial justice, namely, by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, without weighing the evidence or assessing the witnesses' credibility. State v. Snow, 670 A.2d 239, 243 (R.I.1996); State v. Henshaw, 557 A.2d 1204, 1206 (R.I.1989).

The statutory definition of "felony assault" in § 11-5-2(a), states in part, that "[e]very person who shall make an assault or battery, or both, with a dangerous weapon * * * or an assault or battery which results in serious bodily injury, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years." Because statutory definitions are not given, the common law established by our cases has defined the terms "assault" and "dangerous weapon." We have held that assault with a dangerous weapon is

"any unlawful offer to do corporal injury to another under such circumstances as may create a reasonable apprehension of immediate injury unless the person so threatened takes action or inaction to avoid it, coupled with a present ability to carry the offer into effect." State v. Jeremiah, 546 A.2d 183, 186-87 (R.I.1988).

The state has argued that our holding in State v. Andrade, 657 A.2d 538, 543 (R.I.1995), essentially vitiated the "present ability" element of assault with a dangerous weapon. The defendant in Andrade was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon even though the weapon at issue was never admitted into evidence. Id. at 542. Raising an argument similar to the one raised here, Andrade asserted that, absent actual proof of an operative weapon, there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that he had the present ability to inflict injury. Id. Notwithstanding the absence of a weapon in Andrade, we concluded that the jury could infer that Andrade had wielded an operative pistol based on the eyewitness testimony describing his actions and statements. Id. at 543. We therefore affirmed the trial justice's denial of Andrade's motion for judgment of acquittal. Id.

With respect to the case sub judice, it is our opinion that an individual armed as defendant was with operable guns and an arsenal of ammunition can be characterized as having the present ability to inflict injury with a dangerous weapon. Sergeant Chin observed defendant fire several shots, some of which hit their presumed targets. Chin reasonably believed that defendant possessed a weapon which could inflict injury on him as well. But for the restraint of an armed officer, defendant could well have reloaded his weapon from the supply he carried. Under these circumstances, the trial justice was clearly correct in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.

The state has suggested that we apply to this case the United States Supreme Court's ruling in McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17-18, 106 S.Ct. 1677, 1678, 90 L.Ed.2d 15, 18 (1986). McLaughlin interpreted the words "dangerous weapon" in the context of the federal bank robbery statute. Id. at 16-17 & n.1, 106 S.Ct. at 1678 & n.1, 90 L.Ed.2d at 17-18 & n.1. The Court in McLaughlin held that an unloaded gun constituted a "dangerous weapon" under the statute and offered three independent reasons in support thereof:

"First, a gun is an article that is typically and characteristically dangerous; the use for which it is manufactured and sold is a dangerous one, and the law reasonably may presume that such an article is always dangerous even though it may not be armed at a particular time or place. In addition, the display of a gun instills fear in the average citizen;[ ] as a consequence, it creates an immediate danger that a violent response will ensue. Finally, a gun can cause harm when used as a bludgeon." Id. at 17-18, 106 S.Ct. at 1678, 90 L.Ed.2d at 18.

Although we are persuaded that the present ability rule may well be outdated and that McLaughlin's dangerous weapon interpretation represents the better rule, we refrain from applying such a holding in this case without prior notice to litigants. Henceforth, however, in future cases we shall apply the McLa...