State v. Bright

• Decision Date: 04 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 9412012391,9412012391
• Citation: 683 A.2d 1055
• Parties: STATE of Delaware v. Rodney A. BRIGHT, Defendant. I.D. . Submitted:
• Court: Delaware Superior Court

Page 1055

683 A.2d 1055

STATE of Delaware v. Rodney A. BRIGHT, Defendant.

I.D. No. 9412012391.

Superior Court of Delaware,

New Castle County.

Submitted: June 4, 1996.

Decided: June 27, 1996.

Rosemary K. Killian, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, for State.

Kevin P. O'Neill, Heyden, Kania & O'Neill, Wilmington, for Defendant.

OPINION

BARRON, Judge.

This case gives the Court its first opportunity to interpret certain federal confidentiality statutes as they apply to a Delaware prosecution. A Delaware grand jury has charged the defendant, Rodney A. Bright ("Bright"), with Attempted Murder in the First Degree in violation of 11 Del.C. § 531 and five counts of Terroristic Threatening in violation of 11 Del.C. § 621. ¹ On March 13, 1996, Bright filed two Motions to Suppress certain evidence relating to statements made by him to medical personnel at an out-of-state Veterans' Administration Hospital. ² Briefing having been completed, the motions are now ripe for decision.

I. THE FACTS

Bright is a veteran of the United States Armed Forces. Apparently, Bright suffers from certain psychiatric disorders, to wit: manic depression and bi-polar disorder. Bright has sought treatment for these conditions from Veterans' Administration (hereinafter "V.A.") personnel for the past twenty years at various V.A. facilities throughout the nation. In his motion, Bright claims that he has a history of alcohol dependence. Bright does not specifically state that the V.A. hospital or anyone else has treated him for his alcohol dependence. Rather, Bright simply claims that this history of abuse exists and that the V.A. hospital treated his psychological disorders with numerous drugs.

At the time of his arrest, Bright was under the care of Dr. Mayetta at the V.A. hospital in Indianapolis, Indiana. ³ Bright asserts that Dr. Mayetta was a treating psychiatrist employed by the V.A. and/or alternatively received monies pursuant to government contract for mental health and psychiatric services rendered to patients at the V.A. hospital. Dr. Mayetta treated Bright for his mental impairments on an outpatient basis for a substantial period of time. ⁴ The State submits that Dr. Mayetta must have known that Bright had killed his brother in Texas in the mid-1980's and that he was found to be insane at that time. Thus, the doctor would have been cognizant of Bright's dangerous propensities and capacity to harm others.

Doctor Mayetta informed the Delaware police that in December of 1994, during the course of therapy, Bright had repeatedly threatened to harm his ex-wife, Ona Bright, (the "alleged victim"). The alleged victim had concealed her whereabouts from Bright and was living in Delaware. Although Bright had regularly threatened the alleged victim during the month of December 1994, it was one incident in particular that compelled Dr. Mayetta to alert the authorities as to the danger that Bright posed to the alleged victim's safety. ⁵

Dr. Mayetta disclosed Bright's violent intent to two sources in Delaware: the alleged victim and, as stated, the New Castle County Police. ⁶ Dr. Mayetta's actions, combined with commendable police work, resulted in the police capturing Bright approximately a mile and a half from the alleged victim's place of work. When the police apprehended Bright, he possessed a knife, and allegedly had recently purchased duct tape and rope while in Delaware. ⁷

II. DISCUSSION

Bright seeks to suppress the threatening statements he made to Dr. Mayetta and all derivative evidence resulting therefrom. Bright bases his Motions to Suppress on three theories. First, Bright claims that Dr. Mayetta acted as an agent for the prosecution when she questioned Bright; thereby, rendering his statements involuntary under the Fifth Amendment. Second, Bright contends that a federal confidentiality statute, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(c), prohibits the use of records relating to substance abuse programs in criminal proceedings. Third, Bright contends that Dr. Mayetta's disclosure of his statements violates the physician-patient privilege. The defendant's contentions will be addressed seriatim.

A. Bright's Statements Do Not Violate the 5th Amendment.

The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ⁸ U.S. Const. amend. V. Naturally, the admission of an involuntary confession violates due process. Only those confessions that, under the totality of the circumstances, are the product of rational intellect and free will, and not the product of governmental coercion, are considered voluntary. United States v. D.F., 63 F.3d 671, 679 (7th Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Montgomery, 14 F.3d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir.1994)); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523-24, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1140-41, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986); Liu v. State, Del.Supr., 628 A.2d 1376, 1379 (1993); State v. Rooks, Del.Supr., 401 A.2d 943, 948-49 (1979) (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961)); Black v. State, Del.Supr., 616 A.2d 320, 322-23 (1992).

Bright claims that Dr. Mayetta's actions violated the Fifth Amendment. Specifically, Bright maintains that Dr. Mayetta contemplated the possibility of criminal prosecution when she elicited the incriminating information from Bright while at the same time believing she had an ethical duty to report the contents of the conversation. Bright claims that these actions constitute coercive governmental action which renders his statements involuntary under the Fifth Amendment.

In support of this claim, Bright cites United States v. D.F., supra. In D.F., the district court found that certain employees of the mental health facility actively persuaded an inpatient child suspect to reveal that she had killed her two cousins. The D.F. therapists believed that disclosure and punishment would help rehabilitate the patient's mental health. The therapists immediately reported the patient's confession to Protective Services who, in turn, contacted the F.B.I. The district court suppressed the patient's confession since it found that, under these circumstances, the statements were involuntary. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.

The State contends, and the Court agrees, that the D.F. case is clearly distinguishable from the one presently before the Court. First, Dr. Mayetta was not acting as an agent for the prosecution merely because she was employed by a government facility. Although it is clear that one does not have to be a police officer in order to qualify as a state actor for purposes of the Fifth Amendment analysis, it is equally clear that "mere government employment of the questioner, standing alone, does not necessarily make one a 'state actor' for this Fifth Amendment purpose." Id. at 680-81 (emphasis in original).

Instead, in order to implicate the Fifth Amendment, the questioner must contemplate the prosecution of the individual when examining said individual. Id. 682-83 (citing Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 1504-05, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968)). Therefore, a seemingly neutral examination turns into a tool for the prosecution when the caregiver substantially changes his/her role by agreeing, expressly or impliedly, to collaborate in the prosecution of the individual. D.F., 63 F.3d at 683-84; cf. United States v. A.R., 38 F.3d 699 (3d Cir.1994); United States v. Cortes, 922 F.2d 123 (2d Cir.1990); Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692, 699 (5th Cir.1981) (discussing the unexpected role-shifting that occurred when a neutral psychiatric interview was used as a tool for the prosecution). ⁹ Stated differently, the state actor must intend to elicit statements from the patient that will aid in the patient's criminal prosecution. D.F., 63 F.3d at 684; cf. Jackson v. State, Del.Supr., 643 A.2d 1360, 1376 (1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 956, 130 L.Ed.2d 898 (1995) (stating that factors to be considered in determining whether informant is an agent of the State are whether there was an agreement between the informant and the police, the content and scope of any such agreement, whether the police provided direction or instructions to the informant, and whether there was prearranged or ongoing cooperation).

Here, unlike the medical personnel in D.F., there is no indication that the purpose of Dr. Mayetta's questioning of Bright was anything other than to treat him for his medical conditions. Nothing in the record suggests that "the prosecution of the defendant being questioned [was] among the purposes, definite or contingent, for which the information [was] elicited." Id. at 682-83 (footnote omitted). Nor is there any indication that Dr. Mayetta went "beyond [her] accepted medical role[ ] and affirmatively [took] on the role of delivering someone who is in [her] care and custody to the prosecutor...." Id. at 683. Rather, it appears that Dr. Mayetta's sole aim was to treat Bright for his mental illness. Doctor Mayetta only "collaborated" with police when complying with her duty as a psychotherapist to inform the alleged victim and the Delaware police authorities of Bright's threats. See discussion infra section II.C. Since Dr. Mayetta's only objective in conversing with Bright was to treat his medical problems, the Fifth Amendment was not implicated. Id. at 681.

Moreover, the present case differs from the D.F. case since the D.F. patient confessed to her participation in crimes that had already occurred. Here, Bright did not admit to committing a past crime; rather, he made statements regarding actions he planned to take in the future. This fact further indicates that Dr. Mayetta did not intend, implicitly or otherwise, to elicit incriminating statements from Bright since, at the time she was questioning Bright, he had yet to commit a crime.

As such, Dr. Mayetta's actions did not implicate the ...