State v. Brooks, 21580
| Decision Date | 05 October 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 21580,21580 |
| Citation | 283 S.E.2d 830,277 S.C. 111 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Jackie BROOKS, Appellant. |
Jesse McCall and Pat Paschal, Greenville, and Deputy Appellate Defender Vance J. Bettis, Com'n of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Attys. Gen. Kay G. Crowe and Lindy P. Funkhouser, Columbia, and Asst. Sol. Cecil H. Nelson, Greenville, for respondent.
This is an appeal by appellant Brooks challenging his burglary conviction. He alleges and we agree that the State failed to prove an essential element of the crime charged in the burglary indictment. We reverse.
Brooks was also charged and convicted of criminal sexual conduct and larceny. He does not contest these convictions.
The burglary indictment is framed substantially in the language of the common law. The parties concede that the common law definition is the breaking and entering the dwelling house of another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony therein.
Based on this definition, the State must present evidence to support each element of the crime charged in order to uphold the conviction.
Brooks argues there was no evidence of a breaking and we agree. There is no evidence stating that the windows or doors were closed or how the appellant gained entry into the dwelling house. While it is ludicrous to assume appellant was invited to enter the residence and commit this crime upon an unsuspecting victim, the law of this State requires some proof of a "breaking." State v. Nicholson, et al., 221 S.C. 399, 404, 70 S.E.2d 632 (1952); State v. Clamp, 225 S.C. 89, 80 S.E.2d 918 (1954). The burglary conviction must be reversed on this basis.
Next Brooks alleges the indictment was insufficient on its face because it did not specify the felony which he intended to commit.
The common law requires as an ingredient of burglary "intent to commit a felony." Today the "felony" requisite serves no real purpose.
Burglary is a crime against possession, not against property. State v. Clamp, supra. The law of burglary is primarily designed to secure the sanctity of one's home, especially at nighttime when peace, solitude and safety are most desired and expected.
Thus, at the heart of burglary law is protection of the individual and family from unlawful intrusion while home at night.
The difference between a felony and a misdemeanor for most purposes has no significance. Some felonies provide less punishment than do some misdemeanors. In some states the two are not clearly defined.
Burglary calls for harsh punishment because it involves an intrusion in the nighttime of a place where people sleep. It is no less obnoxious that one wrongfully break and enter a sleeping place with intent to steal a $195 watch which is petit larceny, a misdemeanor, than with intent to steal a $205 watch which is grand larceny, a felony. 1
Based on these principles and this Court's authority to modify the common law in certain circumstances, 2 we no longer require as an ingredient of burglary, "intent to commit a felony."
Any indictment hereafter which charges one with breaking and entering the dwelling of another in the nighttime with intent to commit any crime, a felony or a misdemeanor, is sufficient.
No further exceptions need be considered since the conviction has been reversed for lack of evidence.
REVERSED.
Appellant was charged in separate indictments with burglary, criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, and larceny. The indictments were joined for trial and appellant was convicted on all charges, receiving a sentence of life imprisonment for burglary, thirty (30) years for criminal sexual conduct, and ten (10) years for larceny, the first two sentences to run consecutively and the latter concurrently. He has appealed, challenging only his conviction for burglary. Under my view of the exceptions, we need only consider whether it was error for the lower court to refuse appellant's pretrial motion to quash the indictment for burglary.
The indictment charging appellant with...
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State ex rel. Atkinson v. Wilson
...which shall have the force and effect of law."12 Horne cited as its authority to create new common law crimes State v. Brooks, 277 S.C. 111, 283 S.E.2d 830 (1981), and State v. Mouzon, 231 S.C. 655, 99 S.E.2d 672 (1957). In Brooks, the court determined that as an element of burglary, "the i......
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State v. Davis-Kocsis
...sanctity of one's home, especially at nighttime when peace, solitude and safety are most desired and expected." State v. Brooks , 277 S.C. 111, 112, 283 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1981). See generally 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *223 (Wilfrid Prest ed. 2016) ("Burglary, or nocturnal housebreak......
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The State v. Singley
...security and this sanctity the law has created safeguards and imposed severe penalties on their infringement.” State v. Brooks, 277 S.C. 111, 112–13, 283 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1981). Therefore, our burglary laws protect an interest separate and apart from ownership: the right to be safe and secu......
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