The State v. Singley

• Decision Date: 04 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. 26954.,26954.
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent,v.Ferris Geiger SINGLEY, Petitioner.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

392 S.C. 270

709 S.E.2d 603

The STATE, Respondent,

v.Ferris Geiger SINGLEY, Petitioner.

No. 26954.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Feb. 15, 2011.Decided April 4, 2011.

Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, Senior Appellate Defender Joseph L. Savitz, III, South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, both of Columbia, for Petitioner.Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, Office of the Attorney General, all of Columbia, Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.Justice HEARN.

Ferris Geiger Singley was convicted of burglary and armed robbery in an incident involving a home which he jointly owned with his mother and brother. On appeal, Singley argues his first degree burglary conviction must be reversed because of his ownership interest in the house. We granted certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed Singley's conviction. We likewise affirm and find ownership does not preclude a burglary conviction as a matter of law, and we take this opportunity to expand upon the reasoning of the court of appeals.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

By virtue of intestate succession, Singley inherited a 12.5 percent interest in his childhood home from his father in August 2001. His brother owns an additional 12.5 percent, and his mother owns the remaining 75 percent. Singley remained in the house until his early twenties, and then returned again in April 2005. He resided there for three weeks, until his mother “put him out” of the house. He did not return his key to his mother, telling her that he had lost it. As between Singley and his mother, Singley did not have permission to return to the house. It was not until one night in early October 2005, some six months later, that he did so.

On that night, Singley's mother was at a bar with friends, returning home at approximately 2:30 am. While she was out of the house, Singley entered through a back window after climbing a small stepladder. When she returned, Singley jumped out from behind her and put a knife to her throat. He threatened to kill her if she screamed, and then demanded money from her. After she complied with his requests, he forced her into her bedroom and tied her to the bed using jogging pants, medical tape, and pajamas. He threw her telephone out the window and ordered her to wait twenty minutes before attempting to find help. Once she was sure Singley had left and would not return, his mother freed herself from her restraints and went to a neighbor's house to call the police. Police arrested Singley at his residence, which was around the corner from his mother's house.

Singley was indicted for first degree burglary, armed robbery, and kidnapping. Singley moved for a directed verdict on all charges. As to the burglary charge, Singley argued that because he is a part owner of the house and there was no order of protection or similar legal instrument divesting him of his right to enter it, the State failed to prove that he entered the house without the consent of a person in lawful possession. In essence, he argued that because he was a person in lawful possession, he could enter freely without his mother's consent. The circuit court denied Singley's motion. The jury found Singley guilty of burglary and armed robbery, but it acquitted him of kidnapping. The circuit court sentenced Singley to consecutive sentences of life without parole. On appeal to the court of appeals, Singley challenged only his burglary conviction. State v. Singley, 383 S.C. 441, 441, 679 S.E.2d 538, 539 (Ct.App.2009). He repeated the arguments he made at the directed verdict stage that one cannot commit burglary by breaking into one's own dwelling. Id. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Singley's mother was the sole possessor of the dwelling when the burglary occurred, and therefore her consent was needed to enter. Id. at 447, 679 S.E.2d at 542.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Singley raises one issue on appeal: does his ownership interest in the home preclude a conviction of burglary as a matter of law?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court must grant a motion for directed verdict of acquittal when the State fails to produce any evidence of the crime charged. State v. Parris, 363 S.C. 477, 481, 611 S.E.2d 501, 502 (2005). At that juncture, the court is concerned only with the existence of evidence, not its weight. Id. at 481, 611 S.E.2d at 502–03. “If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the Court must find the case properly submitted to the jury.” Id. at 481, 611 S.E.2d at 503. We will view all evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Singley argues that because he has an ownership interest in the house without any legal impediment to his right to possess, he cannot be guilty of burglary as a matter of law. We disagree.

The statute for first degree burglary provides, in pertinent part, “A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if the person enters a dwelling without consent and with intent to commit a crime in the dwelling, and ... the entering or remaining occurs in the nighttime.” S.C.Code Ann. § 16–11–311(A)(3) (2003). It goes on to define entering without consent in part as, “[t]o enter a building without the consent of the person in lawful possession.” Id. § 16–11–310(3)(a). The code provides no further guidance. Singley only challenges the possession element of burglary. More specifically, he only argues his ownership interest insulates him from a conviction of burglary; he does not contend he had consent from his mother to enter the home, and he does not allege his mother did not have a possessory interest in it.

We have maintained consistently for well over one hundred years that burglary is a crime against possession and habitation, not a crime against ownership. State v. Clamp, 225 S.C. 89, 102, 80 S.E.2d 918, 924 (1954); State v. Alford, 142 S.C. 43, 45, 140 S.E. 261, 262 (1927); State v. Trapp, 17 S.C. 467, 471 (1882). In those cases, we held that the victim listed in the indictment need not be the owner of the dwelling burglarized; it is sufficient that the alleged victim was the occupant and possessor of the dwelling. See Clamp, 225 S.C. at 102, 80 S.E.2d at 924; Alford, 142 S.C. at 45, 140 S.E. at 262; Trapp, 17 S.C. at 472.¹ The focus accordingly was on the victim's possessory interest, and the defendant's ownership or possession of the dwelling was not an issue. The same is true for the cases from other jurisdictions relied upon by the court of appeals in its decision. See Murphy v. State, 238 Ga. 725, 234 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1977) (“The defendant contends that the state failed to prove that the dwelling was entered ‘without authority’ of the owner. The state proved that the dwelling was entered without authority from the victim, the lawful occupant. This was sufficient to allow the case to go to the jury for decision....”); State v. Harold, 312 N.C. 787, 325 S.E.2d 219, 222 (1985) (finding that although the state did not prove the victim owned the house in question, it did show she lived there for five months prior to the incident and she was occupying it on the night of the incident).

We have had only one previous opportunity to address the defendant's interest in the burglarized premises under section 16–11–310(3)(a). In State v. Coffin, 331 S.C. 129, 502 S.E.2d 98 (1998), the defendant moved into his girlfriend's mobile home; in accordance with her lease, he was approved as a visitor, and the landlord affixed a copy of his driver's license to the lease with the notation that he was “a legal qualified person living in that mobile home.” Id. at 130–31, 502 S.E.2d at 98–99. The defendant did not sign the lease himself, although he did pay rent on occasion. Id. at 131, 502 S.E.2d at 99. According to the Court, the defendant's girlfriend “threw him out” of the house and refused to let him back in following an argument. Id. He later returned, pried open the front door, murdered his girlfriend, and stabbed her companion. Id. On appeal of his conviction of burglary, the defendant alleged that he was a person in lawful possession of the mobile home and therefore did not need his girlfriend's consent to enter. Id. We rejected that argument:

This evidence supports the inference [defendant] was a guest in [his girlfriend's] home and she was entitled to terminate [defendant's] lawful possession by evicting him as she did before the stabbings occurred. Accordingly, this evidence presents a jury issue whether appellant was in lawful possession of the mobile home at the time of the stabbings.

Id. at 132, 502 S.E.2d at 99.

In Coffin, the facts demonstrated that the defendant did not have an absolute right to possess the property. Instead, his rights were dependent solely on his girlfriend's good graces. Here, it appears Singley did have an undivided right to possess the home equal to that of his mother by virtue of his ownership interest in it. See Watson v. Little, 224 S.C. 359, 365, 79 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1953) (holding tenants in common have equal rights to possess the whole of the property, regardless of their fractional ownership shares); see also S.C. Juris. Cotenancy § 9 (citing Rabb v. Aiken, 7 S.C.Eq. (2 McCord) 118 (1827)) (stating when two or more beneficiaries inherit the property of an intestate, they take as tenants in common). However, we believe that the mere holding of title to property is not dispositive of whether the owner can be convicted of burglarizing it.

It is axiomatic that “one cannot commit the offence of burglary by breaking into his own home.” Trapp, 17 S.C. at 470. However, the concept of what is one's “own home” must be examined in light of the very purpose behind the law of burglary. “The law of burglary is primarily designed to...