Congress of Industrial Organ v. City of Dallas

• Decision Date: 25 October 1946
• Docket Number: No. 13719.,13719.
• Parties: CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS et al. v. CITY OF DALLAS et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

198 S.W.2d 143

CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS et al. v. CITY OF DALLAS et al.

No. 13719.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.

October 25, 1946.

Rehearing Denied November 29, 1946.

Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; Paine L. Bush, Judge.

Suit by the Congress of Industrial Organizations and others against City of Dallas and others to enjoin defendants from dismissing certain city employees who had organized and had become members of a local labor union in violation of city ordinance. From a judgment refusing a temporary injunction, the plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

Lindsay P. Walden, of Fort Worth, and George Clifton Edwards, of Dallas, for appellants.

H. P. Kucera, City Atty., and A. J. Thuss, Jr., Asst. City Atty, both of Dallas, for appellees.

LOONEY, Justice.

This is an appeal from the refusal of the trial court to grant a temporary injunction sought by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), a national labor union with headquarters in Washington, D. C., its local affiliate, and Jas. R. Howell, employe of the City of Dallas, member of said local, representing himself and other employes similarly situated, against the City of Dallas and its officials because they threatened to dismiss certain City employes who organized and became members of a local labor union in violation of an ordinance of the City of Dallas adopted in December 1942.

The points of error urged for reversal, in our opinion, may appropriately be summarized as follows:

1. Appellants contend that the City ordinance sought to be annulled is unconstitutional and void, in that it would deprive the individual involved—employes of the City of Dallas, of their right of assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right of petition guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution and protected against invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment thereof; that said ordinance is contrary to the laws and public policy of the United States, giving and guaranteeing the right of workers to form and join labor unions of their own choosing; that said ordinance abridges and deprives appellants of their privileges and immunities, denies to them equal protection of the laws, is arbitrary, unreasonable, and constitutes an improper exercise of the police power by the City of Dallas.

2. That said ordinance is in conflict with and contrary to the laws of the State of Texas, particularly Articles 5152 and 5154A, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St., making it lawful for all employes to organize and become members of labor unions; and, particularly, is in conflict with Article 11, section 5, of the Constitution of the State, Vernon's Ann.St., that prohibits cities from enacting ordinances contrary to the general laws of the State of Texas.

3. Appellants also contend that the ordinance in question is not applicable to them, in that it specifies the type of labor organizations or clubs made unlawful for an officer, agent or employe of the City of Dallas to organize or join; contending, in this connection, that affiliation with the National Labor organization did not in any way place the local union within the category of excluded organizations, within the meaning of said ordinance.

4. And, finally, appellants contend that the court erred in not suspending the order denying to appellants the relief sought and in not permitting them to supersede said order.

These points of error will be considered in the order named; but it should be understood at the beginning that the status of governmental employes, National, State and Municipal, is radically different from that of employes in private business or industry. This distinction has repeatedly been recognized in legislation, such as the National Relations Act by the Congress. Title 29 U.S.C.A. ch. 7, § 152, provides that the Act shall have no application to either Federal, State or Municipal employes; and the Seventy-ninth Congress, Second Session, in the First Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1947, Public Law No. 663, sec. 301, 60 Stat. 910, 918, provides: "Sec. 301. No part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall be used to pay the salary or wages of any person who engages in a strike against the Government of the United States or who is a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, or who advocates, or who is a member of an organization that advocates, the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence: * * *."

In this connection we do not deem it inappropriate to quote the late President Roosevelt, as no one can truthfully say he was in any sense inimical to labor. In a letter to the National Federation of Federal Employees, dated August 16, 1937, the late president is quoted as saying: "All government employees should realize that the process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable limitations when applied to public personnel management. The very nature and purpose of government make it impossible for administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions with government employee organizations. The employer is the whole people, who speak by means of laws enacted by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative employees and officials alike are governed and guided, and in many instances restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules in personnel matters."

The intent and purpose of the ordinance of the City of Dallas under review, in our opinion, is not out of harmony, but is in accord with the legislative expressions above referred to and the ideas expressed by the late president.

A review of case law on the subject reveals that courts, the country over, have uniformly sustained all governmental laws and regulations of the nature, intent and purpose of the ordinance of the City of Dallas now under consideration. The cases are so numerous that to do more than make a mere reference or an occasional excerpt would lengthen this opinion out of bounds. In the case of Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 601, 607, the Supreme Court of New York had under consideration the question of labor unions among public employes. Mr. Justice Murray, speaking for the court, stated, ably and clearly, the reasons why labor unions among public employes were incongruous, illogical and entirely out of place. He said that "To tolerate or recognize any combination of Civil Service employees of the government as a labor organization or union is not only incompatible with the spirit of democracy, but inconsistent with every principle upon which our Government is founded. Nothing is more dangerous to public welfare than to admit that hired servants of the state can dictate to the Government the hours, the wages and conditions under which they will carry on essential services vital to the welfare, safety and security of the citizen. To admit as true that Government employees have power to halt or check the functions of Government, unless their demands are satisfied, is to transfer to them all legislative, executive and judicial power. Nothing would be more ridiculous. The reasons are obvious which forbid acceptance of any such doctrine. Government is formed for the benefit of all persons, and the duty of all to support it is equally clear. Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally true, that unless the people surrender some of their natural rights to the Government it cannot operate. Much as we all recognize the value and the necessity of collective bargaining in industrial and social life, nonetheless, such bargaining is impossible between the Government and its employees, by reason of the very nature of Government itself. The formidable and familiar weapon in industrial strike and warfare—the strike—is without justification when used against the Government. When so used, it is rebellion against constituted authority. * * *." The court then concluded, as follows: "To hold otherwise would be to sanction control of governmental functions not by laws but by men. Such policy if followed to its logical conclusion would inevitably lead to chaos, dictators and the annihilation of representative government."

The first Texas case on the subject was McNatt v. Lawther, Tex.Civ.App., 223 S. W. 503. It seems that a labor union, affiliated with the A. F. of L., was organized in the Fire Department of the City of Dallas in 1918. The governing authorities of the City issued an order directing the firemen to disband the union or else suffer the penalty of dismissal. The firemen refused, were dismissed, and McNatt and others filed suit demanding restoration; this demand, being denied by the trial court, was appealed and the judgment below was in all things affirmed. Likewise, in the case of San Antonio Fire Fighters' Local Union No. 84 v. Bell, Tex.Civ.App., 223 S.W. 506, it appears that the ruling authorities of the City of San Antonio issued an order to the firemen who had formed the A. F. of L. affiliation that they must disband the union or else be dismissed. On behalf of its members, the union brought suit to enjoin the City from carrying out this order. The trial court denied the relief sought; and on appeal its action was affirmed. Also, in the recent case of National Council of Railway Patrolmen's Union v. Sealy, D.C., 1944, 56 F.Supp. 720, Judge Kennerly held that watchmen employed by the City of Galveston to patrol the wharves upon which railroads were located do not come within the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.; therefore, the City, which owned the wharves, was not compelled to treat with the labor union with respect to wages of the watchmen. Judge Kennerly brushed aside the usual contentions made in a case of this kind, with the mere statement...