State v. Brown

• Decision Date: 17 January 1995
• Citation: 648 So.2d 872
• Parties: 94-1290 La
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 872

648 So.2d 872

94-1290 La. 1/17/95, 97 Ed. Law Rep. 587

STATE of Louisiana v. Thaddeus BROWN, et al.

No. 94-KA-1290.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 17, 1995.

Order Denying Rehearing March 23, 1995.

Richard P. Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Charles M. Futrell, Asst. Dist. Atty., Charmagne A. Padua, Asst. Dist. Atty., for applicant.

Charles G. Wainwright, Gregory K. Voigt, for respondent.

[94-1290 La. 1] JOHNSON, Justice. ¹

The State of Louisiana filed a bill of information charging defendants, Thaddeus Brown, Eugene McShellum and Terrance Watson, with violating La.R.S. 40:981.3. Defendants filed a motion to quash the bill of information, alleging that La.R.S. 40:981.3 was unconstitutionally vague, ambiguous and overly broad, and that the statute violated defendants' due process and 8th Amendment rights. During the motion hearing, the State and defendants stipulated that the defendants were within four hundred (400) to five hundred (500) feet away from school property. The trial court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous and that the statute did not violate the defendants' due process or 8th Amendment rights. However, the trial court upheld defendants' motion on the grounds that the statute, as written, was overly broad. The State of Louisiana sought review in this Court pursuant to Article V, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. Certiorari was granted to determine whether La.R.S. 40:981.3 is unconstitutional on its face. For the reasons set forth in this opinion we conclude that the statute is constitutional and therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

[94-1290 La. 2] FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

According to the incident report, on October 7, 1993, the New Orleans Police Department received information about narcotic trafficking in the 3700 block of Thalia Street in New Orleans. Two Sixth District officers were summoned to the scene where they began a covert surveillance of the area. The officers observed three suspects who appeared to be engaged in drug trafficking. After witnessing what the officers believed to be four drug transactions, the officers approached the scene and found the three defendants to be in possession of seventeen packs of heroin. The defendants, Thaddeus Brown, Eugene McShellum and Terrance Watson were arrested and charged under La.R.S. 40:981.3 with possession with the intent to distribute heroin within one thousand feet of a school yard, namely, Florence Johnson Chester Elementary School.

Through counsel, defendants filed a Motion to Quash the Bill of Information which was heard on March 24, 1994. The trial court held that the "lack of knowledge" ² requirement did not invalidate the statute nor did it violate defendants' due process rights. The court also concluded that the penal provisions of the statute were not excessive, and therefore, not violative of defendants' 8th Amendment rights. The trial court rejected the argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague on the basis of State of Louisiana v. Brown, 606 So.2d 586 (La.App. 5th Cir.1992); writ denied, 630 So.2d 786. ³ (La.1994). However, the lower court upheld the defendants' motion to quash on the ground that one thousand feet is overly broad. The trial judge reasoned that one thousand feet, which is over the length of three football fields, from a school or a playground encompasses too much area. Although the trial judge recognized that the legislative intent in enacting such an enhancement statute was to protect children, the judge concluded [94-1290 La. 3] that one block or one hundred yards from school property would be enforceable and in the realm of what the Legislature intended to do.

The record dictates that defendants are not arguing with particularity that the statute as applied is unconstitutional, but instead that the statute as written is unconstitutional.

Along with these constitutional challenges, defendants have also briefed and argued in this Court that the statute violates equal protection of the laws. Defendants contend that the statute violates equal protection of the laws because it is applied disproportionately to inner-city residents who are mostly minorities.

CONSTITUTIONALITY

In order to create safer school environments for children and deter drug trafficking on school premises, the legislature enacted this statute which enhances the penalties of any persons convicted of distribution or possession with the intent to distribute narcotic drugs within one thousand feet of school property.

La.R.S. 40:981.3 provides:

A. Any person who violates a felony provision of R.S. 40:966 through R.S. 40:970 of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances law while on any property used for school purposes by any school, within one thousand feet of any such property, or while on a school bus shall, upon conviction, be punished in accordance with Subsection E.

B. Lack of knowledge that the prohibited act occurred on or within one thousand feet of school property shall not be a defense.

C. For the purposes of this Section:

(1) "School" means any public or private elementary, secondary, vocational-technical school, or public or private college or university in Louisiana.

(2) "School property" means all property used for school purposes, including but limited to school playgrounds, as well as any building or area owned by the state or by a political subdivision and used or operated as a playground or recreational facility and all parks and recreational areas administered by [94-1290 La. 4] the office of state parks.

D. A violation of this Section within one thousand feet of school property shall not include an act which occurs entirely within a private residence wherein no person seventeen years of age or under was present.

E. (1) On a first conviction, whoever violates a provision of this Section shall be punished by the imposition of the maximum fine and not less than one-half nor more than the maximum term of imprisonment authorized by the applicable provisions of R.S. 40:966 through R.S. 40:970, with the minimum mandatory term of imprisonment being served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, provided in no case shall the term of imprisonment be less than the minimum term provided in R.S. 40:966 through R.S. 40:970.

(2) On second or subsequent conviction, whoever violates a provision of this Section shall be punished by the imposition of the maximum fine and maximum term of imprisonment authorized by the applicable provisions of R.S. 40:966 through R.S. 40:970, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. An offense shall be considered a second or subsequent offense, if, prior to the commission of such offense, the offender had at any time been convicted of any felony violation of this state, the United States, any other state, or any foreign country, relating to an act prohibited by the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law.

This Court has stated in State v. Griffin, 495 So.2d 1306, 1308 (La.1986) that:

Constitutional scrutiny favors the statute. Statutes are presumed to be valid, and the constitutionality of a statute should be upheld whenever possible. State v. Brenner, 486 So.2d 101 (La.1986); State v. Rones, 223 La. 839, 67 So.2d 99 (1953). Because a state statute is presumed constitutional, the party challenging the statute bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality. The attack will fail if there exists a reasonable relationship between the law and the promotion or protection of a public good, such as health, safety or welfare. Theriot v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 436 So.2d 515 (La.1983); Gilbert v. Catahoula Parish Police Jury, 407 So.2d 1228 (La.1981). The legislation must have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest in order to satisfy the substantive guarantee of due process required by both federal and state constitutions. Theriot, supra, at 520; City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Harry's Hardware, Inc. v. Parsons, 410 So.2d 735 (La.1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 881, 103 S.Ct. 178, 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982).

[94-1290 La. 5] To challenge a Legislative Act as unconstitutional on its face is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).

VAGUENESS

Defendants contend that La.R.S. 40:981.3 is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous in that a reasonable person is left guessing at the meaning of "school property" as contemplated by the statute.

This issue was fully discussed in Brown, supra, at 588. The Court in Brown, stated the following:

[A] statute is unconstitutionally vague if an ordinary person of reasonable intelligence is not capable of discerning its meaning and conforming his conduct to it. State v. Greco, 583 So.2d 825, 828 (La.1991); State v. Powell, 515 So.2d 1085 (La.1987); State v. Broom, 439 So.2d 357 (La.1983); State v. Stilley, 416 So.2d 928 (La.1982); State v. Baron, 416 So.2d 537 (La.1982). In addition, a penal statute must provide adequate standards by which the guilt or innocence of the accused can be determined. See State v. Broom, supra; State v. Union Tank Car Co., 439 So.2d 377 (La.1983)[;] State v. Barthelemy, 545 So.2d 531, 532-533 (La.1989).

Furthermore, in State v. Deutch, 245 La. 819, 161 So.2d 730, 736 (La.1964), the Court quoting United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963) stated:

'The strong presumptive validity that attaches to an Act of Congress [Act of the Legislature] has led this Court to hold many times that statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.'

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'Void for vagueness simply...