State v. Brown

• Decision Date: 08 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-34,91-34
• Citation: 588 N.E.2d 113,63 Ohio St.3d 349
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. BROWN, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 349

63 Ohio St.3d 349

588 N.E.2d 113

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. BROWN, Appellee.

No. 91-34.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 21, 1992.

Decided April 8, 1992.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

A police officer may not open a small, closed container found inside an automobile's glove compartment solely as a search incident to the driver's arrest for a traffic violation, after the officer has the suspect--and sole occupant of the vehicle--under control in the police cruiser. (New York v. Belton [1981], 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, distinguished; the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, applied.)

On May 9, 1989, Sergeant Carl Meding arrested Henry Brown (defendant-appellee) for driving under the influence of alcohol. Brown concedes that the arrest was valid. After Meding arrested Brown and placed him in custody in the patrol car, Meding searched the passenger compartment of Brown's automobile. During the course of this search, Meding opened an unlocked brown wooden box that he found in the glove compartment of the car. The box contained seven sugar cubes, which were laced with lysergic acid diethylamide ("LSD").

Brown was the only person in his automobile, and Meding testified that he did not see any drug paraphernalia or other evidence of drug use in the car prior to his search. The car was towed from the scene and was never subjected to an inventory search.

Brown was indicted for one count of drug abuse for possession of LSD on October 10, 1989. Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the LSD found in the sugar cubes because the evidence was obtained during an unconstitutional search. The Medina County Court of Common Pleas granted the motion on March 20, 1990. The court held that the officer was permitted to search the vehicle incident to Brown's arrest, but that he exceeded the proper scope of that search when he opened the closed container without probable cause. The court of appeals affirmed.

This cause is now before the court pursuant to the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.

Dean Holman, Pros. Atty., Cleveland, and John J. Dolatowski, Brunswick, for appellant.

L. Ray Jones, Medina, for appellee.

Randall M. Dana, Ohio Public Defender, and Robert L. Lane, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender Com'n.

WRIGHT, Justice.

This case requires us to define the proper scope of a search of an automobile incident to the driver's arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. The state urges us to reverse the lower courts on the basis of New York v. Belton (1981), 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768. We decline to do so. An arrest for a traffic violation does not automatically entitle an officer to conduct a detailed search of the arrestee's automobile.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution require the police to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before they conduct a search. ¹ However, the warrant requirement is subject to a number of well-established exceptions. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States (1925), 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (police may search an automobile without a warrant when they have probable cause to suspect that the automobile contains contraband); South Dakota v. Opperman (1976), 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (police may search an automobile without a warrant to inventory its contents); Texas v. Brown (1983), 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (police may search suspicious items in plain view in an automobile). The sole issue in this case is whether the warrantless search of Brown's automobile was justified under the line of cases that permits an officer to conduct a warrantless search incident to a lawful custodial arrest, in order to protect himself from any accessible weapons. ² See Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685; New York v. Belton, supra.

The scope of a search incident to arrest was first defined in Chimel v. California, supra. "When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. * * * A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'--construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Id. at 762-763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694.

In New York v. Belton, the United States Supreme Court applied Chimel to the search of an automobile incident to the arrest of one of its occupants. In Belton, a police officer pulled a car over for speeding. New York v. Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at 455, 101 S.Ct. at 2861, 69 L.Ed.2d at 772. While addressing the four men in the car, the officer smelled marijuana and saw an envelope marked "Supergold" that he associated with marijuana. He then ordered all four men out of the car and placed them under arrest for the unlawful possession of marijuana. The officer arrested them, patted them down, and had them stand near the expressway while he searched the car. As part of that search, the officer opened a zippered pocket in a jacket located on the back seat of the car and discovered cocaine. Id. at 455-456, 101 S.Ct. at 2861-2862, 69 L.Ed.2d at 772. The United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of the search. Id. at 462, 101 S.Ct. at 2865, 69 L.Ed.2d at 776.

The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from New York v. Belton. In that case, the officer had arrested Belton and his companions for possession of marijuana prior to his search. The arrests were based on the officer's observation of an envelope that was in plain view and the odor of burning marijuana. These facts provided the officer with both probable cause to arrest the occupants for possession of marijuana and probable cause to search the vehicle for additional marijuana or evidence of marijuana use. See California v. Acevedo (1991), 500 U.S. 565, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1989, 114 L.Ed.2d 619, 631 (discussing New York v. Belton ). Because the search was reasonable based on probable cause, any evidence that the officer discovered while acting within the proper scope of that search was admissible, even if not related to the original charge.

We distinguish New York v. Belton from this case on its facts. A court should never " ' * * * formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.' " United States v. Raines (1960), 362 U.S. 17, 21, 80 S.Ct. 519, 522, 4 L.Ed.2d 524, 529, citing Liverpool, N.Y. & Phil. S.S. Co. v. Commrs. of Emigration (1895), 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 S.Ct. 352, 355, 28 L.Ed. 899, 901. In the case currently before this court, Brown was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, and Meding admits that he had no probable cause or other independent justification...