State v. Bryant

• Decision Date: 10 November 2016
• Parties: State of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Charles Bryant, Jr., Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

227 N.J. 60

148 A.3d 398

State of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Charles Bryant, Jr., Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued September 12, 2016

Decided November 10, 2016

Susan Brody, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant Charles Bryant, Jr. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Brody, on the brief).

Sara M. Quigley, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Ms. Quigley, on the brief).

Alexander R. Shalom, argued the cause for amicus curiae (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, (Mr. Shalom, attorney; Mr. Shalom, Edward Barocas, Rebecca Livengood, Jeanne Locicero, on the brief).

JUSTICE TIMPONE, delivered the opinion of the Court.

Certain core principles underpin our search and seizure jurisprudence. Individual privacy rights, especially in the home, are among the most protected. As Justice Robert L. Clifford wrote for the Court, “we are not dealing with a mere formality but with an underlying great constitutional principle embraced by free men and expressed in substantially identical language in both our federal and state constitutions.” State v. Fariello , 71 N.J. 552, 559, 366 A.2d 1313 (1976) (citation omitted). In the present case, we must balance those important privacy interests with the practical and safety concerns of law enforcement. Specifically, we focus on the guidelines surrounding law enforcement's use of a warrantless “protective sweep” when investigating allegations of criminal activity.

When a woman called 911 to report that her boyfriend had struck her, officers were dispatched to the address she provided. While two officers stayed with the woman, who was in a car in a nearby parking lot, two other officers knocked on the door of defendant Charles Bryant, Jr.'s home. When defendant answered, an officer instructed him to take a seat on the couch. As defendant followed this instruction, the officers entered. One conducted a protective sweep of the apartment while the other questioned defendant. All of this was done without knowing the name of the woman's alleged attacker or defendant's name, and without any indication that there were either other people or any weapons present in the apartment.

Under such circumstances, we find that the law enforcement officers did not adhere to the rigorous standards for proceeding without a warrant under the protective sweep doctrine. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence obtained as a result of their impermissible search must be suppressed. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

We glean the following facts from the testimony given by witnesses at defendant's suppression hearing. On January 27, 2013, just before 3 a.m., officers from the Plainsboro Police Department were dispatched to respond to a report of domestic violence. A woman, via a 911 call, frantically reported that she had been assaulted and that she was outside in her vehicle; she did not give her name or her attacker's, but did supply an address.

Patrolmen Schroeck and McCall were in the first two cars to arrive at the scene, and they proceeded directly to the apartment. Corporal Newbon and Patrolman Lapham, who were in the third vehicle to arrive, encountered a woman in a car in the parking lot. When Newbon approached her to ask what was going on, he discovered that she was the caller. He also noted that she was intoxicated, crying, and excited. He had trouble obtaining information from the woman, who was incoherent and had scratches and marks on her face. Eventually, the woman told Newbon that she had been attacked by Charlie Bryant, her boyfriend. She did not indicate the number of people in the apartment or whether there were any weapons inside. Newbon then left the woman with Lapham and went to the apartment to determine what was happening there.

When Newbon arrived at the apartment, he found that Schroeck and McCall had already entered. McCall was with defendant, who was seated on the couch, and Schroeck called to Newbon from the back bedroom. Schroeck testified that he and McCall, who had been told only the address of the apartment, knocked on the door when they arrived. According to Schroeck, defendant answered after about a minute. McCall then instructed defendant to sit on the couch, which defendant did, and both officers entered the apartment. While McCall questioned defendant, Schroeck conducted a protective sweep of the apartment, searching the kitchen, bathroom, bedroom, and bedroom closet—all locations that potentially could harbor another person.

Schroeck, whose testimony the trial court found forthright, stated that it is his experience to conduct protective sweeps and that he did so for officer safety, because it was not known whether there were any people or weapons in the apartment.

Schroeck added that he was particularly interested in ensuring that no one was hiding in the apartment because domestic disturbances are generally very emotional.

While searching the bedroom, Schroeck detected an “overwhelming odor” of marijuana coming from the closet. Peering into the closet, Schroeck saw a Ziploc bag with green vegetation that he believed to be marijuana protruding through a hole in a shoe box on a shelf just above eye-level in the closet. When Newbon heard Schroeck call to him and entered the bedroom, he also detected the odor of marijuana. Newbon ordered the marijuana seized and had defendant arrested and removed from the apartment.

After defendant was removed, officers locked down the apartment while awaiting a search warrant. The warrant was issued, and the subsequent search yielded multiple items of contraband including a Tec–9 9mm assault weapon, approximately fifty-five grams of marijuana, and marijuana packaging materials.

Defendant was indicted on March 6, 2013, and charged with fourth-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (“CDS”), N.J.S.A. 2C:35–10(a)(3) ; third-degree possession with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:25–5(a)(1) and (b)(11) ; second-degree unlawful possession of an assault firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5(f) ; and second-degree possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–4.1. On the same date, defendant was separately indicted on a charge of second-degree certain persons not to possess a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–7(b).

Defendant moved to suppress all of the evidence seized from the apartment as fruit of an illegal search. After a suppression hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion. The trial court found that the officers were lawfully present in the apartment because they were looking for the suspect in a domestic violence case where the victim presented physical signs of injury. Moreover, the trial court reasoned that, because the officers did not know if the suspect was the man who answered the door or was somewhere else inside the apartment, Schroeck had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the area to be swept could be harboring an individual posing danger. With those findings, the trial court held that the protective sweep doctrine obviated the need for a warrant. The trial court also held that the marijuana discovered during the protective sweep was properly seized under the plain view doctrine.

Defendant appealed the denial of the motion to suppress, arguing that the search was illegal. In an unpublished opinion, an Appellate Division panel affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, on substantially the same grounds.

We granted defendant's petition for certification, limited to the issue of whether the protective sweep of defendant's residence was lawful. State v. Bryant , 223 N.J. 162, 121 A .3d 385 (2015). We also granted the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (“ACLU”) leave to appear as amicus curiae.

II.

Defendant makes two primary points: first, that entry of the officers into the apartment was unjustified because they did not have defendant's consent to enter; and second, that the protective sweep was pretextual in that the officers lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the area to be swept could be harboring an individual posing danger.

The State's justification for its exception to the warrant requirement essentially relies on two grounds: (1) the police were lawfully present in defendant's apartment because in midwinter it was unreasonable to have any conversation with defendant outside; and (2) the police had good cause to perform a protective sweep in this matter because of the danger often inherent in domestic violence calls coupled with the officers' incomplete knowledge of any potential danger awaiting them. In combination, the State contends, those factors created a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the apartment might harbor a hidden, dangerous person.

The ACLU, as amicus curiae, disputes the State's rationale. The ACLU asserts the officers were not lawfully present in defendant's apartment, on the grounds that the officers had no consent to enter the apartment and were not facing exigent circumstances. The ACLU adds that mere uncertainty is insufficient to establish a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the apartment was harboring a hidden, dangerous person.

III.

We review the relevant case law relating to search and seizure. The nearly identical language of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV ; N.J. Const. Art. I, ¶ 7. On numerous occasions, we have considered “New Jersey's unique interests and values” and in doing so, have “construed Article I, Paragraph 7 [of the New Jersey Constitution] to afford our citizens greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than accorded...