State v. Bryant
| Decision Date | 16 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 1973,1973 |
| Citation | 311 S.C. 442,429 S.E.2d 816 |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Michael Lee BRYANT, Appellant. . Heard |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Asst. Appellate Defender M. Anne Pearce, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. Donald J. Zelenka, and Asst. Atty. Gen. Wilbur E. Johnson, Columbia, and Sol. Ralph J. Wilson, Conway, for respondent.
After reviewing the petitions for rehearing in this case, it is ordered that the opinion heretofore filed be withdrawn and the attached opinion, wherein we amended the first paragraph of Part II, be substituted therefor. The opinion as amended shall be reprinted along with the dissenting opinion.
The petitions for rehearing are denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I would grant the petition filed by the State.
Michael Lee Bryant appeals his convictions for failure to stop for a blue light or siren, resisting arrest, assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, and malicious injury to personal property. The issues on appeal concern a defendant's criminal liability for an unintended harm and the pitting of a defendant's testimony against the testimony of another witness. We reverse Bryant's conviction for malicious damage to personal property but otherwise affirm the judgment below.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that at approximately 3:17 a.m. on June 12, 1990, Officer Donald Parker of the Conway Police Department observed a green Ford pickup truck driving toward the town limits at a high rate of speed. The officer turned on his blue light and siren and chased after the pickup. The chase ended when the pickup turned into a driveway and its driver, later identified as Bryant, got out.
The officer pulled in directly behind the truck and "exited" his vehicle. Bryant came up to the officer and immediately grabbed him by the throat with one hand and began to reach for the officer's gun with the other. During the ensuing struggle between the two men, Bryant threw the officer against the patrol car. As a consequence, the police car sustained damage in excess of $200. The officer later gained the upper hand and arrested Bryant.
Bryant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of not guilty to the offense of malicious injury to personal property, an offense created by S.C.Code Ann. § 16-11-510 (1985). 1 More specifically, Bryant argues the State failed to offer any evidence that he acted with malicious intent to damage the police car.
To secure a conviction under section 16-11-510, the State must prove "that it is the intent of the doer that some one [sic] suffer an unnecessary injury to his property." See State v. Weeks, 185 S.C. 277, 282, 194 S.E. 12, 14-15 (1937), overruled in part, State v. Lewellyn, 281 S.C. 199, 314 S.E.2d 326 (1984) (). Here, the State failed to prove by any evidence that Bryant intended to cause damage to the patrol car when he slammed the officer against it. The evidence points to only one reasonable inference and that is that the damage done to the patrol car was an unintended harm. Being an unintended harm, it is not one for which Bryant can be held criminally liable. Bryant's intent to injure the police officer cannot be transferred to the property offense because the two harms differ. See WILLIAM S. MCANINCH AND W. GASTON FAIREY, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA at 19-20 (2d ed. 1989) ( that, where A throws a rock at B intending to injure B but misses B and breaks a window near where B was standing, A is not criminally liable for the destruction of property and stating that "[t]he basic rule is that one cannot be convicted of an offense unless his mental state was that required by the particular offense" and "[t]he doctrine of 'transferred intent' applies only in the situation of same harm but on an unintended victim").
The trial court, therefore, erred in not directing a verdict of not guilty on the count in the indictment that charged Bryant with violation of section 16-11-510.
Bryant contends the trial court erred in improperly allowing the solicitor to pit Bryant's testimony against that of the police officer on an issue critical to the charge of failure to stop for a blue light. 2 This contention is not preserved. The witness answered the question before Bryant's counsel objected and the latter made no motion to strike it from the record after the trial court overruled the objection. See Hart v. Kansas City Public Serv. Co., 154 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Mo.Ct.App.1941) (); cf. State v. Wingo, 304 S.C. 173, 403 S.E.2d 322 (Ct.App.1991) ().
In any case, Bryant suffered no unfair prejudice because the conduct Bryant's counsel complained of, the pitting of the defendant's testimony against that of another witness, did not continue. Cf. State v. Sapps, 295 S.C. 484, 369 S.E.2d 145 (1988) () (emphasis ours).
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the conviction of the defendant.
In the appeal, two basic...
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