State v. Buck

• Decision Date: 03 April 1928
• Docket Number: 38176
• Citation: 219 N.W. 17,205 Iowa 1028
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. BERTHA M. BUCK, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

219 N.W. 17

205 Iowa 1028

STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. BERTHA M. BUCK, Appellant

No. 38176

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

April 3, 1928

Appeal from Scott District Court.--WILLIAM W. SCOTT, Judge.

The defendant-appellant was indicted for the murder of her husband, John W. Buck. She pleaded "not guilty," and her defense was insanity. A jury found her guilty of manslaughter, and she was sentenced accordingly. From this judgment the appeal was taken.

Affirmed.

Bollinger & Block and Chamberlin & Chamberlin, for appellant.

John Fletcher, Attorney-general, Neill Garrett, Assistant Attorney-general, John Weir, County Attorney, and Walter A Newport, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

KINDIG J. STEVENS, C. J., and EVANS, FAVILLE, DE GRAFF, ALBERT MORLING, and WAGNER, JJ., concur.

OPINION

KINDIG, J.

It is charged in the indictment that the defendant, Bertha M. Buck, the appellant here, murdered her husband in Scott County, by inflicting upon his body a mortal wound, on or about the 2d day of June, 1925. This was accomplished through the means of throwing burning gasoline upon his head, neck, and shoulders. Because of the injury thus received, her unfortunate victim languished until June 22d of that year, at which time he died.

Appellant, a woman 50 years of age, is educated, and had borne a good reputation in the community of Davenport. John W. Buck was appellant's third husband; she was twice divorced. Buck, the deceased, was 20 years her senior. They were married in 1911. On June 2, 1925, the date of the occurrence in question, these people lived at 2223 Brady Street, Davenport, where they owned a four-family apartment house. Mrs. Buck and her husband resided on the main floor; and between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening of that day, they were eating in the kitchen. Some controversy arose concerning the current household bills and other expenses, which Mr. Buck refused to pay. Without warning, appellant rose from her place at the table, went to the sink, where a (pint or quart) jar rested, containing gasoline, which she picked up; and, after lighting the fluid, threw the burning contents directly upon the neck and shoulders of her helpless husband. He ran from the house, with his clothes afire, and was taken in charge by neighbors.

As before stated, appellant's defense was "insanity." More particularly, it is claimed she was afflicted with psychopathic personality of the excitable type. That mental condition, it is contended by appellant, made itself manifest in her, "probably from birth, and certainly since early maturity." Aggravation of that mental illness, it is urged, produced the "insanity" existing at the time of the killing. Such irritation, appellant argues, was family troubles, money worries, physical sufferings, menopause, operations, dizziness, and neuritis. Evidence was admitted, including medical testimony, tending to substantiate these torments and disablements, and the resulting "insanity." Regarding this, appellant testified:

"I got up from the table, and went to get a drink of water, back to the sink, where the water was. From the table to the sink was a matter of the length of those three panels [indicating]. We had our supper in the kitchen. Mr. Buck [the deceased] was sitting in his usual place, the north side of the table, and the sink was right back of him. The jar that contained the gasoline was on the window ledge right above the sink. It was right back of Mr. Buck. I kept the gasoline there in the kitchen all the time. I was painting, fixing up the kitchen and the bathroom. * * * That night, at the time we were eating supper, I wouldn't say there was an inch of gasoline in it. It is a short inch. When I put it there, I thought it was just enough to finish. * * * The gas stove was in the other corner, by the sink, on the north wall,--the north side of the house,--the outside wall. The sink was in the left-hand corner, and the gas stove was in the right-hand corner. * * * The matches were on the stove. There is a little shelf right above the four flames. That is where the matches were, in a little tin container. * * * I don't know what happened after I came to the sink, because immediately there was this awful dizziness or flashes. * * * I can't explain how long it did take me before the gasoline was lighted. I cannot describe anything. It was just instantaneous, it seemed * * *. The first thing I knew, everything was just all flames; and when I saw things clear again, I was standing in the bathtub, pouring water on my gown."

John W. Buck, appellant's husband, immediately after the event, told witnesses that his wife, the appellant, threw burning gasoline on his head and shoulders. Mrs. Mary Gustafson swore:

"The next day, when Mrs. Buck [the appellant] got up in the morning, she went about her usual household work, got breakfast, cleaned up her house, and dusted up. She showed me a glass jar sitting in the kitchen on the sink. She said that was the jar that she had had the gasoline in. She picked up the jar, and said, 'This is the jar that had the gasoline in.' And she said, 'I just threw it on him [her husband].' I was present next day, when she had a conversation with one of the tenants * * *. She asked the tenant not to move. She said she lost control of her temper."

Much other and additional evidence was introduced, but the above is enough to understand the general nature thereof.

Nevertheless, the jury found that appellant was of sound mind when she committed the deed which resulted in the death of John W. Buck.

Many errors are relied upon for reversal. Generally, however, they relate to rulings on evidence and instructions to the jury. These assignments will now be the subject of our further review.

I. There is called to our attention the following decision on evidence:

George B. Maxwell, a witness, testified for the defendant:

"I remember the night of June 2, 1925, when I went to the Buck home. * * * Since then, I have seen Mrs. Buck [appellant] frequently. She has acted in remorse several times that I was there. Q. What do you mean by that? A. She was sorry that this occurred."

At this juncture, a motion was made by the State to strike the answer of the witness, and an objection was then interposed to the testimony, by the prosecution, with a request that it might appear in the record before the answer. Thence the court said: "I think it is proper, for the purpose of showing her mental condition." Mr. Bollinger, for the defendant, asserted: "Not mental condition,--just her mental attitude." Following this, the court sustained the objection, and appellant excepted.

In the first place, the objection and motion to strike had reference to the question, "What do you mean by that?" and the answer, "She was sorry that this occurred." It did not relate to the answer, "She has acted in remorse for several times that I was there." The avowed purpose of introducing the statements concerning appellant's "remorse" was to lay the foundation for the determination of her "mental condition" at the time of the act. Even to accomplish the object desired by appellant, there was sufficient in the record to show that she did have "remorse:" that is to say, the following was not stricken from the witness Maxwell's declarations: "She has acted in remorse for several times that I was there." Moreover, regardless of the foregoing, the court was willing to admit the evidence, to show appellant's mental condition, not at the time of the trial, but at the moment of the killing. Yet this was objected to by appellant, with the suggestion, "Not mental condition,--just her mental attitude."

Plainly, it can be seen that the "mental attitude" of this appellant at the time of the murder was quite immaterial. Forsooth, it could have been any one of many different prejudices. Fundamentally, the criterion was "mental condition," and the "remorse" might, as the trial court suggested, have had some bearing as to what that was when the killing occurred.

Appellant cannot now complain of the court's ruling, because she invited it, and, in fact, is responsible therefor.

II. When appellant was testifying, she said, "My father died April 2, 1921." Thereafter, this question was propounded to her: "I will ask you if, before his death, for some time he was out of his mind." To which there was interposed the objection, among others, that it was incompetent, and called for a conclusion of the witness. No answer was permitted by the trial court.

Foundation for reversal on this point is made by appellant upon the theory that, in view of the fact that her defense here is "insanity," she should have been allowed to go into the history of her family, and reveal traits of unbalanced mentality. Under proper circumstances and conditions, that may be done; but this witness was not a physician. She had not related any facts to the jury upon which her conclusion was based, nor was there any proof of the particular trait or peculiarity of her father's weakness. For all that appears, the parent's mental status may have been caused by his last illness, rather than "insanity." Wherefore, the inquiry did call for a mere conclusion, and was incompetent as such. See State v. Hockett, 70 Iowa 442, 30 N.W. 742, and State v. Van Tassel, 103 Iowa 6, 72 N.W. 497.

III. Complaint is made about the instructions because therein the court charged the jury that the burden of proof was upon the appellant, as defendant, to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was "insane" at the time she threw the burning gasoline. The very nature of the act charged, the method used to produce death, and the surrounding circumstances, it is insisted, suggest "insanity," and such mental status appears therefrom, so that the...