State v. Budik

Decision Date16 February 2012
Docket NumberNo. 84714–2.,84714–2.
Citation173 Wash.2d 727,272 P.3d 816
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Kenneth Richard BUDIK, Petitioner.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Janet G. Gemberling, Janet Gemberling PS, Spokane, WA, for Petitioner.

Mark Erik Lindsey, Andrew J. Metts, III, Spokane County Prosecutor's Office, Spokane, WA, for Respondent.

OWENS, J.

[173 Wash.2d 729] ¶ 1 Kenneth Budik was one of two victims of a shooting in the city of Spokane. The other victim, Adama Walton, died as a result of the shooting. Based on Budik's statements that he did not know who was responsible for the crime, he was charged with, and convicted of, first degree rendering criminal assistance. Insufficient evidence supports Budik's conviction; accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and vacate Budik's conviction.

FACTS 1

¶ 2 In the early morning hours of September 14, 2007, 20 year old Budik accompanied 28 year old Walton to the Big Easy nightclub in downtown Spokane. As club authorities had, at some earlier point, become aware that Budik's identification was fake, Budik waited in Walton's 2007 Chevrolet Avalanche pickup truck with a box of wine. Walton returned an hour later, around 2:00 a.m., and the two departed for an “after party.” 2 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 199.

¶ 3 Arriving at the party, which was at a private residence, Budik got out and briefly mingled with several persons he knew in the front yard. Walton, meanwhile, remained in the truck and spoke to a number of individuals. After approximately 10 minutes, Walton gestured for Budik and Budik returned to the truck. Walton then drove to the next intersection, made a U-turn, and came to an abrupt stop in front of the party, squealing his tires. As Budik was sitting in the passenger seat, several gunshots rang out. One shot struck Budik through his left pectoral muscle, shattering a bone in his shoulder. Another bullet went through Budik's left leg just above the kneecap. Walton was even less fortunate, sustaining one gunshot wound to the abdomen and another that passed through both of his lungs and his heart. Walton stepped on the accelerator and the truck traveled a block and a half before colliding with two parked cars and overturning. Budik managed to pull himself from the truck, sought help from a nearby resident, and then called 911.

¶ 4 The first law enforcement officer to interact with Budik was Officer Kevin King. As he was responding to reports of a shooting, the officer had his gun drawn as he approached Budik. Officer King asked Budik a number of questions, one of which was who was responsible for the shooting. Budik replied that he did not know. A second officer, Officer Eugene Baldwin, eventually joined Budik and Officer King. At Officer King's direction, Officer Baldwin patted Budik down for weapons and, finding none, then asked Budik several additional questions. When questioned about who was responsible for the shooting, Budik consistently answered that he did not know. Shortly after Budik was taken to the hospital, Officer Baldwin met Detective Ferguson at the hospital and resumed questioning Budik in the trauma room while doctors and nurses worked on him. Budik declined to give them any specific information.

¶ 5 The day after the shooting, Detective Kip Hollenbeck, with Detective Ferguson, paid a visit to Budik's hospital room. Based on a bullet casing found in the passenger side of the truck, Detective Hollenbeck believed that the shooters must have been so close to the vehicle that Budik would necessarily have seen them. Budik immediately said that he did not see anything. Detective Hollenbeck continued to press Budik for details, and Budik explained what had occurred leading up to and following the shooting. During this exchange, Budik told Detective Hollenbeck that he had been leaning over to pick up a beer when the first shot rang out, though, based on the wounds Budik sustained, the detective did not believe him. When Detective Hollenbeck persisted in asking Budik to identify the assailants, Budik shook his head and asked the detectives to leave. Detective Hollenbeck was left with the belief that Budik feared retaliation.

¶ 6 Several days after the shooting, Walton's mother, Rae Ann Walton (Rae), went to Budik's home and left a note in the mailbox asking Budik to call her. Budik did so one or two days later. Rae asked Budik, [W]ho killed my son?,” and he replied, “Rascal [Juwuan Nave] did it.” 1 VRP at 121. Budik went on to indicate that Nave had walked from behind Freddie Miller and that the shooting then began.

¶ 7 During their investigation, the police quickly became aware of three primary suspects: Titus Davis, Nave, and Miller. Police believed that these three individuals were gang members. Miller was detained and interviewed the day of the shooting and was later charged with murder. Police identified Davis as a suspect by September 15, 2007, and had heard of Nave's involvement [e]arly on.” 2 VRP at 183.

[173 Wash.2d 732] ¶ 8 Detective Hollenbeck described the investigation as “one of the most difficult cases that he had ever worked on, owing to the fear witnesses had of cooperating with the police. 1 VRP at 146. Ultimately, both Davis and Miller were charged with murder. Nave, however, was never charged because although police could place him at the scene, they could not connect him to the fatal shooting of Walton. Detective Hollenbeck testified that it would have been “helpful” had he known that someone had seen Nave participate in the shooting and that the investigation would “have been able to take a different turn” if Budik had told him that Nave was the shooter. 1 VRP at 144; 2 VRP at 184. However, Detective Hollenbeck also testified that he did not credit the account Budik related to Rae; Detective Hollenbeck believed this was simply a rumor circulated to make Nave the “fall guy” for the shooting. 2 VRP at 183.

¶ 9 Based on Budik's repeated disavowals of knowledge of the shooters' identities, the State charged Budik with first degree rendering criminal assistance. The jury found Budik guilty, and the judge sentenced Budik to 13 months in prison, the low end of the standard range. Budik appealed his conviction, raising an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of his conviction, challenging the sufficiency of the State's evidence, and asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Court of Appeals denied all three challenges and affirmed Budik's conviction. State v. Budik, 156 Wash.App. 123, 130, 132, 230 P.3d 1094 (2010). Budik petitioned this court for review of the sufficiency challenge, and we granted review. State v. Budik, 170 Wash.2d 1008, 249 P.3d 624 (2010).

ISSUE

¶ 10 Does sufficient evidence support Budik's conviction?

ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review

¶ 11 In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, the question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, “any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Engel, 166 Wash.2d 572, 576, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009). To determine whether the State has produced sufficient evidence to prove each element of the offense, we must begin by interpreting the underlying criminal statute. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id.

¶ 12 When interpreting a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. State v. Ervin, 169 Wash.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354 (2010). We first attempt to ascertain the plain meaning of the statute. Id. “In determining the plain meaning of a provision, we look to the text of the statutory provision in question, as well as ‘the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.’ Id. (quoting State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005)). If the statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we “look to the legislative history of the statute and the circumstances surrounding its enactment to determine legislative intent.” Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wash.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003).

¶ 13 With these standards in mind, we turn to Budik's conviction of first degree rendering criminal assistance.

II. Rendering Criminal Assistance Requires an Affirmative Act or Statement

¶ 14 Budik was convicted of rendering criminal assistance in the first degree, a class C felony, under former RCW 9A.76.070 (2003). 2 A person violates this statute if (1) he or she renders criminal assistance” (2) to another person “who has committed or is being sought for murder in the first degree or any class A felony or equivalent juvenile offense.” Id. The term “renders criminal assistance” is defined by RCW 9A.76.050. That statute provides that

a person “renders criminal assistance” if, with intent to prevent, hinder, or delay the apprehension or prosecution of another person who he knows has committed a crime or juvenile offense or is being sought by law enforcement officials for the commission of a crime or juvenile offense or has escaped from a detention facility, he:

(1) Harbors or conceals such person; or

(2) Warns such person of impending discovery or apprehension; or

(3) Provides such person with money, transportation, disguise, or other means of avoiding discovery or apprehension; or

(4) Prevents or obstructs, by use of force, deception, or threat, anyone from performing an act that might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person; or

(5) Conceals, alters, or destroys any physical evidence that might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person; or

(6) Provides such person with a weapon.

RCW 9A.76.050. In other words, a person renders criminal assistance if he or she (1) knows that another person (a) “has committed a crime or juvenile offense” or (b) “is...

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