State v. Burgess
| Decision Date | 19 January 1924 |
| Citation | 123 A. 178 |
| Parties | STATE v. BURGESS. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Superior Court, Kennebec County.
Complaint against Ernest Burgess as a person wanton and lascivious in speech and behavior. From order overruling demurrer, defendant excepts. Exceptions overruled.
Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and HANSON, PHILBROOK, DUNN, WILSON, and DEASY, JJ.
Walter M. Sanborn, Co. Atty., of Augusta, for the State.
Frank Plumstead, of Waterville, for respondent.
The complaint and warrant in this case allege (omitting formal parts) that—
"Ernest Burgess, of said Oakland, in said county, on the 2d day of August, 1923, at said Oakland, was a person wanton and lascivious in speech and behavior, against the peace of the state and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided."
The respondent in the superior court filed a general demurrer, which was overruled by the presiding justice, and on exceptions to this ruling the case is before the Law court.
The statute alleged to be violated, and under which this complaint is brought (R. S. c. 143, § 6) provides for the imprisonment for a term not exceeding 90 days of various classes of offenders, including rogues, vagabonds, beggars, jugglers, common pipers, fiddlers, runaways, drunkards, night walkers, railers, brawlers, and pilferers," "persons wanton or lascivious in speech or behavior," and various others. This is an old statute, somewhat quaint in its phraseology, and has come down in substantially the same form through all the revisions since the establishment of our state. In R. S. 1921, c. 111, § 5, this specific clause reads: "Wanton and lascivious persons in speech, conduct or behavior." In fact this statute, was copied from the old Massachusetts statute of March 26, 1788 (St. 1788. c. 21).
It is the contention of the respondent that the crime is inadequately set forth in this complaint, in that the words and acts which constituted the alleged wantonness and lasciviousness on his part should have been specifically set forth.
Such is not the rule of pleading in this class of offenses, where it is the common practice and not the particular words or acts which constitute the crime alleged.
It may and doubtless does become necessary to prove the doing of particular acts and the utterances of certain words of a wanton and lascivious nature in order to make out the statutory offense, but these are merely evidence of the general charge, and need not be alleged in the complaint. Commonwealth v. Pray, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 359. Or as well expressed in a headnote in State v. Collins, 48 Me. 217:
"When an offense consists of a series of acts, or a habit of life, the indictment may charge the offense in general terms, and the particular acts which establish the guilt of the party need not be stated."
Precedents illustrating this...
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Koa Gora v. Territory of Hawaii
...606; Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311, 17 S.Ct. 366, 367, 41 L.Ed. 727; People v. Carey, 217 Mich. 601, 187 N.W. 261; State v. Burgess, 123 Me. 393, 123 A. 178; People v. Kratz, 230 Mich. 334, 203 N.W. 114; State v. Schumacher, 195 Iowa 276, 191 N.W. 870; Glover v. State, 179 Ind. 459, ......
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Knowlton v. State
...the same since R.S.1821 (Chapter 111, Section 5) and followed the Massachusetts statute of March 26, 1788. See State v. Burgess, 123 Me. 393, 394, 123 A. 178. While some accusations under the statute may be based upon firm constitutional ground, Burgess, supra, as to which we here make no f......
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Dispatch from the Supreme Court archives: vagrancy, abortion, and what the links between them reveal about the history of fundamental rights.
...But see Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931); People v. Belcastro, 190 N.E. 301 (Ill. 1934). (63.) See, e.g., State v. Burgess, 123 A. 178, 178 (Me. 1924); Pellman v. Valentine, 57 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1945); THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW 568-69 (2d ed. (64.) GOLU......