State v. Burruell, 1494
Decision Date | 05 May 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 1494,1494 |
Citation | 98 Ariz. 37,401 P.2d 733 |
Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Antonio Tapia BURRUELL, Appellant. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Norman E. Green, Pima County Atty., Carl Waag, Deputy County Atty., Tucson, for appellee.
Ted Pederson, Tucson, for appellant.
This is an appeal from a judgment and sentence for illegal sale of narcotics in violation of A.R.S. § 36-1002.02, as amended. The appellant, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, on April 24, 1964, was adjudged guilty on two counts of illegal sale and sentenced to twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years on each count, the terms to run concurrently.
The pertinent facts are as follows: Defendant was arrested on November 17, 1963, in the city of Tucson, Pima County, Arizona, and was subsequently charged with two counts of illegal sale of narcotics. After a preliminary hearing and arraignment, at which defendant pleaded not guilty, a trial date of February 19, 1964, was set. At the trial, a jury was duly impaneled and sworn, after which the deputy county attorney made an opening statement. Immediately thereafter, counsel for defense made his opening statement. Defense counsel's statement was delivered without objection by either the court or opposing counsel. Shortly thereafter, the deputy county attorney moved for a mistrial on the grounds that defense counsel's opening statement caused 'irreputable harm' to the trial of the case, and that no instruction from the court could 'wipe the slate clean' with reference to the objectionable statements. Defense counsel objected to the motion, but a mistrial was granted. A new trial date was set for April 13, 1964. On March 12, 1964, defendant filed a motion to quash the information and to suppress the testimony of the state's star witness, one Henry Lugo, Jr., an informer, who had made the alleged purchase from defendant. Defendant's motion asserted that to try him again would constitute double jeopardy in violation of the United States and the Arizona constitutions. Further, defendant claimed that Mr. Lugo was an incompetent witness due to Lugo's heavy use of narcotics, and due to pressures brought to bear upon him by the county attorney and the sheriff's office. The motion was denied, and defendant stood trial on April 13, 1964, and was thereafter adjudged guilty on both counts.
Defendant contends that it was error for the court to grant the deputy county attorney's motion for mistrial, claiming there existed no legal cause for such action, and therefore his trial on April 13, 1964, for the same offense placed him in double jeopardy.
In United States v. Tateo, 216 F.Supp. 850, the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York stated:
'The principle of double jeopardy made controlling by this fact is that retrial after the termination-before-verdict of a prior trial is barred unless the termination was either consented to or based upon 'exceptional circumstances'.
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'Federal courts, in seeking to safeguard a defendant's 'valued right * * * to have his trial completed by the particular tribunal summoned to sit in judgment on him', Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 1034, 10 L.Ed.2d 100, have been guided by the strictures of Mr. Justice Story who, in writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in 1824, said:
In State v. Puckett, 92 Ariz. 407, 377 P.2d 779, this court held:
92 Ariz. at 409, 377 P.2d at 780.
Therefore, the reviewing court must examine the record to determine whether or not 'legal reason,' in the nature of prejudicial remarks, existed in the opening statement of the defense which necessitated a mistrial and the granting of a new trial. In order to make a determination as to the sufficiency of the 'legal reason' for the granting of the mistrial, several questions must first be considered, viz.:
1. What is the purpose of the opening statement?
2. What is the latitude afforded counsel in presenting his opening statement? In other words, did defense counsel have the right to make the remarks he did?
3. Was defendant's opening statement a fair statement of evidence, and did he exceed the bounds permitted under Rule 255, Subs. 3, of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. 474?
The purpose of an opening statement is properly set forth by the court in State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285:
In Turley v. State, 48 Ariz. 61, 59 P.2d 312, this court held as follows:
'* * * generally held that such a statement is not, and should not be, permitted to become an argument upon the case, but it is merely intended to advise the jury sufficiently so as to prepare their minds for the evidence which is to be heard, and the extent to which counsel will be permitted to go in making such a statement is subject to the control of the court in the exercise of a sound discretion.' 48 Ariz. at 73, 59 P.2d at 317.
Defense counsel's statement contained the following elements which he stated he intended to prove:
1. 'An unusual and difficult defense of a frameup.'
2. An alibi defense as to the date upon which the alleged sale took place.
3. Defendant's case was one of 20 different cases involving similar charges, based upon the purchase of narcotics from those charged by a state's informer who was the prosecution's chief witness.
4. 'A frameup' based upon the testimony of an informer who had developed a $50-$100 per day drug habit; who was a 'burglar and a thief,' which fact was known to the County Attorney's office, but the County Attorney's office did not prosecute the informer.
5. The informer's compensation 'by the State Liquor Control people' was placed upon a bonus basis, viz., 'that for each buy that he made from these various defendants he received a bonus.'
The basis for the mistrial as contended by the deputy county attorney is set forth in his motion which reads as follows:
The portion of the opening statement referred to by the defense counsel in his motion reads as follows:
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