State v. Burton

• Citation: 182 S.W. 746,266 Mo. 711
• Decision Date: 30 November 1915
• Docket Number: No. 18489.,No. 18488.,18488.,18489.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. MOBERLY SPECIAL ROAD DIST. v. BURTON et al., County Judges.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

182 S.W. 746

266 Mo. 711

STATE ex rel. MOBERLY SPECIAL ROAD DIST. v. BURTON et al., County Judges.

No. 18488.

No. 18489.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

November 30, 1915.

Rehearing Denied February 15, 1916.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Randolph County; A. H. Waller, Judge.

Mandamus proceedings by the State, on the relation of the Moberly Special Road District, against G. R. Burton and others, Judges of the County Court. From the judgment rendered, cross-appeals were filed. Affirmed.

Willard P. Cave, of Moberly, for relator. Jerry M. Jeffries, of Moberly, for defendants.

WALKER, J.

The city of Moberly and contiguous territory in Randolph county for a distance of four miles in each direction from said city was, under the authority of sections 10577, 10586, R. S. 1909, as amended by Laws 1911, p. 370, organized as a body corporate, to be thereafter designated as the "Moberly special road district." This action by mandamus was brought in the circuit court of said county by the state, at the relation of said road district, as plaintiff, against the judges of the county court of Randolph county, as defendants, to compel the latter to pay over (under the provisions of section 10482, R. S. 1909, as amended by Laws 1913, p. 669) to said road district all money arising from a 25-cent levy for road and bridge purposes collected on the property within said district. The levy, however, was made upon all the property of the county. The total fund collected in said district under said levy for road and bridge purposes was $9,334.60. In anticipation of the revenue to be derived from said 25-cent levy, defendants had caused work to be done and debts to be contracted for roads and bridges over the entire county and had issued warrants therefor. Upon a hearing on the application for the writ of mandamus the circuit court found that defendants had issued warrants in said district for $3,303.90 for work done therein, and it was ordered that they pay or issue warrants to plaintiff in the sum of $6,030.70, or the balance remaining in the county treasury which had been collected in said district under the 25-cent levy.

Cross-appeals were perfected from this judgment; plaintiff contending that it was entitled to the entire revenue collected in said district for the preceding year for road and bridge purposes, and defendants that the statute under which the levy was made was unconstitutional, and hence void.

The constitutionality of section 10482, R. S. 1909, as amended (Laws 1913, p. 669), providing for the apportionment by county courts of taxes collected for road purposes within certain special road districts, is assailed by defendants on various grounds. It is first contended that this statute violates section 22 of article 10 of the state Constitution. It will be recalled that this section provides, in addition to taxes authorized to be levied for county purposes (under section 11, art. 10, Const. Mo.), that the county courts of the several counties not under township organization and the township board of directors in counties having township organization may levy and collect as state and county taxes are collected a special tax of not more than 25 cents on each $100 valuation to be used for roads and bridges, but for no other purpose whatever, and the power thus conferred on the county courts and township boards is declared to be discretionary. Three limitations, two express and one implied, say defendants, are found in this section — the first is as to the rate; the second as to the application of the tax when collected; and the third (which defendants say is implied) that the tax must be expended under the direction of the county court over the entire county.

As to defendants' contention in regard to the first and second limitations, there is no question; the Constitution in this regard being expressed and unequivocal. As to the third, it may be conceded as a general proposition that, under section 36 of article 6 of the state Constitution, county courts are created for the transaction of county business, and express jurisdiction is given them in this regard, but it must be borne in mind, despite this provision, that our organic law is not like the federal Constitution, a grant of power, but is simply a limitation upon power which the Legislature otherwise possesses. McGrew v. Railroad, 230 Mo. 496, 132 S. W. 1076; State ex rel. v. Sheppard, 192 Mo. 497, 91 S. W. 477; State ex rel. v. Warner, 197 Mo. 650, 94 S. W. 962; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479. Broadly stated, therefore, the Legislature may enact any law which does not contravene the federal or state Constitution, and in its interpretation the courts will hold it valid unless its unconstitutionality is manifest and exists beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Buente, 256 Mo. 227, 165 S. W. 340, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 879; Board Com. v. Peter, 253 Mo. loc. cit. 530, 161 S. W. 1155, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 310; Harris v. Bond Co., 244 Mo. 664, 149 S. W. 603; State ex rel. v. County Court, 128 Mo. 427, 30 S. W. 103, 31 S. W. 23. The admitted implied existence of the third limitation renders it necessary for same to be so clear and unmistakable as to leave no other reasonable construction than that insisted upon by defendants; otherwise their contention cannot be maintained. Board of Com'rs v. Peter, 253 Mo. loc. cit. 530, 161 S. W. 1155, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 310.

It is only upon the assumption that the entire business of the county must be conducted by the county court, and that the Legislature cannot provide otherwise, that any basis can be found for defendants' contention as to the third limitation. No words in the section authorize it. Consequently it is not such a clear and unmistakable implication as would, under the rule, authorize an affirmative conclusion as to its existence in harmony with defendants' contention, but, on the contrary, it is simply an inference. Constitutional provisions cannot be construed by inferences, especially when it is sought by such construction to render a legislative enactment invalid. In thus construing the section of the Constitution under consideration we are not unmindful of the fact that it contains restrictive language, but the purpose of this language is unmistakable, and is expressly limited to the amount of the levy on each $100 valuation, and the purpose for which the tax is to be used, and not to the officials or body corporate by which it is to be expended. We are not impressed, therefore, with the soundness of defendants' reasoning in so construing section 22, art. 10, Const. Mo., as to confine the disbursement of the taxes therein authorized to the county courts of the respective counties, the effect of which would be to render invalid section 10482, R. S. 1909, as amended.

A fitting supplement to what has been said, and one of the primary principles underlying the system of taxation, is the fact that the inherent power to tax and to appropriate taxes is vested in the Legislature (article 10, Const. Mo.), and may be exercised within its discretion when not violative of an express provision of the federal or state Constitution. Hann. & St. J. Ry. Co. v. State Board, 64 Mo. 294. The comprehensiveness of this power, in the absence of the restrictions indicated, extends to the determination of the time, the amount, the nature, and the purpose for which the tax is to be levied. In re Sanford, 236 Mo. loc. cit. 684, 139 S. W. 376; 37 Cyc. 724, and cases. The legislative power to tax being inherent, the creation of agencies or instrumentalities for the levy, collection, and disbursement of such taxes follows as a necessary consequence, and hence the right of the Legislature to enact a law delegating in this case the disbursement of the taxes collected to a board of commissioners of a special road district is not an improper exercise of such power.

In addition to assailing the validity of section 10482 as amended (Laws 1913, p. 669), as being in conflict with section 22 of article 10 of the state Constitution, defendants claim that section 10594, R. S. 1909, as repealed and re-enacted in 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 675), concerning,...