State v. Butler

• Decision Date: 25 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 20090914–CA.,20090914–CA.
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,v.Jason Lyle BUTLER, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

263 P.3d 463
689 Utah Adv. Rep. 43
2007 UT 47
2008 UT 63
2011 UT App 281

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Jason Lyle BUTLER, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20090914–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Aug. 25, 2011.

[263 P.3d 464]

Randall W. Richards and Brittany R. Brown, Ogden, for Appellant.Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake City; Branden B. Miles, Ogden, for Appellee.Before Judges McHUGH, ROTH, and CHRISTIANSEN.MEMORANDUM DECISION CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

¶ 1 Defendant Jason Lyle Butler appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. After the district court denied his suppression motion, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, see generally State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct.App.1988), for possession of a controlled substance, see Utah Code Ann. § 58–37–8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.2010), ¹ wherein he retained his right to appeal the district court's decision on his suppression motion. We affirm.

¶ 2 Defendant argues that his rights protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution were violated by

[263 P.3d 465]

an illegal traffic stop, an illegal detention following the stop, and an illegal search of his vehicle. ² “We review for clear error the factual findings underlying a district court's decision to deny a motion to suppress. Whether the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress, however, is a legal conclusion that we review for correctness.” State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ¶ 5, 194 P.3d 925 (citation omitted); see also State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 11, 164 P.3d 397 (“In cases involving Fourth Amendment questions under the United States Constitution, we review mixed questions of law and fact under a correctness standard....”). In making the legal determination of whether the facts support the suppression of evidence, we objectively view the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop or arrest, rather than the officer's subjective beliefs about what may justify the stop or arrest. See State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, ¶ 9, 173 P.3d 213 (discussing the requirement that a court evaluate whether probable cause for an arrest existed under the totality of the circumstances); State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (discussing the requirement that a court evaluate reasonable suspicion for a stop under “the totality of the circumstances present at the time of the stop”).I. Defendant's Traffic Stop Based on an Agent's Observation that Defendant Committed a Minor Traffic Violation Was Constitutional. A. Defendant Failed to Establish a Flaw in the Evidence on Which the Court Relied.

¶ 3 Defendant initially argues that the State produced insufficient evidence at the suppression hearing to justify the traffic stop based on Defendant's minor traffic violation. Although Defendant acknowledges in his brief that “both Agents [Brandon] Beck and [Kasey] Burell stated that Defendant failed to signal when he was exiting from the curb,” Defendant suggests that this evidence was insufficient because it contradicted his own testimony that he had properly signaled. Despite listing supporting evidence, Defendant has not established the fatal flaw in the evidence on which the district court relied. See State v. Hodge, 2008 UT App 409, ¶ 17, 196 P.3d 124 (“To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient, Defendant must first marshal the evidence in support of the verdict. To do this, Defendant must ‘present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [he] resists,’ and then ‘ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence.’ ” (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct.App.1991)) (additional citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 20 n. 5, 217 P.3d 733 (“If there is some supportive evidence, once that evidence is marshaled it is the challenger's burden to show the ‘fatal flaw’ in that supportive evidence, and explain why the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding. Examples of such legal insufficiency might include that testimony was later stricken by the court; that a document was used for impeachment only and had not been admitted as substantive evidence; that a document was not properly admitted because it did not qualify under the business record exception to the hearsay rule; and that testimony that seems to support a finding was recanted on cross-examination.” (citation omitted)); Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315 (“After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate

[263 P.3d 466]

court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous.”).

¶ 4 Rather than pointing to a flaw in the evidence, Defendant essentially urges us to reweigh the credibility of the witnesses.³ We decline to do so. See generally State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 48, 63 P.3d 650 (“Since a district court is in a unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence, the court of appeals may not substitute its judgment as to a factual question unless the district court's finding is clearly erroneous.” (citation omitted)). The district court clearly determined the agent's testimony was more credible than Defendant's testimony, as demonstrated by the district court's factual finding that “Defendant was parked parallel to the curb in front of the residence and as he was pulling away from the curb the agent observed that he failed to use his turn signal.” ⁴ The district court also determined that Agent Beck transmitted this information to Officer Conners, who then initiated the stop. Because Defendant points to no flaw in the evidence, we determine that the district court's findings are supported by legally sufficient evidence, and we use those factual findings to determine whether the district court correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress. See generally Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 20 n. 5, 217 P.3d 733 (“No matter what contrary facts might have been found from all the evidence, our deference to the trial court's pre-eminent role as fact-finder requires us to take the findings of fact as our starting point, unless particular findings have been shown, in the course of an appellant's meeting the marshaling requirement, to lack legally adequate evidentiary support.”).

B. Based on the District Court's Findings, the Traffic Stop Was Constitutional.

¶ 5 “ ‘[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments.’ ” State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (alterations in original) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). “While the Constitution does not forbid all searches and seizures, it does forbid those that are unreasonable.” State v. Biggs, 2007 UT App 261, ¶ 10, 167 P.3d 544. “Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer is justified in stopping a vehicle when the officer observes the driver commit a traffic violation, or when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver committed or is about to commit a crime, such as transporting drugs.” State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah Ct.App.1997); accord State v....