State v. Byrd

• Decision Date: 07 December 1897
• Citation: 121 N.C. 684,28 S.E. 353
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. BYRD.

28 S.E. 353

121 N.C. 684

STATE

v.BYRD.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 7, 1897.

Homicide —Self-Defense —Mitigation — Burden of Proof—Character of Deceased—Threats.

1. Where, in a prosecution for murder, there is an entire absence of evidence of self-defense, it is not error to instruct that there was no evidence tending to show the killing was done in self-defense.

2. Where a willful killing has been admitted or proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden is on the accused to show such facts as would excuse or mitigate the homicide; and, though mitigating circumstances are shown, the burden still rests on defendant to show facts in justification.

3. In a prosecution for murder, facts offered by the accused in excuse or mitigation need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but only to the satisfaction of the jury.

4. Where the killing is admitted, and there is no evidence of self-defense, evidence of threats against the accused, and of the violent and dangerous character of deceased, is not admissible on the question of self-defense.

5. If threats were not communicated to the accused, and the character of deceased was unknown to him, evidence of either is not admissible to show self-defense.

6. Evidence of the general character of deceased as a violent man, and of threats made by him against defendant, is admissible where the evidence of the killing is wholly circumstantial, whether or not defendant knew of deceased's character and of the threats, and though there is no evidence that the killing was in self-defense.

Appeal from superior court, Mitchell county; Adams, Judge.

Mitchell Byrd was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. Affirmed.

E. J. Justice, for appellant.

The Attorney General, and S. J. Ervin, and W. C. Newland, for the State.

DOUGLAS, J. This Is an indictment for murder, resulting in a conviction for manslaughter. There were several exceptions to the exclusion of testimony tending to show the violent and dangerous character of the deceased, and threats made by him against the prisoner, which were communicated to the prisoner. The prisoner also excepted to the charge of the court that there was no testimony tending to show that the killing was done in self-defense. Upon the correct ness of this charge depends the validity of the exceptions to the exclusion of evidence. After a careful examination of the testimony, we are unable to find any evidence, even a scintilla, tending to show self-defense. If there were any such evidence, its weight would be for the jury, and not for the court, to determine; but, in its entire absence, it was proper for the court to instruct the jury that there was no such evidence. The killing of the deceased by the prisoner with a pistol, which is per se a deadly weapon, was directly proved by two witnesses, and admitted by the prisoner. Such being the case, the burden rested upon the prisoner of showing such facts as he relied on in mitigation or excuse, and for this purpose he would have the equal benefit of all the evidence in the case, whether introduced by himself or by the state. In the absence of any such evidence, he would be deemed guilty of murder. Mitigating circumstances might reduce the crime to manslaughter, but even then the burden would still remain upon the prisoner of showing such further facts as would excuse the homicide, before he would be entitled to an acquittal. State v. Willis, 63 N. C. 26; State t. Ellick, 60 N. C. 450; State v. Johnson, 48 N. C. 266; State v. Haywood, 62 N. C. 376; State v. Smith, 77 N. C. 488; State v. Brit-tain, 89 N. C. 481; State v. Thomas, 98 N. C. 599, 4 S. E. 518; State v. Rollins, 113 N. C. 722, 18 S. E. 394; State v. Horn, 116 N. C. 1037, 21 S. E. 694. The leading case of Com. v. York, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 93, has a full discussion on the subject. But in all cases the willful killing must be admitted or proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as up to this point the prisoner is always presumed to be innocent. Facts offered by the prisoner in excuse or mitigation need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but only to the satisfaction of the jury. As the killing was admitted, and there was no evidence of self-defense, we think that the testimony as to the violent and dangerous character of the deceased, and his threats against the prisoner, whether communicated or not, was properly excluded. Threats, even when made by a man of known violence of character, do not, of themselves, excuse or mitigate homicide, nor are they per se evidence of self-defense. The burden of the plea se defendendo being upon the prisoner, where there is no evidence the court can so instruct the jury. Where there is evidence tending to show self-defense, such threats are admissible as tending to show the reasonable apprehension of immediately impending danger on the part of the prisoner. Under such circumstances,...