State v. Byrd

• Decision Date: 17 January 1978
• Docket Number: No. 7710SC604,7710SC604
• Citation: 35 N.C.App. 42,240 S.E.2d 494
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Lawrence Raye BYRD.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 494

240 S.E.2d 494

35 N.C.App. 42

STATE of North Carolina v. Lawrence Raye BYRD.

No. 7710SC604.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Jan. 17, 1978.

Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Associate Atty. Donald W. Grimes, Raleigh, for the State.

Thomas L. Barringer, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.

CLARK, Judge.

The first issue raised by this appeal is whether the trial court erred in admitting on rebuttal for the purpose of impeachment inculpatory statements made by defendant to the investigating officer during custodial interrogation but denied by defendant at trial.

For the first time since Miranda (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)) laid down definitive rules to prevent police abuse in custodial interrogations, the United States Supreme Court, in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), contracted rather than expanded the exclusionary rule by its holding that in-custody statements made voluntarily and understandingly, even though excluded by Miranda from the prosecution's case in chief as substantive evidence, may be used to impeach a testifying defendant's credibility.

The court rejected the idea that this expansion would encourage impermissible police conduct for that "sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief." However, to be admissible as impeachment evidence, it is clear that the confession must satisfy the legal standards of trustworthiness that it was voluntarily and understandingly made though Miranda -barred. And see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975).

In State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 551, 187 S.E.2d 111 (1972), where the State in its case in chief did not attempt to offer the defendant's custodial confession, but after defendant on cross-examination denied he told law officers that he used a knife and choked the rape victim, the State offered in rebuttal the testimony of an interrogating officer that defendant told him he used a switchblade knife and choked her. Defendant's admission was Miranda -barred because he admittedly had not waived his right to counsel. The trial court instructed the jury that the evidence was admitted for purpose of impeachment only, but made no finding that the admission was voluntarily and understandingly made. In finding no error the Supreme Court overruled State v. Catrett, 276 N.C. 86, 171 S.E.2d 398 (1970), which held a Miranda -barred confession not admissible for any purpose, because it was based on an interpretation of the Miranda decision, but that interpretation was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, supra.

State v. Bryant, supra, did not discuss the absence of any finding by the trial court that defendant's admission met the legal standards of trustworthiness, but it does not appear that defendant requested a voir dire or offered evidence contradicting voluntariness. Though Bryant and Oregon v. Hass, supra, are authority for the proposition that where there is no evidence of involuntariness or coercion the trial court is not required to find that the Miranda -barred admission was voluntary, it is the better practice for the trial judge to chart the admissibility of a Miranda -barred admission by finding, either after voir dire during the State's case in chief or upon defendant's objection during rebuttal, whether the statement was voluntarily and understandingly made. And if found to have been voluntarily made, the trial judge should find that he was so satisfied by the preponderance of the evidence in order to meet the standard of proof required by the prosecution in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972).

In the case before us we do not find State v. Bryant, supra, to support the admissibility of defendant's Miranda -barred admission made to the interrogating officer. In the case sub judice the trial court found that the illiterate defendant did not have the mental capacity to understand his right to counsel. This showing of illiteracy and finding of mental incapacity to understand his right to counsel casts some doubt not only upon his capacity to understand any of the Miranda rules but also upon the voluntariness of his admission in light of defendant's testimony that the interrogating officers shouted at him and beat on the table. Under these circumstances, with the burden on the State to satisfy the trial judge of voluntariness by the preponderance of the evidence, we find that the trial judge erred in admitting ...