State v. C.J.F.
| Decision Date | 29 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-04-00257-CV.,01-04-00257-CV. |
| Citation | 183 S.W.3d 841 |
| Parties | The STATE of Texas, Appellant, v. C.J.F., Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Alan Curry, Assistant District Attorney, Charles A. Rosenthal, Jr., District Attorney-Harris County, Houston, for appellant.
Scot R. Courtney, Scardino & Courtney, Houston, for appellee.
Panel consists of Justices TAFT, ALCALA, and HIGLEY.
The State of Texas has filed a motion for rehearing of our opinion issued on August 25, 2005. After due consideration, we deny the State's motion for rehearing, but withdraw our opinion and judgment of August 25, 2005, and issue the following opinion and judgment in their stead.
The State of Texas appeals from dismissal of charges filed against appellee, a juvenile, for engaging in delinquent conduct by committing the felony offense of manslaughter. The trial court dismissed appellee's charges with prejudice on the grounds that the State's petition violated appellee's rights against double jeopardy. The State contends that the trial court's dismissal was erroneous for four reasons.
First, the State asserts that appellee failed her burden to produce evidence that the facts of the offense were barred by double jeopardy. Second, the State asserts that its nonsuits of the third and fourth amended petitions in cause number 2002-07732J, the pleadings that preceded this cause, did not constitute a dismissal of the prosecution for purposes of appellee's right against double jeopardy because the nonsuits were timely taken before any evidence was heard in the case. Third, the State asserts that jeopardy could not have attached from the third and fourth amended petitions in cause number 2002-07732J because the third amended petition was superseded by the fourth amended petition and was therefore no longer a live pleading, and because the trial court had no jurisdiction over the fourth amended pleading due to lack of service of that petition on appellee. Fourth, as a matter of first impression in Texas, the State contends that, unlike other criminal proceedings, in which jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn, jeopardy does not attach in a juvenile proceeding until the trier of fact begins to hear evidence or when the first witness is sworn. We affirm the trial court's dismissal.
On April 18, 2002, appellee, a 15-year-old juvenile, was involved in an automobile collision that resulted in the death of Kathryn Sanchez. On September 20, 2002, the State filed its original petition in cause number 2002-07732J, which asserted that appellee intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly caused Sanchez's death. The State filed its first amended petition on October 9, 2002, and filed a second amended petition on January 31, 2003.
On May 1, 2003, the grand jury returned the State's third amended petition, which, like the original petition, alleged that appellee intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly caused Sanchez's death, but, in addition, authorized a determinate sentence.1 In response to the State's motion to abandon the words "intentionally" and "knowingly" from the third amended petition, the trial court struck those words from that petition. Believing that the grand jury might have authorized a determinate sentence based on the higher culpable mental states for conduct that was "intentionally" and "knowingly" performed, as compared to "recklessly" performed, the trial court quashed the determinate sentence portion of the petition. After the trial court deleted the higher culpable mental states and quashed the authorization for determinate sentencing, the third amended petition charged only reckless manslaughter against a juvenile, with no authorization for a determinate sentence. On October 16, 2003, the grand jury returned the State's fourth amended petition, which was identical to the third amended petition's remaining charge of reckless manslaughter, but, in addition, authorized a determinate sentence.
On January 5, 2004, appellee was admonished concerning the range of punishment for the reckless manslaughter charge in the fourth amended petition, which included authorization for a determinate sentence. During the trial court's voir dire of the jury, which followed, the trial court informed the jurors that appellee was charged with reckless manslaughter and that the punishment range included the possibility of 20 years in prison as a determinate sentence if appellee were transferred to adult prison when she turned 21 years of age. A jury was then empaneled and sworn. Immediately after the jury was released for the day, appellee's attorney informed the trial court, for the first time, that appellee had not been properly served with the fourth amended petition and that the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to rule on the allegations in the State's fourth amended petition, for which the jury had already been empaneled. Appellee's attorney also stated that, although the trial court lacked jurisdiction over appellee's fourth amended petition, appellee was ready to proceed on the allegations in the third amended petition, which authorized appellee to be sentenced as a juvenile for reckless manslaughter, but did not authorize determinate sentencing. After the State's attorney requested a hearing to determine whether appellee had been properly served, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue.
Following the hearing and after the trial court questioned whether appellee had been served with the fourth amended petition, appellee and the State's attorney each represented to the trial court that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the fourth amended petition because it had not been served on appellee. Appellee and the State's attorney disputed, however, whether the third amended petition remained a live pleading in the trial court.
The State argued that the third amended petition had been superseded by the fourth amended petition and that it was therefore no longer a live pleading. Appellee's attorney restated his readiness to proceed on the third amended petition, which did not include the possibility of a determinate sentence, argued that jeopardy had attached on the third amended petition because a jury had been selected and sworn, and objected to dismissal of the jury or declaration of a mistrial.
In the State's arguments to the trial court concerning its impending ruling on whether to dismiss the empaneled jury, the prosecutor criticized appellee's decision to wait to object about the lack of service until after the jury was empaneled and sworn and argued that appellee's "sandbag" technique was unfair. The prosecutor refused to proceed to trial before the jury that had been empaneled on the grounds that the trial court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the fourth amended petition due to the lack of service of that petition on appellee. The State further contended that the jury had never been empaneled to decide the third amended petition because that petition was no longer a live pleading due to the existence of the fourth amended petition. The State requested a nonsuit of both the third and fourth amended petitions, which the trial court granted, and the empaneled jury was dismissed over appellee's objection.
On January 13, 2004, the State filed its original petition in new cause number 2004-00332J. Like the fourth amended petition, the new original petition charged appellee with reckless manslaughter and included authorization for a determinate sentence. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the cause based on double-jeopardy violations, along with a supporting brief. The State responded in writing to the motion to dismiss by asserting (1) that the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the fourth amended petition due to lack of service of that petition and therefore jeopardy could not attach on a matter that the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear, and (2) that a dismissal of a petition does not constitute an adjudication of the merits of the dismissed action because the dismissal merely places the parties in the same positions they held before the court's jurisdiction was invoked. The trial court dismissed the cause with prejudice, holding that double jeopardy barred any future prosecutions arising out of the same transaction.
When "the trial judge is not in an appreciably better position than the reviewing court" to rule on a matter, we review the trial-court rulings. Ex parte Peralta, 87 S.W.3d 642, 645 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.). Because the facts before us are undisputed and the trial court's ruling did not turn on the credibility or demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court's double-jeopardy ruling de novo. See id.
The State's second and fourth arguments assert that charging appellee is not barred by double jeopardy because the State's nonsuits were timely as a matter of civil law, having been taken before any evidence was heard in the case. The State also asserts that, unlike other criminal proceedings, in which jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn, jeopardy does not attach in juvenile proceedings until the trier of fact begins to hear evidence or when the first witness is sworn. We address these contentions together.
Juvenile proceedings and appeals from those proceedings are governed by an unlikely and sometimes perplexing hybrid of civil and criminal law. In re R.S.C., 940 S.W.2d 750, 751-52 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no writ). An appeal from an order of a juvenile court is governed by the requirements pertaining to civil cases generally. TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 56.01(a)(b) (Vernon 2002). A juvenile-delinquency proceeding is considered a civil proceeding, but is quasi-criminal in nature. In re J.R., 907 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ); C.E.J. v. State, 788 S.W.2d 849, 852...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re H.V.
...519, 531, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975); In re J.R.R., 696 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1985). 30. State v. C.J.F., 183 S.W.3d 841, 847 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). 31. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.225(c), 32. 384 U.S. 436, 469-70, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ("[T]he ......
-
In re M.P.
...Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13, 87 S.Ct. at 1436. State v. C.J.F., 183 S.W.3d 841, 847 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (citations omitted); see In re J.S.S., 20 S.W.3d 837, 841-44 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. denied) (appl......
-
In re P.M.
...are limited to adults. In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1, 13, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) ; State v. C.J.F., 183 S.W.3d 841, 847 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court determined in Gault that juveniles are entitled to not......
-
Castro v. State, 01-06-00359-CR.
...when jury is empanelled and sworn); McElwee v. State, 589 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex. Crim.App.1979); State v. C.J.F., 183 S.W.3d 841, 847 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). ...