State v. Cabezuela
Citation | 350 P.3d 1145,2015 NMSC 016 |
Decision Date | 07 May 2015 |
Docket Number | 33,781. |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Adriana CABEZUELA, Defendant–Appellant. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender, Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Nicole Beder, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
{1} This Court previously issued an opinion following Defendant Adriana Cabezuela's first trial in which a jury convicted her of intentional child abuse resulting in the death of her eight-month-old daughter Mariana Barraza (Baby Mariana). See State v. Cabezuela (Cabezuela I ), 2011–NMSC–041, ¶ 1, 150 N.M. 654, 265 P.3d 705 ( ). After we reversed and remanded for a new trial, Defendant was again tried and convicted of the same offense and sentenced to life imprisonment.
{2} On direct appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the district court erred by not holding a presentencing hearing to consider mitigation evidence before imposing a life sentence, (2) the evidence was not sufficient to support her conviction, (3) a forensic pathologist's trial testimony violated Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, (4) the district court improperly instructed the jury by giving UJI 14–610 NMRA (1993, withdrawn 2015), a definition instruction on intent, and (5) Defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. We decide in the State's favor with respect to issues (2) through (4). With respect to issue (1), however, we conclude that the district court should have heard evidence in mitigation before imposing sentence, and we remand to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. With respect to issue (5), we conclude that Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument is more appropriately considered in a habeas corpus proceeding.
{3} Defendant was the mother of six children. The three youngest, including Baby Mariana, resided in the house Defendant shared with her boyfriend, Leonardo Samaniego, Jr. The other three children lived with either their father or grandmother. Samaniego was not the father of any of Defendant's six children.
{4} At approximately 1:45 a.m. on June 14, 2007, Officer Shawn Hardison responded to a 911 call regarding an unresponsive child in Hobbs, New Mexico. Officer Hardison testified that when he arrived, he saw Defendant outside on a cell phone crying and that she asked him to “help her baby.” Inside the house, Officer Hardison found Baby Mariana on the floor, wearing a diaper, and not moving. There were other people inside the house, but no one was attending to Baby Mariana. Baby Mariana was pale or blueish and did not appear to be breathing. When Officer Hardison placed his cold hand on Baby Mariana's chest, she “took a ragged breath” as the ambulance arrived. Emergency medical technicians then took over and transported Baby Mariana to Lea Regional Medical Center (LRMC) where she later died.
{5} While Officer Kathleen Rix was at LRMC for an unrelated matter, a nurse approached her and asked her to look at Baby Mariana. Officer Rix first noticed bruising all along Baby Mariana's right side, because that was the side facing her. Officer Rix testified that when she got a better look at Baby Mariana's entire body, she saw “just bruises pretty much everywhere.” Defendant and Samaniego arrived at LRMC and spoke with one of the emergency room doctors while other medical staff treated Baby Mariana. They left with police officers before medical personnel pronounced Baby Mariana dead.
{6} Defendant spoke with officers at the police station. Initially, she professed not to have any idea how Baby Mariana stopped breathing or how she sustained any of the visible injuries on her body. As the interview evolved, however, Defendant made a number of highly incriminating statements which we discuss in more detail later in this opinion.
{7} A jury found Defendant guilty of intentional child abuse resulting in Baby Mariana's death, and the district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. Defendant appeals her conviction directly to this Court. See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2 (); see also Rule 12–102(A)(1) NMRA ( ).
{8} We take the unorthodox step of proceeding directly to sentencing before discussing the issues relevant to Defendant's conviction. We do so because our legal precedent dictates clearly that Defendant was entitled to present mitigation evidence and have the district court consider reducing her life sentence by up to ten years (one-third of thirty years, the minimum before one becomes eligible for parole). See NMSA 1978, § 31–18–15(A)(1) (2007) ; NMSA 1978, § 31–18–15.1(A)(1) (2009) ; NMSA 1978, § 31–21–10(A) (2009).
{9} Section 31–18–15.1(A)(1) provides:
The court shall hold a sentencing hearing to determine if mitigating or aggravating circumstances exist and take whatever evidence or statements it deems will aid it in reaching a decision to alter a basic sentence[ and] may alter the basic sentence ... upon ... a finding by the judge of any mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense or concerning the offender....
At the sentencing hearing in this case, which appears to have taken no more than two minutes, the State informed the district court that Defendant was “subject to a sentence of life in prison followed by a period of five years parole, which is a minimum mandatory sentence of thirty years” without any provision for mitigation. Defense counsel agreed that “this is a situation where there is a minimum mandatory sentence, thus anything that we discuss here today does not affect that.” Apparently then, both attorneys were operating under a legal misapprehension that a conviction of intentional child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve requires a minimum mandatory sentence of thirty years. Both were wrong, and as a result misled the sentencing court.
{10} Nearly five years ago, we addressed this same issue in State v. Juan, 2010–NMSC–041, ¶¶ 35–42, 148 N.M. 747, 242 P.3d 314. In Juan, we concluded that the Legislature gave district courts “authority to alter the basic sentence of life imprisonment for noncapital felonies,” including intentional child abuse resulting in the death of a child. Id. ¶ 39. See § 31–18–15(A)(1) ( ).
{11} Mandatory life sentences, with or without the possibility of parole after thirty years, are for capital felonies and are not subject to mitigation. See Juan, 2010–NMSC–041, ¶ 42, 148 N.M. 747, 242 P.3d 314 (). Unlike a capital felony, a basic sentence of life imprisonment for a noncapital felony is not a mandatory life sentence and is subject to mitigation. See id. .
{12} It follows that this Defendant was found guilty of a noncapital felony and, as a result, her life sentence was basic, not mandatory. Accordingly, the district court was required to consider mitigation evidence before issuing a final sentence.
{13} In Juan, we discussed the “proper numerical standard by which to measure the [district] court's authority to alter a basic sentence of life imprisonment,” and concluded that it was at the point in time when an inmate becomes eligible for parole. Id. ¶ 41. In this case, that period is thirty years. Id. Section 31–18–15.1(G) provides that “in no case shall the alteration [of a defendant's sentence] exceed one-third of the basic sentence.” Since our opinion in Juan, the district court has had the authority to alter Defendant's basic sentence of life imprisonment by reducing the number of years she has to serve before becoming eligible for parole by up to one-third of the minimum possible sentence, or ten years. As a result, the basic sentence of thirty years before parole eligibility could become as little as twenty years. But that decision can only be made after considering evidence in mitigation, and we remand for that purpose.
{14} Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her verdict, yet, ironically, much of the State's evidence came directly from her own statements to officers presented by the State at trial. “The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v. Duran, 2006–NMSC–035, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In her initial interview with police officers, Defendant changed her story more than once. She first offered that Baby Mariana fell off the bed the previous afternoon. When prodded about what appeared to be bite marks on Baby Mariana's body, Defendant told the officer that her eighteen-month-old child caused them. Defendant later admitted, however, that she had lost control a few times when Baby Mariana was crying and had bitten Baby Mariana on her legs and cheek.
{15} When asked if Baby Mariana's “head could...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Luna
...of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction." State v. Cabezuela , 2015-NMSC-016, ¶ 14, 350 P.3d 1145 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our review involves a two-step process in which we first "view the evidence in the light most......
-
State v. Chavez
...of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction." State v. Cabezuela , 2015-NMSC-016, ¶ 14, 350 P.3d 1145 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to......
-
State v. Anderson
...of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction." State v. Cabezuela , 2015-NMSC-016, ¶ 14, 350 P.3d 1145 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to......
-
State v. Garcia
...Defendant did not raise the issue in the district court, we review for fundamental error. State v. Cabezuela , 2015-NMSC-016, ¶ 37, 350 P.3d 1145. Our analysis "begins at the same place as [the] analysis for reversible error[:]" we ask whether "a reasonable juror would have been confused or......