State v. Campbell, 3683--I

• Decision Date: 15 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 3683--I,3683--I
• Citation: 15 Wn.App. 98,547 P.2d 295
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Clifford Morgan CAMPBELL, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 98

15 Wn.App. 98

547 P.2d 295

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Clifford Morgan CAMPBELL, Appellant.

No. 3683--I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

March 15, 1976.

Peterson, Bracelin, Young & Putra, William R. Creech (Court-appointed), Rochelle Kleinberg, Seattle-King County Public Defender (Court-appointed), Seattle, for appellant.

Christopher T. Bayley, King County Pros, Atty., Jonathan B. Noll, Mary Kay Barbieri, Deputy Pros. Attys., Seattle, for respondent. CALLOW, Judge.

The defendant Clifford Campbell appeals from a conviction of violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. The appeal challenges the warrantless search of the defendant's apartment and the subsequent seizure of seven marijuana plants. We hold that in view of the exigent circumstances confronting the police, the search and seizure were reasonable and affirm.

On October 13, 1974, the defendant's apartment was burglarized. A neighbor saw the burglary in process, observed a fleeing suspect, and summoned the police. Upon arrival, a police officer talked with the eyewitness, was advised of the burglary, and discovered both a broken apartment window and wide-open apartment door. The officer entered the apartment to investigate the recent crime, to look for possible participants in the burglary, to search for evidence of the burglary, and to aid any victims. During the search, the officer opened a closet door in the kitchen of the apartment and found seven marijuana plants growing under artificial light.

The plants were seized and the defendant was charged with a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. A pretrial motion to suppress the marijuana plants on the grounds that the search and seizure were illegal was denied. The plants were admitted into evidence during the trial and the defendant was found guilty.

The question presented is whether the warrantless search of the defendant's apartment and the seizure of the marijuana plants violated the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, article 1, section 7 of our state constitution, and RCW 10.79.040.

The standard by which the propriety of any search and seizure is to be judged is whether the search was reasonable under the facts, circumstances, and exigencies of the particular case. Only unreasonable searches are forbidden. State v. Henneke, 78 Wash.2d 147, 470 P.2d 176 (1970). A warrantless search is initially deemed to be unreasonable subject to certain specific exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Brown, 9 Wash.App. 937, 515 P.2d 1008 (1973). Each of the established exceptions to the requirement that a warrant be secured before search is undertaken is predicated upon a showing that the exigencies of the particular situation made a warrantless search imperative. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948); State v. Smith, 9 Wash.App. 309, 511 P.2d 1390 (1973).

A recognized exception to the requirement for a warrant provides that emergency or exigent situations may justify a warrantless entry into a home. Police officers may enter a dwelling, without a warrant, to render emergency aid to one reasonably believed to be in need of assistance. State v. Sanders, 8 Wash.App. 306, 506 P.2d 892 (1973). See also United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1972), Cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 1951, 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974); United States v. Nash, 394 F.Supp. 1257 (E.D.Wis.1975); People v. Johnson, 32 Ill.App.3d 36, 335 N.E.2d 144 (1975). It is reasonable for officers, responding to a request for police assistance and with probable cause to believe that an open, unsecured dwelling has been recently burglarized, to immediately enter the dwelling without a warrant for the limited purposes of investigating the crime, rendering aid to any possible victims of the felony, protecting the occupant's property, and searching for remaining suspects. Cf. United States v. Langley, 466 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1972); State v. Proctor, 12 Wash.App. 274, 529 P.2d 472 (1974). The circumstances of this case support the conclusion that the officer's warrantless but limited intrusion into the wide-open apartment to investigate the burglary was justified by the situation confronting him and was reasonable.

The search being reasonable, was the seizure of the marijuana plants discovered during the search proper? Under the plain view doctrine, contraband may be seized without a warrant if the police had justification for entering the dwelling and they came upon evidence of the commission of a crime. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra; State v. Murray, 84 Wash.2d 527, 527 P.2d 1303 (1974), Cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004, 95 S.Ct. 2407, 44 L.Ed.2d 673 (1975). Here the exigent circumstances justified the police entry into the apartment for the purpose of investigating the burglary, apprehending perpetrators, protecting property, aiding victims, and discovering evidence. The opening of the closet door was within the permissible scope of the warrantless search justified by the emergency circumstances, and the officer was properly in the performance of his duty when the contraband marijuana plants appeared in plain view. Since the officer recognized that the plants were contraband and could be destroyed or removed, their immediate seizure was proper. State v. Campbell, 13 Wash.App. 722, 537 P.2d 1067 (1975). The warrantless seizure of the marijuana plants, like the initial warrantless search, was justified and reasonable.

The defendant lastly contends that the search was executed improperly for the officer admittedly failed to knock and announce his identity and purpose prior to entering the apartment. He argues that the unannounced entry violated the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, article 1, section 7 of our state constitution, and RCW 10.31.040.

An essential...